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Abstract 
 
This dissertation uses historical recovery and 
rhetorical analysis to argue that the Farmer Labor Party in 
Minnesota in the 1920s and early 1930s was successful in 
its efforts to change the debt relationship between the 
farmer, banker, and the state. The party’s rhetorical 
success helped originate a financial paradigm shift that 
lead to the creation in 1933 of national banking and debt 
structures for the agricultural sector that still exist. 
This dissertation fills in a significant gap in scholarship 
related to discussions of agricultural finance in the 
decade prior to the passage of the Farm Credit Act of 1933 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which includes 
the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933. There are 
additional insights into early efforts at regulation-free 
financialization of agriculture and farm mortgages; a map 
for social movement scholars and practitioners interested 
in altering debt relations and facilitating changes at a 
federal legislative level; and contextualization of New 
Deal agricultural interventions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The American banker and businessman can handle problems as 
they arise without Government aid. . . . economic ills should 
be cured by economic remedies, and not by socialistic 
legislation. –Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, 
March 4, 1925, letter to Minnesota banker Clive Jaffray about 
his agricultural credit company. 
 
Unless something is done for the American farmer we will have 
a revolution in the countryside in less than 12 months. –
Edward A. O’Neal, president of the American Farm Bureau, 
January 25, 1933, about the need for federal legislation to 
stabilize debt crisis in agriculture.  
 
 
The Farm Credit Administration (FCA), which calls 
itself “the largest agricultural lender in the United 
States,” includes on its website multiple pages devoted to 
the history of the agency. Rooting the FCA’s existence in 
the need for a system to counter “the frequent boom-and-
bust cycles that have occurred since the First World War,” 
the history continues, arguing that Congress needed to 
authorize more “suitable credit” options for farmers, 
particularly as “farmers have been among the most 
vulnerable workers to this cycle” (Farm Credit 
Administration 1999a). In its comprehensive list of 
remedies to the problem of farm debt, the website begins 
  2 
the same as most agricultural finance textbooks and other 
histories of the topic with Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, 
William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson’s studies and 
actions, which eventually led to the Federal Farm Loan Act 
of 1916. While that act did establish the 12 Federal Land 
Banks, its focus on long-term loans left unchecked the need 
for short-term lines of credit (generally used to buy seed 
or stock). Hence, Congress passed the Agricultural Credits 
Act of 1923, which created 12 Federal Intermediate Credit 
Banks (FICB) for the purpose of providing low-interest 
loans to agricultural cooperatives, commercial banks, and 
other institutions interested in providing short-term 
credit to farmers (Farm Credit Administration 1999b).  
It is at this point in the history that the Farm 
Credit Administration makes a move that is commonly 
employed by those who write about farm credit systems, even 
in textbooks on the subject (Barry, Peter J. and Paul N. 
Ellinger 2010, 310-318; Kohls, Richard L. and Joseph N. Uhl 
2002, 365-372). The move is to acknowledge that the 1920s 
were difficult for farmers and then to explain that the 
Great Depression made things far worse, leaving farmers 
with debts and expenses they could not pay, which in turn 
caused many to abandon their farms to foreclosure: 
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Expectations that commercial banks would participate 
[in providing agricultural finance] in great numbers 
were not realized, however, and so the FICBs did not 
significantly improve the flow of short-term credit to 
farmers.  
Soon after, the nation was mired in the Great 
Depression. Prices for farm commodities had been 
falling all through the 1920s as the wartime need for 
those commodities ended, but now substantially 
accelerated. Farmers, unable to pay their expenses and 
loan payments, walked away from their farms, leaving 
the FLBs with numerous defaults. By 1933, nearly one-
half of the [National Farm Loan Associations] were 
failing, and farm foreclosures were common. Congress 
stepped in with two new laws. (Farm Credit Association 
1999c) 
 
With the financial situation so dire for the farmer, the 
story goes, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order 
to create the Farm Credit Administration, which supervised 
all agricultural credit facilities (U.S. President 1933), 
and under FDR’s guidance, Congress passed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 (which included the Emergency Farm 
Mortgage Act of 1933) and the Farm Credit Act of 1933. To 
be clear, that is all true. However, the gap in this 
narrative of government-sponsored agricultural finance is 
significant.  
Social movement scholars write about the Farmer Labor 
Party and Populist movements of the 1920s (Holbo, Paul S. 
1963; Mayer, Eugene 1987; Millikan, William 2001; 
O’Connell, Thomas Gerald 1979; Stuhler, Barbara 1973; 
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Valelly, Richard M. 1989); historians write about the 
Coolidge years, the growing desperation of farmers, and the 
shifting meaning of capitalism (Bernstein, Irving 2010; 
Deutsch, Tracey 2010; Gibson-Graham, J.K. 1996; Kennedy, 
David M. 1999; Krippner, Greta R. 2011); rhetoricians write 
about FDR and the New Deal (Stuckey, Mary 2013; Houck, 
Davis W. 2002; Kiewe, Amos 2007). Yet, even in the 
scholarly narratives there is a tendency to avoid an 
investigation into the rhetorical forces that would lead to 
a new debt relationship between farmers, bankers, and the 
federal government.  
 This project begins the important task of filling in 
that gap, exploring a number of questions about this origin 
point of the federal system of agricultural credit, a 
system that still structures much farm debt today. It 
answers such questions as: How was farm debt framed in the 
decade prior to the passage of the acts that would lead to 
the formation of a state-run finance solution? How did 
bankers, farmers, and legislators frame the problem of farm 
debt and what remedies did they suggest? What were the 
dominant and emergent narratives regarding farm debt? What 
role did the Farmer Labor Party play in structuring the 
rhetoric about farm debt and the farm crisis? How did the 
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U.S. come to move agriculture into a new financial paradigm 
that favored state involvement in debt structures over a 
privatized, free-market system?  
To answer those questions, this project focuses on a 
study of the rhetoric of bankers, the Farmer Labor Party, 
and legislators. The rhetorical texts come from a variety 
of period sources, many of which are archival: main-stream 
newspapers, alternative press, memoirs, radio addresses, 
political cartoons, and oral histories. Regarding main-
stream newspaper texts, this project uses articles about 
agricultural finance or farm troubles from the Minneapolis 
Tribune that ran primarily in January 1925 and January, 
March, and May 1933. The New York Times also serves as a 
source for 1933 stories of national import. Those date 
ranges provide a means of limiting the data pool to make 
the project both manageable and focused. Because January 
marks the start of the legislative season it is a 
particularly important month to study. While the 1920s are 
rich terrain generally, 1925 was chosen for study because 
it is midpoint between the end of World War I (when farm 
prices began to plummet) and the passage of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. In 1933 it was 
necessary to look at three months—January, when the session 
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begins; March, when Roosevelt takes office (until 1937, the 
president-elect was not sworn in until March); and May, 
when the bill was finally passed.  
Additionally, rhetoric from the Farmer Labor Party and 
other activist organizations is drawn primarily from 
radical newspapers and from history books written about the 
Farmer Labor Party or radicalism more generally; a memoir 
from a prominent Twin Cities banker in the 1920s is 
considered; and a variety of policy documents and policy-
maker speeches, including the words of Floyd B. Olson and 
FDR, are utilized to gain a broad view of the various 
frames used to consider agriculture in the 1920s (prior to 
the crash of 1929), 1930 to 1933, and in 1933 when the Acts 
were passed. The chapters of this project unfold 
chronologically in the periodization just described.  
This project is based largely on archival material 
from the Minnesota Historical Society. That is not 
coincidental. On an archival visit to the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum in Hyde Park, New 
York, research into former wartime and Washington 
correspondent Lorena Hickok’s role in New Deal policy 
rhetoric uncovered a letter addressed to Harry L. Hopkins, 
director of the Works Project Administration, and carbon 
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copied to Eleanor Roosevelt to share with the President. 
That letter stemmed from Hickok’s October, 1933, visit to 
the Twin Cities, where she learned from multiple sources 
about a scandal related to the banking industry, farm 
mortgages, and questionable land valuations in relation to 
refinancing. Attempts to contextualize that letter led to 
the discovery of the gap in scholarship, but also to the 
knowledge that Minnesota played a powerful part in the 
shaping of agricultural finance at the national level. The 
combination of the state’s long-lasting third party (the 
Farmer Labor Party) and its position as a banking hub of 
the Midwest makes Minnesota’s agricultural and finance 
history a rich resource for the dissertation’s focus; the 
state’s dedication to preserving history at the Minnesota 
Historical Society in the state Capitol made it possible to 
draw from a wide variety of original sources, further 
enabling a richness and variety in the voices used to tell 
this story. 
Significance of Project 
 
In addition to filling in a gap in scholarship about 
this important juncture in the formation of the national 
banking and debt structures used by the agricultural sector 
of the economy, this project also: 1. gives insight into 
  8 
early efforts at regulation-free financialization of 
agriculture and farm mortgages, efforts which ultimately 
failed to be realized, 2. provides a map for social 
movement scholars and practitioners alike who could benefit 
from an example of a successful social movement (Farmer 
Labor Party) that effected change in debt relations on a 
federal legislative level (and still exists today in the 
form of the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party, or DFL), and 3. 
contextualizes the New Deal’s agricultural interventions as 
ideas that had been in development for some time, enabling 
FDR to activate existing rhetoric as he demands compromise 
to institute a new financial paradigm that significantly 
changed the debt relations of farmers, bankers, and the 
government while creating long-lasting structures. 
Chapter 2, which provides most of the insight into 
early efforts at regulation-free financialization of 
agriculture and farm mortgages, contributes to the 
expanding body of work devoted to understanding capitalist 
thinking and the origins of financialization through its 
analysis of the dominant narratives of the period. The 
analysis shows not just the power of the dominant frames of 
bankers but also exposes some of the cracks in the 
narrative’s veneer. Early efforts to drive a wedge into 
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those cracks is discussed in this chapter as well, as the 
early rhetorical work of the Farmer Labor Party in the 
1920s is examined as an emergent narrative of the period. 
In the emergent narrative, spread through the party’s 
educational, protest, and political efforts (including the 
election of Senator Henrik Shipstead on the Farmer-Labor 
ticket), state intervention is called for as a means of 
tempering the profiteering of the few while the many 
suffer. Partly that push toward continued and/or expanded 
private financing for agriculture stemmed from an overly 
inflated confidence in the best practices of industry, 
practices that many bankers and politicians at the time 
expected to apply to farming. Just as important, however, 
was the belief of those in power that a capitalist, free-
market system was the best possible way to run American 
business; it was a belief that ran all the way to the top 
in the person of President Coolidge. 
In Chapter 3, the Farmer Labor Party’s rhetoric is the 
focus, as by 1930, when Floyd B. Olson is elected Governor 
of Minnesota on the Famer Labor Party ticket, the farmer 
activist narrative has shifted into a dominant position 
from an emergent one. That now dominant narrative is one 
that calls for the enactment of a new financial paradigm to 
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replace the failed system explored in Chapter 2. It is 
significant to note in this chapter the powerful and 
lasting effects of a social movement that devoted a decade 
to educating the people (farmers and laborers), organizing 
to further expand the reach of the party, and entering 
directly into politics at the local, state, and national 
level. Too often in rhetorical studies of social movements 
there is a tendency to focus on the stages of the movement, 
a focus that leads to identification of a beginning, 
middle, and end (Tilly, Charles and Lesley J. Wood 2009). 
Under that traditional model, it would be tempting to say 
the Farmer Labor Party “ended” as a social movement when it 
became an effective third party in the powerful Midwest 
state of Minnesota. However, in this chapter, the election 
of Olson is not viewed as an end but rather a strengthening 
of the party to the point that it has the direct power not 
just to change the conversation about farmer debt, but to 
enact actual structural changes in debt relations. For that 
reason, this chapter contributes to the field by showing 
that through consistent rhetorical work, a social movement 
can substantially change the way society functions. 
Chapter 4, the final analysis chapter, is an 
examination of the rhetoric surrounding the Agricultural 
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Adjustment Act of 1933, including the Emergency Farm 
Mortgage Act of 1933 rider, and the Farm Credit Act of 
1933. In the enactment of these bills, agriculture becomes 
accepted as a sector that requires federal oversight and 
involvement. This marks the coming of a new financial 
regime, one made possible largely by the 10-plus years of 
farmer activists insisting upon a new system. This chapter 
contributes to the existing scholarship about the New Deal 
by contextualizing FDR’s agricultural interventions as 
ideas that had been in development--and growing in power 
and acceptance--for many years. Further, rather than 
judging the Acts as “good” or “bad,” the focus here on a 
blending of dominant and emergent narratives adds to the 
understanding of Roosevelt’s political savvy as he 
successfully (at least for the time covered in this 
project) appeases both farmers and bankers. Additionally, 
the unpacking of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 
does important work to historicize a radically different 
effort to stabilize housing, one that can add insight to 
studies of the most recent housing crisis. 
Additionally, this project enters into the growing 
body of rhetorical criticism and analysis of economic 
issues. Rhetoricians conduct criticism of economic issues 
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in three primary ways: first, as historical; second, as 
communicative labor; and, third, as corporate 
control/political economy. In the historical category of 
rhetorical criticism/analysis of economic issues, a 
subcategory into which this dissertation fits well, 
examples of particularly salient work include Xing Lu & 
Herbert W. Simons 2006 Quarterly Journal of Speech article 
“Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders 
in the Post-Moa Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies” and 
G. Thomas Goodnight & Sandy Green’s 2010 Quarterly Journal 
of Speech article “Rhetoric, Risk, and the Markets: The 
Dot-Com Bubble.” Lu and Simons do a fairly traditional 
rhetorical analysis (Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s public address 
work is cited here) of the speeches and other public 
statements of the Chinese Communist Party from 1978 through 
2004 to uncover how the government is able to coordinate 
and impose the shift to a capitalist system, which so 
profoundly clashes with the Marxist/Maoist ideology that 
preceded it. Goodnight and Green, beginning with David 
Zarefsky and rhetorical movement theory, track the movement 
of risk culture into surprising places. Their analysis and 
insights regarding bubbles historically, and the dot-com 
bubble specifically, provide not only sound rhetorical 
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criticism and analysis of an economic issue, but provide a 
different way of looking at crisis that adds depth to 
historically grounded analysis of finance. 
The “communicative labor” category is far and away the 
fastest-growing area of rhetorical research of economic 
issues, beginning with Ronald Walter Greene’s  2004 
“Rhetoric and Capitalism: Rhetorical Agency as 
Communicative Labor” in Philosophy and Rhetoric and 
continuing with work such has Greene’s 2007 Communication 
and Critical Cultural Studies (CCCS) piece titled 
“Rhetorical Capital: Communicative Labor, Money/Speech, and 
Neo-Liberal Governance;” David Carlone’s 2008 CCCS piece, 
“The Contradiction of Communicative Labor in Service Work;” 
Joshua Hanan’s 2010 CCCS “Home is Where the Capital Is: The 
Culture of Real Estate in an Era of Control Societies;” and 
Phaedra Pezzullo’s 2011 CCCS “Boycotts and Buycotts: The 
Impure Politics of Consumer-Based Advocacy in an Age of 
Global Crises.” The final category, research that primarily 
considers corporate control and political economy, is 
exemplified by Jarrod Waetjen & Timothy A. Gibson’s 2007 
CCCS “Harry Potter and Commodity Fetishism: From Text to 
Corporate Intertext” and Davi Johnson’s 2008 CCCS 
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“Psychiatric Power: The Post-Museum as a Site of Rhetorical 
Alignment.” 
Methods 
 
Framing analysis is well accepted as a means of 
unpacking both current events and historical ones, 
providing an important means of tracing the reality that 
“is created through the social process of communication” 
(Johnson-Cartee 2005, Location 105). Primarily, my interest 
lies in the frames used by journalists, social movements 
(membership and leadership), and political and economic 
leaders; their frames serve as a means of gaining a better 
understanding of society’s take on important issues at 
particular times in history. Because journalists, social 
movements, and those in power—be it politicians or bankers—
are at once influenced by those around them as they 
influence those same people, their words can provide 
tremendous insights into the defining events and 
structures, the dominant narratives if you will, of given 
moments in time, which in turn helps us understand the 
frameworks in which we exist now. Or, as Johnson-Cartee 
(2005) reminds us, “News content helps shape our political 
and social reality, for such content contains the political 
mosaics from which we choose to construct our own personal 
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realities” (Location 2961). And, I would add, in addition 
to the sort of “mass-mediated reality” embraced by 
followers of Nimmo and Combs that relies primarily on 
published texts, the unpacking of other powerful voices in 
society—be it social movements or elected officials or 
their aids—helps make sense of the dominant rhetoric of 
society. 
As Catherine Squires (2007) reminds us when drawing 
from Robert Entman’s work on framing, “Individual 
journalists, editors, photographers, sources, and 
institutions consulted by newsmakers all contribute to the 
framing process by selecting and providing particular views 
of an issue, its causes, remedies, and repercussions” 
(Location 142). While Squires’ work uses framing analysis 
to unpack the complicated rhetoric surrounding multiracial 
individuals, mine relies upon frames and narrative as a 
foundational view for understanding differing views of the 
“farm crisis” in the years leading up to the passage of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and the Farm Credit Act 
of 1933. Further, Gary Woodward (2007) has clearly argued 
that narrative is the foundational approach used by 
journalists, as evidenced by the very naming of articles as 
news stories. “The word story is such a basic descriptor of 
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a news event that we tend to forget that it defines a 
unique way for organizing ideas” (Woodward 2007, 36). For 
this project, the specific narrative framework, or type of 
story, that is best suited for tracing the framing of the 
“farm crisis” is the four-pronged approach as described by 
Entman and explicated by Johnson-Cartee (Location 3320-
3336): 1. Define problems, 2. Diagnose causes, 3. Make 
moral judgments, and 4. Suggest remedies. It is with those 
categories in mind that I engage with the texts utilized to 
explore this issue. Such analysis makes way for recognition 
of larger narratives that dominate or emerge at any given 
time. 
In a few rare cases, it is a simple process to break 
out the four frames listed above as separate pieces of the 
story told by reporters, activists, and those in power. 
However, more often the frames tend to merge as the 
narrative moves to tell not only a story but to tell a very 
specific one that encourages listeners and/or readers to 
reach a shared conclusion. It is helpful to turn to the 
work of Edward Schiappa (2003) as he explains that the ways 
in which situations are defined creates a kind of frame 
that generates social influence: 
When we define a situation, that definition  
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becomes a form of social influence by implying what 
are or are not appropriate responses to it. . . . That 
is, when a given phenomenon is named or labeled as 
ecological destruction or as economic development, our 
expectations and evaluations are framed accordingly. 
(151) 
 
As such, we can view competing frames also to be competing 
situational definitions. For example, when a speaker’s 
frame regarding the farming crisis is bracketed by a 
socialist worldview, the problem is likely to be defined in 
terms that incorporate causal issues such as exploitation 
of the working class or failure of government to act as a 
stabilizing influence for the human beings it serves. In 
contrast, when a speaker’s frame is bracketed by a 
capitalist worldview, the problem is likely to be defined 
in terms that would be used to describe any industry, terms 
that tend to favor business over human welfare—for example, 
the crisis might be defined as a problem of too little 
diversification and marketing savvy in the agricultural 
sector. 
 Additionally, the use of framing analysis here is a 
diverse one in that it embraces not just the standard 
domain of mainstream newspaper stories, but also includes 
as much as possible other voices from the time period in 
question. As Judith Butler (2010) illustrates in Frames of 
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War, particularly in the chapter “Torture and the Ethics of 
Photography: Thinking with Sontag,” although the framing of 
an issue in media is often the most easily deconstructed, 
we must consider the frames that come before, after, and 
around the mediated moment under consideration. Therefore, 
it is important for this project to incorporate a study of 
alternative press, social movement rhetoric, policy 
initiatives and policy makers, and others with an interest 
in the topic at hand. 
 It is also important when seeking to uncover the 
various frames visible in such diverse texts to have a 
method for making sense of what emerges as some common or 
shared themes among communicators. For this project, I rely 
upon a rhetorical uptake of Raymond Williams (1977) and his 
Marxism and Literature chapter, “Dominant, Residual, and 
Emergent.” As I use his concepts in the chapters that 
follow, I do so to recognize that shifts in “meanings and 
values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of 
relationships are continually being created.” The 
vocabulary of “dominant” and “emergent” is particularly 
useful as a way to express the widely repeated and 
practiced understanding of farm debt as an economic problem 
to be solved by bankers (dominant) while recognizing that 
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in the same time and space, there can be a growing 
acceptance a new way of framing issues of farm debt by 
activating the federal government to support the interests 
of farmers (emergent). To be clear, when the Farmer Labor 
Party narrative becomes dominant, it does not mean that the 
capitalist banker narrative disappears. It just means that 
culturally more are willing to engage in the rhetoric and 
the social practice of the Farmer Labor Party. Williams’ 
vocabulary is also useful when examining the rhetoric 
surrounding the New Deal agricultural finance changes, as 
it tends to blend the two competing narratives. That 
blending is an important part of a lasting societal shift 
as such shifts are dependent upon “finding new forms or 
adaptations of form” (Williams 1977, 126). In this case, a 
government structured financial solution that serves both 
farmers and bankers. 
 
Williams also works nicely with much of the social 
movement theory that guided the initial work on this 
project. While it can certainly be a useful construct to 
examine social movements in terms of stages, to focus too 
much on delineating a beginning, middle and end runs the 
risk of missing the larger point of the movement—what it 
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can teach us about the drives to push toward change or 
powerful rhetorical moves that bring people together in 
exciting new ways. Therefore, it is important to not 
envision the movement as existing in its own right, but 
rather to always consider it as temporally and materially 
situated. What David Zarefsky (Zarefsky, Stephen E. Lucas, 
and James R. Andrews 2006) terms a “historical” approach to 
the rhetoric of social movements is one that obviously lays 
the pathway to historicization and contextualization of 
movements we study. Lucas, too, pushes us to go beyond 
merely charting the progression or stages of a movement: 
More vital are the further steps of 1) explicating the 
cumulative metamorphosis of discourse in response to 
emerging exigencies imposed from within and without 
the movement and 2) assaying how that metamorphosis 
functions. The passage of a social movement through 
the stages of inception, crisis and consummation is 
less important than the ways rhetoric helps to propel 
the movement from stage to stage or to retard its 
evolution. (Zarefsky, Stephen E. Lucas, and James R. 
Andrews 2006, 140) 
 
The “metamorphosis” approach to conceptualizing what 
happens rhetorically in a movement is a useful one as it 
emphasizes the constant evolution, the cycle of birth and 
rebirth, that happens when people join together to make 
things better. It also meshes well with the fluidity of the 
Williams terms dominant, residual, and emergent.  
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Lucas continues: 
Social movements arise out of and are shaped by the 
dynamic interaction of multifarious and effervescent 
forces. For present purposes, I shall focus on three: 
objective material conditions, rhetorical discourse, and 
the perceptions, attitudes, and values—the 
‘consciousness’ –held by the members. (140) 
  
Basically, Lucas asks that when we study social movements 
and the rhetoric that propels them, that we avoid over-
simplification of the situation. He wants us to see that 
“rhetoric” does not exist independently of all of the other 
things going on in/around/through a movement. As such, 
socio-economic structures matter, demographics matter, 
environmental conditions matter, ethnicity matters, 
identity constructs matter. That thinking underlies the 
study of the Farmer Labor Party, as should be evident from 
the contextualization of the rhetoric examined. 
Roadmap 
 
This project not only fills in a gap in scholarship 
about an financial paradigm shift that lead to the creation 
in 1933 of national banking and debt structures for the 
agricultural sector that still exist, but also: 1. gives 
insight into early efforts at regulation-free 
financialization of agriculture and farm mortgages, efforts 
which ultimately failed to be realized, 2. provides a map 
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for social movement scholars and practitioners alike by 
providing an example of a successful social movement 
(Farmer Labor Party) that effected change in debt relations 
on a federal legislative level, and 3. contextualizes the 
New Deal’s agricultural interventions pre-existing ideas 
that enabled FDR to activate existing rhetoric as he 
demanded compromise to institute a new financial paradigm 
regarding the debt relations of farmers, bankers, and the 
government. 
To recap, in Chapter 2, framing analysis of the 
dominant narratives in 1925 is used to illuminate a time 
when bankers were attempting to establish a successful and 
regulatory-free credit and debt environment to underwrite 
farming. In Chapter 3, the Farmer Labor Party’s rhetoric is 
the focus; by 1930, when Floyd B. Olson is elected Governor 
of Minnesota on the Famer Labor Party ticket, the farmer 
activist narrative had shifted into a dominant positon from 
an emergent one. In Chapter 4, the final analysis chapter, 
the rhetoric surrounding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933, including the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 
rider, and the Farm Credit Act of 1933, is analyzed. It is 
in the enactment of these bills that agriculture becomes 
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accepted as a sector that requires federal oversight and 
involvement. 
In closing, these words from Governor Olson, spoken in 
an address to the Independent Bankers Association in 
Minnesota on August 30, 1933, are offered as a preview of 
the paradigm shift that unfolds in the rhetoric examined in 
the chapters to follow: 
While the concentration of wealth and the concentration 
of the control of our money and credit has been steadily 
accelerated, the misery and distress of the farmer and 
the wage earner who make up the majority of our 
population has been steadily increasing. . . The only 
agency powerful enough to tear down the structure and 
protect the credit system of the United States is the 
federal government. (Olson 1933) 
 
This dissertation explores the rhetorical work done between 
1925 and 1933 that allowed Governor Olson’s diagnosis of the 
farm crisis to take hold in the United States. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Dominant and Emergent Rhetoric of Farm Debt 
 
The 1920s were not so roaring for many in the U.S., in 
particular for those in the rural sectors of the country. 
This chapter keeps at its center an analysis of the 
rhetoric that frames the “farm crisis” in various ways from 
various perspectives during the 1920s with a particular 
focus on Minnesota and its interplay with Washington D.C. 
The focus on Minnesota follows, first, that this state was 
both a banking hub and an agricultural center in the 1920s, 
making it a particularly powerful juncture for a study of 
finance and agriculture; and second, that the Farmer Labor 
Party, which played a significant role in shifting the 
frames of the “farm crisis” during that decade, was 
particularly successful in Minnesota. Rhetorical analysis 
of numerous texts from the period provide insight into 
early efforts at establishing a regulatory-free credit and 
debt environment to underwrite farming. Although such 
frames were indeed dominant through much of the decade, the 
consistent and effective rhetorical pressure of the Farmer 
Labor Party began to change that conversation, moving the 
farmer’s relationship to debt toward a model of federal 
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regulation, thereby forever altering the relationship 
between banks, farms, and the state. This chapter begins 
the work of filling in a gap in scholarship regarding this 
important time in the formation of our national banking and 
debt structures as they relate to agriculture while 
simultaneously contextualizing the New Deal’s agricultural 
interventions as ideas that had been in development for 
more than ten years.  
Known as a time that “farmers’ living standards 
eroded” (Kennedy 1999, 22), the 1920s was also a period of 
tremendous growth for industry. With that growth came a 
recognition that unless the entire country, including rural 
America, experienced rising income, industry itself would 
falter as its consumer market dried up. Even General Motors 
Corp., which had changed the marketing for automobiles by 
introducing its own consumer credit division in 1919 and 
investing $20 million in advertising in the 1920s, by 1926 
reported some recognition that its growth was reaching a 
limit, saying that “volume has now reached such large 
proportions that it seems altogether unlikely that 
tremendous annual increases will continue” (Kennedy 1999, 
22). That was particularly true so long as rural America 
continued to slip into poverty that made buying a tractor a 
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pipe dream, let alone owning a car (Jorgensen 1976, 2).  
Much of the difficulty for farmers followed from the 
sharp rise in prices paid for goods during World War I, a 
time when the U.S. provided much of the food for the war 
effort in Europe. Prices rose so high for commodities such 
as wheat, for example, that the annual price of $2.16 per 
bushel seen in 1919 would not come again until 1947 (USDA 
National 2010). Such a spike caused much questionable land 
to be converted into farmland, particularly in northern 
Minnesota; regardless of the expansion, however, when the 
international market dropped sharply after the war, prices 
were bound to drop. Such radical shifts in pricing and, 
therefore, the ability of farmers and others to pay their 
debts, played a part in liquidity problems experienced by a 
large percentage of rural banks. Regardless of the farm 
crisis and its far-reaching effects into banking and 
industry, the Coolidge administration and the dominant 
voices in media and business still believed that a free 
market was the best market and government intervention was 
a bad path to follow: 
Coolidge appointed to the chairmanship of the Federal 
Trade Commission in 1925 a man who believed the 
commission was ‘an instrument of oppression and 
disturbance and injury,’ a statement that only 
slightly exaggerated conservative opinion about all 
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regulatory agencies. . . . [and] Coolidge occasionally 
emitted pithy slogans that summarized conservative 
Republican orthodoxy. ‘The chief business of the 
American people is business,’ he legendarily 
pronounced in 1925. He declared only somewhat more 
expansively on another occasion that ‘the man who 
builds a factory builds a temple; the man who works 
there worships there.’ (Kennedy, p 33) 
 
That laissez fair approach to government and pro-
business/industry sentiment was one shared by many business 
owners and bankers in the 1920s and quite evident in the 
main stream press of the period. 
 Beginning with rhetorical analysis of the frames 
visible in the mainstream press coverage and memoirs of 
those in power, this chapter will first introduce the 
dominant message that a free market, pro-banking America 
will lead to a better and stronger future for all. The 
chapter then explores the emergent rhetoric of the period 
that counters the dominant message by introducing the 
Farmer Labor Party’s frames that supported early efforts to 
realize a future with strong government involvement in 
public affairs including price stabilization, fair labor 
practices, and debt structures. This chapter will trace the 
narratives created by these frames in preparation for the 
next chapter, which encompasses the period from 1930-1933, 
when the Farmer Labor Party message begins to shift the 
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balance toward government intervention as the economy 
worsens and a foreclosure crisis takes to the fore, 
heightening the demands for government intervention in farm 
debt. In the final chapter the influence of more than a 
decade of conflicting rhetorical constructs will be evident 
in the eventual compromise of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933, which permits a federal government role in 
price stabilization, credit structures, and foreclosure 
intervention, as well as the formation of the Farm Credit 
Administration (by executive order) and the Farm Credit Act 
of 1933, which created the financial infrastructure that 
still dominates agricultural credit today. 
 
Dominant Frames 
 
 The dominant frames regarding farming and “farm aid” 
in the 1920s define the reality of the situation in some 
significant ways, including as an industrial sector with 
terrific potential that suffers from a shortcoming of 
marketing expertise, lack of diversification, and loss of 
liquidity at rural banks. The dominant frames have a 
tendency to reference the “agricultural sector” or farming 
in more general terms, often lumping together crop 
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producers with dairies and cattle ranches, in essence 
situating farming as one among many industries. In 1925, 
roughly the midway point between the end of World War I 
(when demand for U.S. farm products declined dramatically) 
and the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and Farm 
Credit Act (with the Farmer Labor Party still in its early 
years of organizing, educating, and publicizing its 
socialist-infused message) the dominant framing of the 
problem with farming is clearly defined by bankers such as 
Clive Jaffray of First National Bank and by legislators who 
had the backing of big banking, as reflected in the reports 
of the pro-business, anti-Communist leading newspaper, the 
Minneapolis Tribune. 
Focusing on the coverage from January of 1925, as 
agriculture is heavily covered at the start of each 
legislative session and “outlook” stories abound, the frame 
is clear: if there is a problem with agriculture, it is 
caused by too much government interference/legislation and 
not enough focus on marketing of products. The relationship 
between the farmer and debt is one that is framed as best 
handled by bankers in a regulation-free environment. 
Frequently, articles talk about banks doing very well, farm 
debt being repaid because of a great wheat crop, and, when 
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problems are alluded to or “farm aid” called for, it is 
consistently framed as a need for more lines of credit, 
greater diversification, and better marketing practices. 
 An article authored by Edward W. Decker--a prominent 
banker in the region as president of Northwestern National 
Bank of Minneapolis, the visionary behind banking 
consolidation in the Midwest, and an active supporter of 
the anti-union Citizens Alliance group (Millikan 2001, 
235)-- makes important moves to define agriculture first 
and foremost as a business. That work begins with the 
story’s headline: “Business Said to Have Taken Turn for 
Better” and the subhead: “Northwestern National Bank 
President Foresees Good Times in New Year” (1925, 1). 
Already in the headline and subhead we can see a narrative 
forming in which the desire for “good times” is expressed 
while the conflicts surrounding prices for farm goods are 
concealed as readers are asked to look to a future where 
the expert/banker envisions a rosy economic scene. In the 
text of the article, Decker definitively frames any prior 
problems in the agricultural sector as well as the few 
lingering problems as the result of too much legislation 
and poor business practices in the past, while suggesting 
that through “sound economic principles” and improved 
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methods as remedies, “our people” will have a better year. 
Decker tells readers: 
Everything indicates that we have now turned the 
corner of prosperity in this district and are now 
facing much better and more promising times for the 
future. It would not be a correct statement to say 
that our troubles are all behind us, as there are some 
sections which will need one or two more good crops 
and fair prices to put them in really normal condition 
. . . . We have learned better what we knew before—
that only sound economic principles can exist in any 
line of industry, and that our fundamental ills are 
not cured by legislation. 
 
While the farmer is never mentioned directly, agriculture 
as an industry is clearly assessed as a part of the economy 
that must exist outside of government interference, or, in 
other words, in a free-market, capitalist system. 
Legislation is the problem, free-market economic principles 
the solution. The farmer/debt relationship is framed as one 
that must exist without legislation. Rather, what is needed 
are a few more seasons with “good crops” and “fair prices,” 
a frame that at once points to the perceived power of the 
free market while failing to account for the relationship 
between prices and production. That failure to reconcile 
increased production with lower prices is one way that the 
rhetorical frame, while still dominant, begins to show some 
cracks. 
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 Decker also weaves moral judgments throughout his 
piece, beginning with the opening paragraph in which he 
writes, “Providence has been very kind to us, in that we 
received a bountiful crop in practically all lines of farm 
products, and as production in many other parts of the 
world was well below normal, we have received an unusually 
high price.” Indeed the implication is clear that the 
righteous--in this case the people of the Ninth Federal 
Reserve District--are rewarded in the global market, even 
if such rewards come through the suffering of others. 
Again, a lack of clarity in describing the economic 
situation at once illustrates the banker’s understanding of 
the free market at an almost theological level while 
failing to reconcile the reliance on “unusually high 
prices,” which rhetorically opens some cracks in the 
dominant narrative for an emergent one. In his closing 
paragraph, Decker again evokes a righteous moral tone when 
framing remedies: 
Our people look forward to the year 1925 with renewed 
courage and hope and also with renewed determination 
to do our work better than ever before. We are 
diversifying more in our farming; we are learning 
better methods of doing business; we are making 
scientific investigations which are bound to improve 
our methods in every way. 
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While his reference to scientific investigations is not 
fully explained, other than praise for “eradication of the 
teaberry bush,” apparently a carrier of black rust (which 
hurts wheat crops), it is likely an allusion to the new 
University of Minnesota “science” of the time that showed 
that better care of dairy cows (meaning better feed and 
room to roam) yields not just greater milk production but a 
higher percentage of butter fat and protein (1925a, 2)1. It 
is important to note Decker’s focus on “diversifying” and 
“learning better methods of doing business,” as such 
phrases do important work to frame the remedy for the farm 
problem in terms that enfold agriculture into a larger 
economic model. Further, his use of the pronoun “we” in the 
closing paragraph frames a scenario in which this hard-
working, righteous “we” engages in better 
business/industrial practices through diversification, 
leading to a bright and hopeful future for all. This 
Providence-fueled success is instructional in tone, as a 
Pastor might suggest that “we” do the right thing, exposing 
                                                 
1 This article is an interesting one from a morality frame standpoint, as 
it claims that “Cow testing associations not only locate the low 
producing cows, but reveal the kind of dairy farmers their owners are; 
They measure men as well as cows.” The better the farmer’s cows’ butter 
fat and protein production, the better the farmer is as a person. 
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the patriarchal2 nature of those who manage the lines of 
credit used by the farmer debtor. 
 The Decker-authored article accompanies the lead story 
on the page, a reprint from the New York Evening Post with 
the headline: “Farm Economic Position Found Much Stronger” 
and two subheads: “Last Six Months Shows Great Wheat 
District Improvement” and “Increased Returns from Higher 
Acre Yields Are Factor” (Mayer 1925, 2). The piece is 
authored by the Managing Director of the War Finance 
Corporation (he would later head the Federal Reserve Bank), 
which the National Archives describe as “an independent 
agency,” established in 1918, that provided “support to war 
industries and banks that aided them, and assisted in the 
transition to peace” (United States National Archives and 
Records Administration 2011). The WFC was also involved in 
agricultural loans and cooperative marketing associations. 
While this article is most useful for witnessing the 
lead-up to the gross overvaluation of farms and farm 
mortgages that would contribute to the foreclosure crisis 
of the early 1930s, it is also significant for its framing 
of what problems it sees with farming as happenstance: “Low 
                                                 
2 By “patriarchal” here I mean that in replicating the tone of a sermon, 
Decker rhetorically structures his conversation with the farmer as a 
father would instruct a child. 
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yields, low prices and unfavorable conditions, coupled with 
accumulated burdens over a series of years, brought about a 
serious situation, which was intensified by the failure of 
a considerable number of banks.” The article downplays this 
early status of agriculture, claiming that banks are doing 
better than ever and that “agriculture as a whole is in 
better shape than it has been for many years,” success it 
frames as a result of good crop yields and better business 
practices leading to higher profit. The transference here 
between the farm problem and a banking problem is also an 
interesting one, as by defining the problem in terms of 
bank failure, it implies that an appropriate remedy would 
be one that secures the banking industry.  
As with the Decker narrative, Mayer, too, speaking 
both of farmers and for them, supports the banking industry 
narrative that all is well and will keep getting better so 
long as sound economic principles are followed, namely 
those that treat farming like an industrial business.3 In 
                                                 
3 To be clear, industrialization of the farm in the 1920s did not mean 
the same thing as it does today when we have dairy farms with 10,000 
head and corporate-owned grain farms spanning thousands of acres that 
are harvested by computer-programed harvesters. While arguably the 
1920s could be pointed to as an origin point for the industrialization 
we now see, at that time it primarily meant diversification, increased 
use of tractors and processing equipment, and a Fordist approach to 
improving production. 
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the opening paragraph of the article, the positive 
narrative is clear: 
‘The war is over at last.’ That remark was made to me 
recently by a man who is in close touch with 
agricultural conditions. It is not, of course, to be 
taken in the literal sense. It was merely intended to 
express the state of feeling that exists today in many 
agricultural communities. It does not mean that 
everything, everywhere, is rosy and that all the ill 
effects resulting from the chaos and disorganization 
of war have disappeared. It does not mean that there 
is nothing more to be done to place our agricultural 
industry on a sound economic basis, or that all the 
difficulties of the past three or four years have been 
met and overcome. But it does mean that today 
agriculture as a whole is in better shape than it has 
been for many years. 
 
Not only is the frame of a better economic future visible 
here along with the recovery narrative, but so, too, is the 
framing of the banker as patriarch who must explain to the 
“children of agriculture” that continued hard work is 
necessary to bring agriculture into the industrial economic 
model. 
By observing the frame of a recovery narrative, the 
positive spin on the farm sector gives insight into the 
early focus by the dominant class on a regulation-free 
business and banking environment. In that environment, a 
better future is possible, one with strong returns on wheat 
crops that will fuel a return to liquidity for banks, the 
author claims “that today agriculture as a whole is in 
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better shape than it has been for many years, and that the 
1924 farming operations have greatly strengthened its 
economic position.” While it was certainly true that wheat 
prices were higher in 1924 (at a yearly average of $1.24 
per bushel, up from 92 cents per bushel the prior year 
according to USDA historical data), prices were still a far 
cry from the $2.16 per bushel paid out in 1919 when global 
demand from the war spurred rising prices along with 
increased production. When considering the positive frame 
of this narrative, it is important to note not just what is 
specifically named but also what is not. Specifically in 
this case, the lack of prices named in the piece is 
significant; this is an article that shares a dizzying 
array of figures, from crop yields per acre to total wheat 
production to gross income expected from tobacco—yet the 
commonly used measure of price paid per bushel is not 
listed. It enables the author to make positive claims of 
prosperity through use of “evidence” that only tells part 
of the story, helping to support the overall framing that 
regulation is not needed as “fair prices” will be set by 
the market, not by the government. 
Even when referencing livestock problems in the West, 
the article focuses on the positive news that there has 
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been “considerable liquidation of old indebtedness,” which 
helps the banks and therefore the communities, while the 
article claims that “the industry is gradually but slowly 
getting upon a firmer foundation,” though it fails to 
specify what caused the livestock problem in the first 
place or how the recovery is possible (other than the 
retired debt and general references to good economic 
practices). So, again, by leaving important facts out of 
the article, it is possible to frame the current problem of 
drought and indebtedness for cattle feed as a problem from 
the past that is being remedied through farmer repayment of 
debt without giving any specifics as to costs incurred when 
moving cattle to different land. It is a positive narrative 
that is all the more troubling when viewed from the 
present, as regardless of the positive spin, things were 
about to get considerably worse for both growers of grain 
and the cattle industry. 
 In the same January 1 “outlook for the new year” issue 
as the Decker and Mayer articles is one authored by another 
prominent banker, Francis A. Chamberlain, president of 
First National Bank in Minneapolis. Chamberlain, like 
Decker, was an active supporter of the anti-union Citizens 
Alliance as well as a founder of the American Committee of 
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Minneapolis (ACM), which used patriotism and propaganda as 
tools in its efforts to undermine the Municipal Nonpartisan 
League (a predecessor to the Farmer Labor Party) by 
focusing attention on members’ former ties to the Socialist 
Party (Millikan 2001, 43-44). The headline of his article 
is “Wonderful 1924 Grain Crops Are Called Life Saver,” run 
with the subhead, “Farmers and Business Men Benefit by 
Paying Up Indebtedness.” From a definitional standpoint, 
the problem is immediately framed as one of unpaid debt, a 
problem remedied by repayment of debt fueled by “wonderful” 
crop output. Chamberlain leads with:  
The Northwest should be and, without doubt, is 
grateful for its wonderful grain crops of 1924. They 
came as a veritable life saver to the farmers and to 
business men [sic] generally. This combination of one 
of the largest harvests in Northwest history, with the 
unusual prices at which it is being marketed has 
resulted in the payment of a vast amount of 
indebtedness, much of it long past maturity. 
 
In his rejoicing over a good grain crop and repayment of 
debt, he frames problem, cause, and remedy at once by 
suggesting that past-due debts, caused by lesser crops in 
the past, are a problem remedied by “wonderful” crops and 
repayment of loans to banks. Both his use of “unusual” and 
“wonderful” to describe prices and crops, respectively, 
echo the other banker frames that point to a providence-
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fueled and surprising turn of events in their praise of 
free-market sensibilities. Again, this explanation, which 
does not account for price to production valuations, opens 
some cracks in the dominant narrative, making way for the 
emergent narrative that will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
 Further on in the article the frames are reinforced 
when Chamberlain writes that “This new money has put the 
farmers on their feet or at least helped them in a 
remarkable way toward improving their financial positions.” 
So, then, the problem for farmers, when there is one, is 
having a poor “financial position” and bad debts. Everyone, 
including banks and “business men generally,” benefit when 
debt obligations are met. Outside of this frame, of course, 
is the quality of the debt issued by the banks as well as 
the fact that the prices paid for the wheat crop are still 
about half what was paid per bushel for the same size crop 
five years earlier. In other words, Mr. Chamberlain’s 
joyful outlook for the year is one that privileges bankers 
and businesses that lend to or profit from farming and does 
little to explicate the complicated financial mire in which 
many farmers found themselves. It is a narrative that 
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illustrates the dominant frame of the regulation-free 
farmer debtor/banker creditor relationship. 
 Looking back to the subhead’s claim of “benefit” 
following the “paying up of indebtedness,” the moral tone 
is one that frames the repayment of debt as good for the 
farmer and the community. There is no concurrent moral 
assessment of the debt itself, but rather an assumption 
that it is right and good that the farmers’ improved 
“financial positions . . . enables banks to collect a very 
large amount of paper that, under less auspicious 
conditions, would have been classified, necessarily, as 
doubtful or slow.” Finally, in the last paragraph a similar 
moral tone to that used by Decker is evident in 
Chamberlain’s references to “intrinsic wealth4” and 
“courage” of the masses:  
I am looking forward to the New Year with sincere 
confidence that Minneapolis, Minnesota and the 
Northwest will make further substantial progress 
toward a condition of true prosperity, in line with 
their intrinsic wealth. One crop, no matter how 
excellent, will not solve all financial problems, we 
all know. But this one has brightened the general 
outlook tremendously and given everyone renewed 
courage to face the future. 
                                                 
4 I do not believe the phrase as used here is meant to be “intrinsic 
value,” which is a term commonly used either to describe the value of 
call or put options on stocks in relation to their market price or to 
describe the result of a method used by financial analysts that, while 
comparable to market value, is separate from it (Downes and Goodman 
1991). 
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The implication is clear that with courage, hope, and hard 
work the righteous will be rewarded when the “intrinsic 
wealth” of the Northwest is realized. “Intrinsic wealth” is 
a phrase that connotes a morality in which those deserving 
of reward (namely, those who repay their debts, have 
courage, and work hard) will reap a financially bright 
future. 
 This realization of wealth and financial reward is 
also indicative of the narrative that frames positively the 
desire for increased wealth and a strong banking system 
ensured not by legislation but by “farmers” and “business 
men” doing the right thing; in other words, free of 
regulation and abiding by sound economic practices. 
Further, his defining of the crop as “one of the largest 
harvests in Northwest history” and his combining that claim 
with the repayment of debt creates a narrative in which 
farmer, business man, and bank all benefit from good crops 
and good behavior. His rousing good cheer on the subject is 
not unlike the press releases that often accompany poor 
earnings reports from a corporation, in that an effort is 
made to draw attention to a relatively positive number (in 
this case the large harvest) rather than on the more dismal 
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aspects of the report. Again, when looking at the framing 
of the issue by this banker, it is vital to note what is 
excluded from the data. While USDA statistics do indeed 
show that 1924 was the largest harvest since the 1919 peak, 
since prices were coming in at almost half what was paid 
five years earlier, the crop size is far less relevant than 
the bushel price. To envision crop size as a solution is to 
emphasize efficiency of production as the best way for 
farmers to move forward and fails to take into account sale 
of product or associated debt. It essentially orients 
production/supply without consideration of the complex 
relationship between crop production and prices. Finally, 
it is a narrative frame that again silences the distress 
many farmers experienced over grain prices while placing 
Chamberlain’s privileged voice in the role of patriarch 
exclaiming the joy of the situation. Here he claims to 
speak as an authority on this subject, but it is an 
authority inherent in the hierarchy that gives his money 
and position of power greater value than that of the people 
who actually deal with the grain production and associated 
financial hardships.  
 In an Associated Press article with a Washington, 
D.C., dateline, the capitalist views on farming as just 
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another industry in need of better business practices is 
the clear frame. Headlined “Leaders Seek Enactment of 
Farmer Relief,” by “relief” the article means a plan to 
extend more credit to “agriculture,” particularly the 
cattle industry (1925, 1). This article marks one of the 
first times that mention is made of marketing cooperatives 
as a solution to the “farm problem,” clearly implying that 
if farmers learn proper marketing techniques and learn to 
band together to behave more like other industries at least 
in scale and ability to sell, things will be better. So, 
here, then, the problem for the farmer is defined in terms 
of not having large enough lines of credit and a lack of 
marketing expertise to sell product. In as much as a cause 
of the problem is suggested, it is a somewhat vague 
reference to the cattle industry being “declared by the 
[President’s agricultural] commission members to have been 
the most affected by the depression, although the prospect 
now is brighter.” Government involvement is suggested here, 
but only as a means of helping organize the cooperatives. 
To be clear, the formation of cooperatives, which was 
generally favored by farming organizations both to save 
money on storage and processing equipment and to enable a 
stronger negotiating position with retailers, is framed in 
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the dominant narrative as a corrective for controlling the 
supply side of the equation and stabilizing prices. With 
higher prices, in this framing, farmers are able to pay 
their debts. The potential for a more just society through 
cooperatives often promoted by clergy (Dietrich, 1933) and 
leftist farm groups does not come into the discussion in 
the dominant narrative, once again providing the potential 
for the emergent frame to take hold. Additionally, while 
this article is a short one, it does reflect the ongoing 
narrative of a positive outlook for a “brighter” future, 
one that will be achieved through best business practices 
and greater use of debt. Even in this fairly mundane story 
about the work of congressional leaders regarding problems 
with farming, the message is clear that government 
intervention is not the answer.  
 Cooperative marketing as the primary means of 
providing relief is praised by the paper in its article 
about the outgoing governor Preus headlined: “Preus’ Term 
Is Notable for Farm Relief,” with the subhead: 
“Establishment of Cooperative Marketing Is One of Biggest 
Achievements” (Minneapolis Tribune 1925c, 2). The paper 
praises Preus for being “an enthusiastic advocate of 
cooperative marketing” rather than relying on too much 
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involvement from the state in the affairs of business and 
agriculture. In other words, it clearly reflects the frame 
that a regulation-free environment is preferred in relation 
to farming. It further rejoices in Preus efforts to help 
found the Rural Credit Bureau, which extended lines of 
credit to farmers using the farmland and chattel as 
collateral (which had disastrous results by 1930). Again, 
the problem (suggested through the framing of the remedies) 
for which “relief” was provided in this frame was the 
problem of not enough credit and a need for better 
marketing by farmers.  
 Throughout the year, the newspaper continues to cover 
the “farm problem” and “farm relief” in roughly the same 
frame, be it from the national level with President 
Coolidge’s efforts to institute a federal program to teach 
cooperative marketing across the country to more lines of 
credit and a growing farm mortgage market, all implying 
that the biggest problem farmers face is lack of credit and 
marketing savvy. So dominant was the free-market sentiment 
and focus on farming as an industry like any other that 
even the so-called laissez faire Coolidge was considered 
too ambitious in his efforts to have federal oversight of 
the co-operative marketing program developed by his 
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agricultural committee5. The legislation produced by his 
committee was replaced in February of 1925 with a version 
that removed all federal control, creating instead a board 
that would offer advice when solicited. Regarding the 
revised bill, the paper does quote Michigan Republican 
Representative Williams as saying, “You might as well go 
out on the capitol steps and give three rousing cheers for 
the farmers’ economic recovery so far as doing the farmers 
any good. It merely provides for $500,000 worth of free 
advice” (Minneapolis Tribune 1925b, 1). However, that quote 
marks the second-to-last paragraph in an article that 
otherwise implies the logic of Congress in its decision to 
replace the original legislation with its advisory version. 
Again we see the dominant framing of farming and farm debt 
as an industry that must remain free of government 
regulation. 
 For further insight into the pro-capitalism framing of 
farm debt in the 1920s, one banker’s memoir from the period 
is quite illuminating. Clive Jaffray was a man of 
considerable influence in the Twin Cities; besides his role 
in First National Bank, he is credited with the founding of 
                                                 
5 The Federal involvement would have been a cooperative marketing board 
that would aid in management and development of cooperative marketing 
associations throughout the country. 
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the Minikahda Golf Club (where powerful leaders of banks, 
businesses, and the Citizens Alliance anti-union business 
group would meet), with being a founding investor in The 
Blake School preparatory academy for the sons of the elite, 
a founder of the Minneapolis Civic and Commerce 
Association, and President of the Soo Railroad (Millikan 
2001, 77, 243, 387, and 407). He was also closely involved 
with the successful efforts to consolidate Midwest banking, 
which established the Twin Cities as a financial leader 
domestically and globally. 
 Reading Clive Jaffray’s memoirs, which he dictated to 
his secretary and donated to the Minnesota Historical 
Society himself, sometimes feels like it must be an 
accidental delving into an early draft of Atlas Shrugged. 
As was the case with many of the 1920S capitalists who 
placed themselves and their endeavors on the highest 
possible wrung of the hierarchy they created, Jaffray was 
very proud of his financial endeavors (actually, of all of 
his endeavors, including his golf swing). His tone 
throughout his memoir, a unique genre that is less about 
establishing historical truths and more about telling a 
truthful self-narrative as one remembers it, is one of 
self-aggrandizement that never admits fault or failure——
  49 
when the Soo Railroad stops doing well while he is in 
charge, he frames his decision to leave his post as 
president as a logical step since the company had outlived 
its usefulness. He even talks about his first job 
delivering newspapers in heroic terms, as if this boyhood 
endeavor ought to be marked as a first step on his journey 
to Capitalist Sainthood. His haughty persona, while amusing 
at times, more importantly showcases the belief of mid-
1920s capitalists in America that knowing how to make money 
gives them a right to shape the society in which the rest 
live, particularly since few are likely to have his “gift” 
for finance—and especially not farmers.  
Jaffray lists his many accomplishments in mostly 
chronological order and includes the formation of the 
Agricultural Credit Corporation, an organization whose 
questionable dealings would eventually bring him to the 
attention of President Roosevelt because of a highly 
critical letter drafted by New Deal field reporter and 
friend to Eleanor Roosevelt, Lorena Hickok. Jaffray says in 
his memoir that the idea for the organization came after a 
meeting with President Coolidge in Washington (sometime 
between 1920 and 1925, the date is not clear) during which 
the Twin Cities bankers asked Coolidge for help stabilizing 
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the banking crisis in the Midwest. After the meeting, 
Jaffray and several of his Twin Cities banking friends were 
gathered for some after-dinner conversation at the house of 
Eugene Mayer, (one of the authors featured above) who would 
later become president of the Federal Reserve Bank, during 
which time “a discussion arose as to the best way of 
securing help without depending on the government” (1956, 
42). It is interesting to note that despite the gathering 
following meetings with President Coolidge, Jaffray frames 
the discussion in terms of finding ways for business to 
work without help from the government, further illustrating 
the narrative shared with his peers in which government-
free financial success is so strong that any conflicting 
reality is not pulled into the story in a meaningful way.  
Jaffray continues his story, explaining that Mayer and a 
New York businessman suggested to the group that there 
might be a way to help the bankers and farmers in the Twin 
Cities area without involving the government: namely, that 
they could raise private capital which would be used to 
make loans to banks and farms as a means of stabilizing the 
economy. The New York businessman, Clarence Wooley, agreed 
to put up $5 million in capital if the Twin Cities bankers 
would do the same to get things started. They accomplished 
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the $10 million goal in a matter of days and formed the 
Agricultural Credit Corporation, which sold ten-year income 
bonds (primarily to East Coast and Chicago investment 
firms) through its holding company, the Agricultural 
Securities Corporation (Jaffray). It is immediately clear 
that Jaffray frames the problem with farming as, first, a 
problem of banks lacking liquidity, and secondarily as a 
problem of a lack of investment income for farmers, a 
problem whose remedy is more lines of credit. Of course, 
those lines of credit are to be provided through private 
banking interests free of government interference or 
regulation. 
Jaffray, working with cash raised largely through East 
Coast investors, reported that  
Work was then begun to help out needy banks by 
furnishing them money and keeping them from failing. 
In 1925, business began to improve, our crops were 
good, and as a result, we stopped lending money to 
banks. We then thought it would be wise to help good 
farmers [emphasis mine] diversify their operations by 
buying live stock. (42)  
 
Jaffray goes on to say that this venture “proved very 
successful” (43), particularly for farmers in North and 
South Dakota as well as Minnesota. The moral implications 
are quite clear, as is the ideological framework. First, 
“good farmers” should be extended lines of credit so that 
  52 
they can “diversify,” or, in other words, treat their farms 
like any other industry, one that will benefit from 
diversified growth. Of course, neither crops nor livestock 
can be counted on for consistent production in the way that 
factory goods can be counted on to have consistent output; 
drought and economic hardship nationally made it impossible 
for farmers to pay back the loans to Jaffray’s company (at 
least until much later when government intervention would 
change the game, as will be discussed later). 
Another glimpse into the framing of the problem by 
Jaffray and his class is present in the letter of praise 
Jaffray inserts into his memoir in response to the “success 
of the company,” a letter written by then-Secretary of 
Treasury Andrew W. Mellon. In the letter, Mellon writes in 
response to a copy of the annual report of the holding 
company: 
I have read this report with interest. I think you and 
your associates are entitled to the greatest credit 
for the effective assistance which you have rendered 
in allaying the disturbed agricultural condition in 
the northwest. To be able to do this on a business 
basis, with private capital and without calling upon 
the National Treasury for subsidies, shows that the 
American banker and businessman can handle problems as 
they arise without Government aid. Your work has been 
a distinct contribution to the argument that economic 
ills should be cured by economic remedies, and not by 
socialistic legislation. (43-44) 
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Mellon goes on to close the letter by thanking Jaffray and 
his associates for their accomplishments on behalf of “the 
Treasury,” “the Administration,” as well as “those 
interested in sound government.” The problem of the 
“disturbed agricultural condition” is a frame that 
practically erases the farm and the farmer, or at the very 
least reduces the farm to just another industry that can 
only benefit from the insights of businessmen and bankers. 
Further, by the use of the phrase “socialistic 
legislation,” Mellon is defining as un-American government 
policies that might legislate banking and finance 
industries. Obviously, that which is “un-American” in this 
context is bad; therefore non-interference is good.  
 In both the memoir and the letter from Mellon the 
shared narrative of an abundant future in which the 
“industry” of agriculture thrives, particularly for “good 
farmers” and the bankers who fund them, is evident. It is 
particularly interesting that this narrative was powerful 
enough for Jaffray to hold onto even with the benefit of 
hindsight. Although he dictated and donated his memoir 
three decades later and almost 25 years after the federal 
government had stepped in to bail out farmers and the 
bankers who made poor bets on agriculture’s financial 
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future, still he holds to the frame that the free market is 
good, government interference is bad, and farming is an 
industry made strong through better banking and business 
practices. Jaffray’s choice to tell a tale that completely 
writes out the considerable conflict surrounding his 
Agricultural Credit Corp also illustrates the power of his 
shared narrative and framing of a government-free farm 
credit system in that had the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
not passed some years later, his Agricultural Credit Corp 
likely would have been a complete loss.  
Although it is not particularly surprising that 
Jaffray chooses not to address any negatives about the 
Agricultural Credit Corporation, it is striking to read so 
much detail about a company and then to have the author 
abruptly stop discussing it. For example, he lists the 
precise dollar amounts of the initial capital investment by 
city: New York City, $2,247,000; Boston, $155,000; 
Philadelphia, $330,000; etc. (42). Yet, after his 
reprinting of a Minneapolis Tribune story praising company, 
he moves right into his railway conquests of 1926 and 1927, 
then jumps ahead to 1933 but only to discuss railways (44-
45). No further mention is made of his capitalist endeavor 
to financialize farm debt. Of course, if he did explain how 
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the company’s existence ended, even without the scandalous 
part thrown in, it would undermine his pro-capitalist, 
positive narrative substantively. The company ceased to 
exist in 1933 when government-backed loans (courtesy of the 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933) were used to repay all 
of the private loans issued by Jaffray’s group. Had the 
company not been able to get its paper refinanced with 
government money, Jaffray himself would have to have taken 
substantial losses instead of passing those on to the 
investors from other cities. 
To summarize, the dominant frames surrounding farming 
and finance in the mid-1920s in Minnesota were those 
established by bankers and the mainstream press. Those 
voices primarily framed problems as a lack of lines of 
credit, framed causes as insufficient business savvy on the 
part of farmers, passed moral judgment on “good farmers” as 
those who pay their debts, and framed the best remedies as 
increased lines of credit provided through private (meaning 
non-government) means to enable diversification and 
improved production and sales. While undoubtedly the 
dominant narrative of the time envisioned a bright future 
in line with those frames, a different, competing narrative 
was gaining in strength amid the farmer class. In this 
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competing narrative, the problems, causes, remedies, and 
moral judgments are quite different and all point to a need 
for the involvement of the state in agriculture. 
 
Emergent Frames 
 
The Farmer Labor Party is arguably one of the most 
important organizations to consider when tracking the 
framing of “farm crisis” in the 1920s and 1930s as it 
stands as a powerful counter to the dominant frames 
represented in the mainstream press and its related 
oligarchy.6 In the 1920s, the party, formed at the end of 
the prior decade, was effectively using education, 
organized protests, and politics to push its ideology. To 
situate the movement so that it is clear how and why its 
rhetoric had such force despite its members’ low ranking on 
the social and economic hierarchy I will begin here with a 
brief introduction of the Farmer Labor Party. Although its 
own organization, the Party’s mission was rooted in the 
goals of the Working People’s Non-Partisan League platform 
of 1919, which called for: “the eight hour day and forty-
                                                 
6 Millikan refers to the bankers of this period as the oligarchy of the 
Twin Cities, specifically including Jaffray, Decker, and Chamberlain, 
among others. 
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four hour week; the establishment of cooperatives; state 
compensation for injured workers; equality of men and women 
and equal pay; abolition of unemployment; public ownership 
of railroads, banks, terminal grain elevators, and public 
utilities” (O’Connell 1979, 10). Beyond pursuing what was 
then considered a socialist platform, the Famer Labor Party 
marked the beginning of one of the longest-lived and most 
successful third-party state governments in Minnesota.  
The FLP is the stuff of legend and even song. Sung to 
the tune of “Wabash Cannonball,” “Farmer-Labor Train” is 
among my favorite Woody Guthrie tunes from the Asch 
collection recorded in 1944, and its lyrics do a terrific 
job relating the spirit of this complicated social movement 
while at the same time exposing some of the dominant frames 
evident in the rhetoric surrounding the party, frames that 
point to the need for legislative remedies to farm 
problems: 
  Farmer-Labor Train (by Woody Guthrie) 
From the high Canadian Rockies to the land of Mexico, 
City and the country, wherever you may go, 
Through the wild and windy weather, the sun and sleet and rain, 
Comes a-whistlin' through the country this Farmer-Labor train. 
 
Listen to the jingle and the rumble and the roar, 
She's rollin' through New England to the West Pacific shore. 
It's a long time we've been waitin', now she's been whistlin' 
'round the bend, 
Roll on into Congress on that Farmer-Labor train. 
 
There's lumberjacks and teamsters and sailors from the sea, 
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There's farmin' boys from Texas and the hills of Tennessee, 
There's miners from Kentucky, there's fishermen from Maine; 
Every worker in the country rides that Farmer-Labor train. 
 
There's warehouse boys and truckers and guys that skin the cats, 
Men that run the steel mills, the furnace and the blast, 
Through the smoky factory cities, o'er the hot and dusty plains, 
And the cushions they are crowded, on this Farmer-Labor train. 
 
Listen to the jingle and the rumble and the roar, 
She's rollin' through New England to the West Pacific shore. 
It's a long time we've been waitin', now she's been whistlin' 
'round the bend, 
Ride on into Congress on that Farmer-Labor train. 
 
There's folks of every color and they're ridin' side by side 
Through the swamps of Louisiana and across the Great Divide, 
From the wheat fields and the orchards and the lowing cattle 
range, 
And they're rolling onto victory on this Farmer-Labor train. 
 
This train pulled into Washington a bright and happy day, 
When she steamed into the station you could hear the people say: 
"There's that Farmer-Labor Special, she's full of union men 
Headin' on to White House on the Farmer-Labor train. (2009)   
 The song clearly frames the movement in moral terms 
and suggests it as a powerful force for bringing about a 
governmental remedy (though for what is not explicitly 
named, considering Guthrie’s established reputation as a 
labor and union activist and the naming of groups known for 
being exploited, the inferred problem is one of 
exploitation/lack of care for the working class). It is a 
fitting tribute to an organization that consistently framed 
the farm crisis as a problem rooted in lack of governmental 
oversight and a failure to recognize the importance of 
agriculture/food and farms/houses as basic rights of 
humanity. Also in the song one of the most important 
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elements of the mythos surrounding the Farmer Labor Party 
is visible, and that is its ability to cross class and 
labor divides, bringing together factory laborers, miners, 
and agricultural workers. In singing about the crossing of 
false divides, it is clear that the lyrics work to frame 
the party as a morally sound one in which people from all 
walks of life, all regions, all colors are riding side by 
side with the power of a multi-dimensional union to enact 
change at the level of the federal government. That 
solidarity is key to the party’s efforts to improve society 
by demanding increased state involvement in agriculture.  
 Also present in the song is a common narrative theme 
that further illustrates the solidarity of the FLP by at 
once illustrating difference between members and then 
breaking down those differences. Just as Guthrie 
differentiates farmer from factory worker by contrasting 
“the smoky factory cities” with “the hot and dusty plains,” 
he simultaneously expresses their similar plight by evoking 
the idea of hard labor in the heat and foul air, be it from 
the furnace and soot or the sun and dirt. It is a narrative 
that commonly appears in the mythology surrounding the 
Farmer Labor Party, especially the story of its origin. 
When writing of the initial formation of the Farmer Labor 
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Party, a favorite story that is usually told as a colorful 
anecdote is about a meeting that was held in Minnesota in 
1918 when many voters were quite upset with the failure of 
Republicans and Democrats to respond to difficult economic 
times (Valelly 1989).  
Gathered together through the efforts of Socialist 
activists, union members from the urban workforce were 
seated in one half of the room; farm owners and laborers 
were on the other side. When the problems the state was 
facing and the failure of the existing political parties to 
meet those problems were brought to the fore, it was quite 
clear that both groups were being hurt by the status quo. 
When asked in a rousing speech if they would stand up and 
support their brothers across the aisle, the union members 
stood and shouted their support. Then, when asked if they 
would support the unions, the farmers, too, stood and waved 
their hats in boisterous support of their urban 
compatriots. With the entire meeting hall standing and 
whooping, it is said, the Farmer Labor Party was born. 
It is, undoubtedly, a pleasing tale and a wonderful 
image. Whether or not that is how it happened, what matters 
is that it is this particular narrative that has been 
accepted and is repeated by group members across time and 
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place. It is particularly interesting that the divide 
between farmer and laborer is expressed as such a clear 
differentiation, as it surely aids in the narrative quality 
of the story despite its lack of grounding in reality. In 
fact, for farms situated near urban centers, workers often 
took jobs in factories when farm work was light, and 
factory workers often took jobs on farms during harvests. 
Additionally, it was not uncommon for unemployed factory 
laborers to exchange room and board on a farm for menial 
farm labor until they could get work in the city again. 
Further, the classification “farmer” can mean many things: 
owner of land on which farm goods are produced, 
agricultural worker, tenant farmer, wife, child, etc. But 
in this persistent narrative, farmer is classified to some 
extent as the opposite of the city worker. Regardless of 
the complexity of identity construction, however, of most 
importance is the idea that all those of a lower economic 
class have more power when they work together. Therefore, 
coming together is framed not only as morally right, but it 
is framed as an important part of the remedy to the problem 
of economic hardship faced by most working class people 
during the interwar. And, again, through that solidarity it 
is possible for a once non-dominant idea to gain increasing 
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strength, promoting strong government involvement in the 
affairs of the farmer and worker classes. 
The Farmer Labor Party had national success and, 
although its life as a national movement was short lived, 
it lasted at least 25 years in Minnesota and it achieved 
political reform at the local, state, and federal levels. 
As described by the Minnesota Historical Society (MNHS), 
which also shares in the romantic notion of opposites 
coming together to fight for a better society, the Farmer-
Labor Movement “is an unlikely coalition of two seemingly 
disparate groups, rural and urban, that found common cause 
and united in pursuit of their goals” (Minnesota Historical 
Society, 2014). Referring to the period from 1910-1945 as a 
“turbulent” one in Minnesota, the MNHS points to the severe 
economic stressors that at once effected farmers and city 
workers in the state as it describes the origin of the 
Farmer-Labor Party: 
Drought and the Great Depression brought havoc to 
wheat farmers of the region: prices for their product 
plummeted, and farm foreclosures meant ruin. In the 
city, jobs were scarce and wages low. Laborers—those 
fortunate enough to have work——fought for fair wages 
and against unfair laws that prohibited unionization. 
Out of that ferment, a coalition of reformers and 
radicals formed the “Farmer-Labor Party,” a 
designation it used on the ballot for its candidates 
who were neither Republican nor Democratic. 
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The MNHS concludes its report with a nod to the longevity 
of this unique third party in Minnesota, referencing its 
roots in the 1910s as the Nonpartisan League (an openly 
Socialist reform group), its ability to win elections over 
the Republican and Democratic candidates, and its final 
merger in 1943 with the Democratic Party to create the 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party of Minnesota. It is 
noteworthy that the MNHS describes the Farmer Labor Party 
in a way that so reflects the powerful narrative of 
solidarity of divergent peoples leading to political 
change, as, again, that solidarity would help to make pro-
agriculture legislation a reality. 
Among traditional historians, the movement is 
generally discussed as a political one, which was started 
on a national scale about 1916 and in Minnesota in 1918 
(Holbo 1963, Minnesota Historical Society 2014). Among 
populists, so successful do they view the movement in 
Minnesota that rather than seeing its merger with the 
Democratic party in 1943 as an end, they name it a 
continuation in a slightly different form and point to its 
influence on politicians today, including Al Franken (The 
Progressive Populist). Marxists, however, see the movement 
as a glorious rise of Socialist values in the face of the 
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insidious growth of Capitalism, a rise that was destroyed 
from within as early as 1930 by the lower middle-class 
membership (petit bourgeoisie) and their Stalinist leanings 
toward state control (Creel 1946). It was in 1930 that 
Floyd Olson, who grew into politics in the 1920s as a 
Farmer Laborite and called himself a “radical,” ran for 
Governor on the Farmer-Labor Party ticket—and won. Olson is 
often described as a skilled politician and a “people’s” 
governor; many believed he would have been President of the 
United States had he not died at 44 from cancer (Holbo 
1963, Minnesota Historical Society 2014, Creel 1946, Mayer 
1987). 
However, far from being the death of the party mourned 
by Marxists, I take the more positive view that Olson’s 
prominence on the local and national stage, as well as his 
own radical political views, helped him to carry forth the 
message of the Farmer Labor Party that the farm crisis is a 
problem rooted in lack of governmental oversight and a 
failure to recognize the importance of agriculture/food and 
farms/houses as basic rights of humanity. It is the 
successful move into legislative power, in this case at the 
gubernatorial level, that helped make possible the change 
in debt relations between farmers and creditors. The 
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following is from the Farmer Labor Association’s 
constitution, ratified in 1924, and gives early insight 
into what the organization and its followers would come to 
define as the problem: 
We aim to rescue the government from the control of 
the privileged few and make it function for the use 
and benefit of all by abolishing monopoly in every 
form, and to establish in place thereof a system of 
public ownership and operation of monopolized 
industries which will afford every able and willing 
worker for opportunity to work, and will guarantee the 
enjoyment of the proceeds thereof, thus increasing the 
amount of available wealth, eradicating unemployment 
and destitution, and abolishing autocracy. (O’Connell 
1979, 134) 
 
Clearly, the party chose early on to define, generally 
speaking, the problem faced by society as one rooted in the 
failure of a government they need “to rescue . . . . from 
the control of the privileged few” and an economic system 
that favors the few over the many, all problems caused by 
monopolies and private ownership of industry. The moral 
frame is also quite clear: the people have a right to work 
and to be paid for that work for the benefit of society 
(aka public ownership); monopolies and autocracies are 
wrong. The overall remedy is strong government involvement 
in industry and guaranteed fair pay for workers, a frame 
that will be repeated for many years, thus moving into the 
realm of possibility a radically different system. 
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The Farmer Labor Party was quite effective in getting 
heard its message promoting government involvement through 
unification of the people. Beginning with something as 
simple as the first article of the FLA’s constitution, one 
of the goals of the movement was to unify formerly 
disparate groups in the name of economic independence, as 
its stated objective was: 
to unite the members of all farmer, labor and other 
kindred organizations, and unorganized elements which 
support independent political action by economic 
groups, into a political association; and to carry on 
an intensive program of education and organization 
incidental to participation in the political campaigns 
of the Farmer-Labor movement. (Holbo 1963, 302) 
 
The focus of the movement was three-fold: education, 
organization, and political action, all of which worked 
together to place the Farmer Labor Party in a position of 
power to rhetorically frame the “farm crisis” as a 
governance problem caused by too much power held by too few 
people, all of which could be made morally right through 
the remedy of government policies that put the welfare of 
humanity above profit, especially in relation to credit and 
debt structures. 
The educational rhetoric component was particularly 
important on many levels. First, evidenced by the framing 
of the farmer in the mainstream press, there was an 
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assumption that those who work on farms are not in an 
intellectual or social position to have a voice. That much 
farm labor was comprised of recent immigrants helped to 
fuel this preconception, as did the isolation of many farms 
throughout the state (and the country). Changing not just 
that perception, but also influencing the farmer class by 
introducing the idea that through solidarity there is 
political power, was a primary goal of the party and one 
that it had tremendous success achieving in the 1920s.  
By educational rhetoric, I mean the movement’s 
extensive educational program, which included driving 
speakers all over rural Minnesota to speak at various 
granges and churches and meeting halls. There were also 
numerous printings of newspapers, which were produced at 
the cost of the party, that were distributed all over the 
state on a “pay if you can” basis. Rooted in Socialist 
Party traditions, these efforts were grounded in the belief 
that education and knowledge are prerequisites of bringing 
change. Through knowledge, not only will farmers become 
better advocates for themselves and their communities, but 
they are more likely to come together and work for a 
different societal structure, one that privileges the many 
over the few and one that requires government oversight in 
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the management of key areas such as agricultural credit and 
production.  
In addition to the speakers and newspapers, the Party 
also printed leaflets with the latest news and 
announcements about upcoming protest efforts that needed 
support. The leaflets would be distributed where farmers 
came to unload their milk and cream every other day. Such 
distribution efforts give a window into the dedication of 
those involved in the movement as well as the organizers’ 
true understanding of their target audience’s needs, as 
illustrated by Clara Jorgensen in an interview about her 
time as a dairy farmer, Farmer Labor and Farm Holiday 
activist, and member of the Communist Party in the 1920s 
and 1930s: 
People went, see they had these local creamers for one 
thing you know and so people hauled in their milk. . 
., you could always leaflet that . . .the day before 
and this happened in every little town; they had these 
people come in with sleds. They liked to read a little 
bit waiting to get their cream unloaded you know, but 
this is what happened and that’s one of the ways that 
it was very quick [to get the word out about 
protests]. (Jorgensen 1974, 5)  
 
Jorgensen continues to explain that word of mouth was also 
very important for sharing the latest news and ideas; not 
only was it enjoyable to discuss politics at the creamery, 
but “you’ve got kids . . . and you could walk, use your 
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feet, you know, which people did, so it wasn’t that much . 
. . a problem, especially when you were young,” and the 
“kids” would help spread the word from farm to farm. 
Through the newspapers, pamphlets, speakers, and 
message walkabouts, the educational rhetoric of the 
movement was always ongoing, both preceding the physical 
enactments of solidarity and working through them to the 
end. As such, they played an important part in crafting 
both the frames through which events and policies related 
to farming were viewed as well as providing a shared 
narrative through which the desire for a more just system 
of government is imagined.  
Among the many messages shared through such methods is 
a parable of sorts that illustrates the collapsing farm 
economy; costs for production were some 35 percent higher 
than prices in the mid to late 20s, a figure that would 
turn doubly bad after the crash in 1929 (O’Connell 1979, 
164). Hence the tale of the cow, here told by Oscar 
Torstenson, a Dawson farmer, when reflecting upon the 1920s7 
price drops: 
You see, the price, it was nothing for what you had to 
sell. I know one fellah, he shipped a cow, and he told 
                                                 
7 Specific years were not provided, however the conversation was about 
the worsening situation for agriculture in the mid- to late-1920s. 
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me about it. He was on the same school board with me.  
He asked a trucker to pick up the cow he wanted to 
ship.  When he got the returns, in place of getting a 
check, he got a statement that the cow hadn't brought 
enough to cover the freight commission and handling 
charges. So when he met the trucker in town the next 
time he says, "I plan to ship another one. If you take 
it, you let it ride as long as she's got anything to 
ride on.  After that you stop and kick her out. (165) 
 
While it is surely possible that Mr. Torstenson did in fact 
know the man with the cow and the sardonic wit, considering 
the similarity of this story to one told by Clara Jorgensen 
it is far more likely a shared narrative that has spread 
out across farms and time. From a framing perspective, it 
is surely noteworthy that the farmers who talk about the 
economic situation in the 1920s do so with concrete 
examples of production costs and price paid for goods; it 
is quite a different frame than the more generalized 
economic theories visible in the rhetoric of the bankers. 
It is such frames, grounded in specificity, that help lay 
the groundwork for the changes in debt relations to come. 
Jorgensen begins her cow tale like this:  
I know one of our friends, he has a check, he saved 
it, a check stub or whatever, for a cow, a big cow, $7 
and something, some people they had to pay money and 
you heard this over the radio just recently, of a guy 
that shipped a calf and by the time everything was 
deducted he got 66 cents. Another one, that was on the 
radio, another one sold a couple of calves and ended 
up with 25 cents. (4) 
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Her husband finished the story, adding “And then we have, 
somebody out here that sent the calf down, he got a bill, 
when he got down there, there wasn’t enough to pay 
transportation” (4).  
The point, of course, is not whether or not the story 
is a true one but that it defines a serious problem of the 
time: it costs more to produce farm products than can be 
redeemed with prices that were being paid. Further, in 
these scenarios, everyone makes out except the farmer: the 
trucker gets paid for making the haul and the buyer gets a 
cow on the cheap while the farmer takes a loss in time and 
money. In the context of the party’s goals overall, the 
remedy to this morally wrong scenario is organization in 
the form of the Farmer Labor Party, organization that will 
lead to government intervention in the form of price 
stabilization and reduced overhead (namely, reduced taxes). 
The narrative shared through this repeated scenario works 
double time, both illustrating the economic crisis on the 
farm (a powerful motivator to take action) while providing 
for the possibility of an entirely different scenario 
unfolding. In the unspoken scenario, a fair price is paid 
for the cow (or the wheat or corn or hog). To get that fair 
price would require government intervention, which can be 
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achieved through solidarity, education, and organized 
action. The party gives the potential for the narrative 
having a different ending. 
 Finally, the Farmer Labor Party’s rising influence 
(despite its lack of dominance in the main stream media in 
the 1920s) can be observed in the election and radical work 
of Minnesota Senator Henrik Shipstead. Shipstead, a dentist 
who had unsuccessfully run for Governor in 1920 as an 
Independent (against Preus, to whom he had lost the 
Republican primary), ran for Senator in 1922 against Frank 
B. Kellogg. Shipstead, who ran on the Farmer Labor Party 
ticket, was noted for driving from town to town in an old 
Ford. Once there, he would talk to voters about economics 
generally and “the depression in farm prices” specifically, 
framing the problem as one rooted in the immorality of war 
and suggesting as remedy improved legislation that favored 
the farmer and labor class. He would also take up a 
collection to pay for tires and gasoline to get him to the 
next town, which worked rhetorically to situate Shipstead 
as a true representative of the people whose vote he was 
soliciting. Compared with the wealthy corporate lawyer 
Kellogg, who traveled by “a chauffeur-driven Pierce-Arrow,” 
Shipstead was an obvious choice amid growing unrest among 
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farmers and laborers who were facing an increasingly 
difficult economy and anti-union efforts that were 
supported by the judicial system in the Twin Cities 
(Stuhler 1973, 78). 
 A Minneapolis Morning Tribune story from the campaign 
trail makes clear Shipstead’s rhetorical identity as one in 
line with farmers and laborers with the headline “Shipstead 
Calls for ‘New Deal8’ to Agriculture” and the subheads 
“Farmer-Labor Senatorial Candidate Makes Keynote Speech” 
and “Monopoly of Coal Operators Should Be Taken Away, He 
Affirms” (1922, 4). The story’s lead and second paragraph 
drive the point home: 
Dr. Henrick Shipstead, candidate for the United States 
Senate on the Farmer-Labor ticket in Minnesota, 
declared in his keynote address here [Detroit, 
Minnesota] today that ‘we must establish a definite, 
practicable policy of legislation for agriculture and 
labor so that the farmer and laborer can feel as 
assured of a livelihood from their occupation as are 
the mine owners, railroad owners and makers of war 
material.’ 
Dr. Shipstead said that he, if elected, will 
participate in the work of the ‘farm bloc, the labor 
bloc, the business men’s bloc, the soldiers’ bloc, and 
the mothers’ bloc. 
 
                                                 
8 Note that the call for a “new deal” precedes by a decade the adoption 
of the phrase by FDR. Commonly used by the Farmer-Labor Leader when 
calling for change, the Oxford English Dictionary points to scant usage 
of the phrase before 1932. Until becoming associated in the U.S. with 
the FDR administration, it used to be used metaphorically, drawing upon 
its meaning in card games (a quite literal meaning—as in a new hand of 
cards) (2014). 
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The direct quotes continue, creating a narrative in which 
Shipstead points to the problem of an overly strong 
legislative representation of oil, mining, steel, railroad, 
and Wall Street interests. As such, the framing of the 
problem by Shipstead is quite clear: there is too much 
power held by the large “monopolies,” a power that corrupts 
and leaves too many citizens without needed representation 
and legislation. The remedy is framed as targeted 
legislation at the federal level that will provide a “new 
deal and new leadership at Washington” to improve the 
status of farmers, laborers, and soldiers. Part of that 
legislation, although not specifically described in this 
article, is visible in his call for the elimination of the 
existing problem of a few powerful interests being in 
control of “the people’s money and credit.” Rather, the 
people, as represented by their elected officials in the 
federal government, should be in control of the structure 
of their lines of credit; this is an important idea that 
links legislative representation to debt structures, paving 
the way for government intervention. Shipstead promises, in 
essence, to shift the balance of power in the federal 
government in favor of farmers and laborers, a move that 
will include improving access to funds; in other words, 
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government oversight or involvement in farm and labor 
finance. 
 Shipstead, the first non-Republican since 1863 to 
take the Senate seat for Minnesota, did so with a strong 
margin. His victory was just one feather in the cap of the 
Farmer Labor Party that year. Although Preus, the 
incumbent, succeeded in holding his gubernatorial post 
against the FLP candidate that year, voters nonetheless 
smiled on the party, sending three FLP legislators to 
Congress, electing 24 to the state senate, and 46 to the 
lower house of the legislature (Stuhler 1973, 78-79), a 
sound beginning to the party’s influence on state and 
national politics in the 1920s. With such strong entry into 
political office, it becomes evident that the three-pronged 
approach of education, organization, and political change 
was working to prop up this third party, which would give 
it greater voice as the decade progressed and give these 
new ideas the strength to effect change in debt relations 
on a federal legislative level.  
 Although Shipstead was known for his radicalism in 
the areas of “agrarian interests and foreign affairs” (he 
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served on the foreign relations committee)9, he was also a 
proponent of pro-labor efforts, namely union organizing, 
which was of course a vital goal of the Farmer Labor Party 
and also fit his worldview as union organizing was vital to 
making secure the entire infrastructure that surrounds 
agriculture. In 1926 and 1927, the Citizens Alliance, a 
brutal union-busting organization founded by local Twin 
Cities businesses and banks and supported by local judges 
they helped put in office, took a number of successful 
steps to criminalize and combat union organizing. A series 
of injunctions by the courts first severely limited 
protesting by making it illegal for strikers and organizers 
to have any contact with scabs and open-shop workers and 
then going so far as to make it illegal to even hold signs 
peacefully and a respectful distance from the business in 
question. Commenting on his first legislative move to fight 
labor injunctions, in 1927, Shipstead is quoted as saying,  
The extension to which equity jurisdiction has gone 
robs the average working man . . . of his right to be 
governed by law as distinct from being governed by 
judicial discretion, which is another name for the 
absolutism of kings by divine right (Millikan 2001, 
192). 
                                                 
9 Among his more radical stances were his opposition to the League of 
Nations, his belief that the treatment of Germany after the war was 
sowing the seeds of another world conflict, his opposition to 
conscription, and his steadfast belief in Jeffersonian ideals of 
agriculture as the cornerstone of Democracy (Stuhler 1973, 79-82). 
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Shipstead’s criticism is a biting one and reflects his 
party’s belief in representation of and fairness toward the 
working class as well as a harsh view of anything smacking 
of absolute power in the hands of a few. By defining the 
problem in terms of the “divine right” of kings, he makes a 
moral judgment that points to the cause of an out-of-
balance judicial system that requires a legislative remedy 
if the “working man” is to be restored to his rightful 
place as a law-abiding citizen with the right to organize 
and protest. 
 When that first pro-labor organizing bill failed to 
pass (despite his eloquence, Shipstead was still in a 
minority position as the sole member of the Farmer Labor 
Party in the U.S. Senate), he introduced another one in 
1930, the Shipstead Act, specifically aimed at protecting 
organizers. Although that one, too, failed to pass, it did 
set the stage for a pro-labor bill that would be passed 
into federal law soon after (the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-
Injunction Bill). “A Mankato paper commented: ‘For a long 
fight for this law, Senator Shipstead has made a name for 
himself that will live on long after he is gone. His work 
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will be a tangible factor for the common good in the age-
old struggle against special privilege” (Millikan, p 193).  
 Indeed, Shipstead’s voice was but one to rise from 
the chorus of Farmer Labor Party members--from farmers to 
factory workers, labor organizers to politicians--who would 
continue to work for a different future, refusing to be 
tied to the dominant frame of the decade and instead 
insisting upon significant changes in debt relations 
through federal government involvement. As the next chapter 
unfolds to cover the period after the stock market crash 
and until the Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 
1933, the shift in the dominant frame will become evident 
in the election of the first Farmer Labor Party governor as 
well as in the main stream press coverage and the 
legislative efforts to provide government intervention to 
stabilize farm prices.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Farmer Activist Narrative Shifts Rhetoric of Farm Debt 
 
The emergent narrative of the “farm crisis” in the 
1920s framed the problem of farm debt as one caused by a 
reckless and selfish oligarchy, a problem that required a 
remedy in the form of government intervention. That once 
emergent narrative begins to evolve into a position of 
dominance in the early 1930s, providing powerful rhetorical 
means to shift the financial paradigm away from regulation-
free financialization and toward federal government 
management of agricultural finance. As we grow closer to 
the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and 
the Farm Credit Act of 1933, the worsening economy surely 
played a role in the positive reception of demands for 
stronger government; however, that role is too often used 
as a catch-all excuse to explain the radical changes in 
policy. The consistent work of organizations like the 
Farmer Labor Party to educate, organize, and change policy 
made familiar the remedy frame that governmental 
intervention would be necessary to solve the farm crisis. 
By 1932 this once emergent frame would warrant the dominant 
national narrative represented by the passage of the farm 
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bills in 1933.  
This chapter focuses on an analysis of the rhetoric 
that frames the “farm crisis” predominantly from the 
perspective of this new financial paradigm. The focus is 
primarily on Minnesota’s Famer Labor Party, which came to 
its height of power in 1930 with the election of Floyd B. 
Olson as Governor on the FLP ticket, as well as some 
related mainstream news coverage and other farm radical 
rhetoric. The powerful and vast Northwest agricultural and 
banking region, well represented in Minnesota press and 
politics, played a vital role in the arguments for the new 
financial paradigm. In this chapter it is particularly 
important to note the role of the highly successful Farmer 
Labor Party in shifting the rhetoric of the “farm crisis” 
through its educational programs, protests, and direct 
involvement in local, state, and federal government. The 
consistent and effective rhetorical pressure of the Farmer 
Labor Party began to change the national narrative, moving 
the farmer’s relationship to debt toward a model of federal 
oversight, helping make ready legislators and voters to 
accept the New Deal’s agricultural interventions that would 
arrive in 1933. 
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 As is well established, the 1920s came to a harsh 
finish. Noted historian David M. Kennedy (1999) puts it in 
quite dramatic terms, comparing the October 1929 stock 
market crash to an earthquake that “cracked startlingly 
across the United States, the herald of a crisis that was 
to shake the American way of life to its foundations” 
(1999, 10). As bad as things were for the country at large 
as 1930 shepherded in the Great Depression, things were 
worse for agricultural areas that had not shared the same 
1920s boom as industry and Wall Street. In Minnesota, 
nonfarm earnings dropped by 6 percent from 1929 to 1930 
while farm earnings dropped 17 percent in the same period. 
Nonfarm earnings dropped another 44 percent from 1930 to 
1931 while farm earnings fell 53 percent in the same 
period. By 1933, compared with 1929 levels, the drop in 
nonfarm earnings in Minnesota was 41 percent—an astonishing 
figure—but one that is dwarfed by the 78 percent plummet in 
farm earnings in the same period (United States Department 
of Commerce, 2010). 
 What those figures meant for the people living in 
rural Minnesota in the early 1930s was unprecedented 
unemployment, homelessness, hunger, rampant foreclosures, 
fear and unrest. As bad as those things had been in the 
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middle of the 1920s, the stock market crash intensified 
financial woes, leading to the collapse or freezing of 
banks; the problems were especially bad in rural areas. 
Although Floyd B. Olson himself asserted in later years 
that “his success depended on hard times” (Mayer 1987, 42), 
arguably his success was equally dependent upon his five 
solid years of cultivating voters both within his Farmer 
Labor Party and among small business leaders (both 
Republicans and Democrats). In the November, 1930, 
gubernatorial election in Minnesota, both Olson’s 
substantial skills in the political arena as well as the 
decade of rhetorical work put in by the Farmer Labor Party 
would win out. Minnesota voters gave Olson 473,154 votes to 
the Republican candidate’s 289,528 and the Democrat’s 
29,109. And so began a new decade in Minnesota, with a 
Farmer Labor Party governor given a mandate from the people 
of his state.  
 
The Olson Years 
 
 Regardless of his mandate from voters, Olson faced an 
uphill battle as Governor his first year in office. The 
legislature was still largely controlled by Republicans, 
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who even went so far as to strip Olson’s Lieutenant 
Governor, Henry Arens (FLP), of his power to decide upon 
the make-up of the Rules Committee. With so many 
Republicans in power, combined with former Governor 
Christianson (R) appointees in some key posts, Olson at 
first had some difficulty getting Farmer Labor party 
faithfuls in key positions of power. However, he did manage 
to get enough FLP representatives in place to avoid too 
strong a backlash from the party. His time in office was 
known, though, for his efforts to strengthen the party 
through alliances with Republicans and Democrats, a 
departure from the typical patronage of newly elected 
Governors, which was visible in his appointments. Often 
those appointments were given to his supporters from other 
parties (such as Jean Wittich, a Republican who campaigned 
for Olson) or even to well-connected individuals who hadn’t 
campaigned for him (Mayer 1987, 61-67; Valelly 1989, 57-59; 
Farmer-Labor Leader 1930a). Key among his new alliance is a 
group that not only broadened his constituency, but also 
strengthened the reach of the Farmer Labor Party into the 
realm of the middle-class. 
 A political cartoon that ran on the front page of the 
Farmer-Labor Leader on December 17, 1930, titled “THE CLEAN 
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SWEEP!” does much to illustrate and define the new face of 
the Farmer Labor Party as well as its growing constituency 
and the promise of a new financial regime (Farmer-Labor 
Leader 1930b). Olson is drawn in a vest and tie, his 
sleeves rolled up, indicating that he is ready to get to 
work using the broom in his hands to clean up a number of 
issues that are framed as problems, including “favoritism 
and laxity in the bank dept.,” “irregularities in rural 
credit bureaus,” and “old ‘special privilege’ himself,” all 
of which work together to cause a failed system that favors 
the few over the many. Olson has an expression of critical 
determination and confidence with his arched eyebrow and 
slight smile and clear satisfaction with his upright 
posture, framing the new governor’s opposition to the old 
guard as the remedy to the problems featured. Further, the 
clean-up suggested in the cartoon clearly frames the 
Governor as morally just in his actions while those being 
swept into the trash are immoral. Besides the obvious 
reference to cleanliness being close to Godliness, his 
placement above the dust cloud with his clean clothes help 
drive home the point that he will clean up the mess at the 
State House. 
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Fascinating as the portrayal of Olson alone is, the 
two most important elements of the cartoon, as they reflect 
the vital work of the Farmer Labor Party the past decade, 
are the men supporting Olson and the representation of a 
Wall Street elite crumpled up in the trashcan labeled 
“Minnesota [tr]ash can for special privilege.” First, the 
three supporters are all clearly labeled in both the way 
they are drawn and explicitly with words. On one side is 
the “Minn. Bench, Bar, School and Church;” On the other 
side are the “Minn. Farmer” and “Minn. Labor.” It wouldn’t 
be necessary to be able to read the labels, however, to 
know what is represented in the images. The “bench, bar, 
school and church” representative, standing behind Olson’s 
right shoulder on which he is resting a supportive hand, 
has many signs that indicate education and status—but not 
wealth. His suit is traditional, not flashy, with a rounded 
collar. He wears a top hat, but not an extravagantly high 
one, and he has plain glasses.10 
                                                 
10 The middle class, specifically the “business man,” became an 
increasingly important part of the FLP in the early 1930s. The front 
page of the July 16, 1931, Farmer-Labor Leader featured under the 
banner headline “FARMER-LABOR PARTY DEMANDS NEW DEAL FOR BUSINESS MAN 
AS FOR FARMER AND LABOR” featured multiple stories about the importance 
of “business men” joining the FLP as the party that “must primarily 
represent the farmers and the workers of brain and hand” as opposed to 
the Republican and Democratic parties that “are unfit to govern” with 
their policies “dictated by the special interests” as “the political 
expression of large industrial, banking and public utility groups.” 
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Behind Olson’s left shoulder on which he, too, rests a 
supportive hand, is the Minnesota farmer, clearly 
recognizable by his suspenders and work shirt, bandana, 
straw hat and scraggy beard. Continuing the chain of 
support is the representative of labor, recognizable by his 
overalls, work shirt with rolled sleeve to show a muscular 
arm, and factory worker cap. All eyes are turned to Olson 
with approving smiles as they say, “Go right ahead, 
Gov’nor! That’s why we voted for you! We saw you use that 
broom in the Minneapolis City Hall! We don’t mind th’ 
dust.” So, yes, Olson in the Governor’s seat is part of the 
remedy, but not Olson alone; it is the entire party (as 
represented by its key constituents of Farmer, Labor, and 
Middle Class worker) working together with Olson to enact 
change that empowers this clean-up of the state.  
That vision of solidarity, which is carried forward 
into the 1930s from its strong roots in the 1920s, becomes 
an even more important narrative as the party grows in 
strength and purpose.11 The cartoon’s message that Olson’s 
                                                 
(Wefald, Knud 1931; Williams, Howard Y. 1931) Eventually this alliance 
would wane, but it was an important part of the shift into dominance of 
the idea of Government intervention into finance. 
11 While in 1930 the Farmer-Labor Association counted 7,500 official 
members, that year was the start of a building of membership that would 
lead to 20,000 to 30,000 members after 1933 (Valelly 1989, 62). Keep in 
mind, too, that membership does not equate to reach; only those who 
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supporters had witnessed him “use that broom” before is 
referencing Olson’s prior years as Hennepin County 
Attorney, during which time he garnered a well-deserved 
reputation for taking down corrupt Aldermen; the message at 
once indicates faith in his skills and frames his 
supporters as willing to endure the uncomfortable parts of 
the demanded changes. After all, each of them have 
experience with “the dust” in their own right, and 
sacrifice is a morally just path to follow.  
The morally upright, solidarity and sacrifice elements 
of the cartoon are particularly important when thinking 
about the ways the Farmer Labor Party’s narrative has moved 
into a more dominant position by 1930. Part of the 
organization’s success is that even when this cartoon was 
drawn, more than a decade after the Party’s founding, there 
is still considerable repetition of the importance of the 
unique solidarity that makes it strong. This time there is 
the fascinating addition of the educated man who is of 
service to his community (as either a judge, a teacher, or 
a pastor), an addition that still fits within the Farmer 
Labor Party goal of creating a better world through a 
                                                 
could afford to pay dues were counted as members, but many more in 
farming communities were readers of the Farmer-Labor Leader and 
participants in grass-roots organizing and protesting. 
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government that puts the welfare of its working class 
people above the profit of a few. The farmer and labor 
representatives stand so close they are almost one. And all 
three of them have Olson’s back, so to speak. So while the 
rest of the country was reeling in fear of the continuing 
economic distress, the Farmer Labor Party envisions itself 
coming together and, through solidarity and government 
intervention, enacting positive change that will right 
financial wrongs. 
The righting of financial wrongs is particularly vivid 
in the illustration of the fancy banker/Wall Streeter in 
the garbage. Here the caricature of the banker is linked 
causally to the many problems being swept up as those 
problems belong in the trash with the corrupt, selfish 
profiteers who must be among the first targeted in the 
clean-up. That clean-up, led by Olson with the solidarity 
and support of the Farmer Labor Party (as represented by 
the men behind him), is framed as the remedy to the 
problems caused by Wall Street. It is clear that the 
defeated man who has been swept into the trash is a banker 
or a representative of Wall Street because of his fancy 
black and white shoes with their prominent buttons, his 
very tall hat (which, although crushed like an accordion, 
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is almost the same height as the “bench, bar, school and 
church” representative), his distinctly white shirt cuffs, 
and his gloves. Further, as his new place in Minnesota is 
in a “trash can for special privilege,” we see the 
enactment of the new financial paradigm in which government 
works with the support of a political alliance of farmer, 
laborer, and small businessperson to restore balance and 
limit the power of Wall Street.  
 In his January 7, 1931, first inaugural address to the 
legislature, Olson’s rhetoric is illustrative of the 
ongoing transition of Farmer Labor Party political and 
economic beliefs from the earlier phase as emergent into 
their increasingly dominant position. As Raymond Williams 
(1977) notes, there is not always a clear-cut epochal 
separation point when assessing periodization (121). 
Rather, from a rhetorical perspective, we can see in the 
Governor’s address a blending of some of the dominant and 
emergent frames with a clear move toward the more radical 
perspective that called for government intervention into 
economics.12 After the standard inaugural opening in which 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, Olson biographer Mayer devotes little space to this 
address, describing it as a disappointment to the Farmer Labor Party 
for its lack of radicalism, an opinion that gets repeated on numerous 
websites that cite Mayer. However, The Farmer-Labor Leader, which runs 
the entire address in its January 24, 1931, issue, describes his 
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he calls for nonpartisan camaraderie for the benefit of 
Minnesota, he immediately frames a key problem for the 
state: 
We are confronted at this time with an acute 
unemployment situation. It is the duty of the state, 
as the guardian of all its citizens to do everything 
possible to alleviate the situation. The most 
practical means of helping is in the carrying on of 
public work, which not only will provide employment 
for persons now idle, but will tend to encourage and 
stimulate private industry. (Olson 1931, 2-3)  
 
Here the problem is clearly labeled as unemployment. The 
remedy suggested is one of direct intervention by the state 
in the form of a public works program, which he sells not 
just as a benefit for the unemployed but also as a stimulus 
plan that will help private industry as well. 
 In addition to suggesting the public works plan, he 
makes it clear that the old financial regime, as 
represented here by the prior administration, failed the 
people of Minnesota with its focus on “economy” (read very 
little government spending). Because of the lack of 
spending in the past, Olson explains that expenses will 
                                                 
proposals as “practical measures designed to meet the immediate and 
pressing problems confronting the people and the state,” and frames the 
address overall as “concise” and presented in a “forceful manner.” 
While perhaps not an introduction overwrought with partisan joy, nor 
does it express disappointment.   
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have to go up now to meet the needs of things that have 
been neglected, such as new buildings and infrastructure:  
Let us meet the situation frankly and courageously, 
and provide for these improvements, not only because 
they are of an immediate necessity, but also because 
they will assist the people of Minnesota in our 
unemployment situation. (4) 
 
Here he frames his suggested remedy of a public works 
project as both urgent and morally just, as “they will 
assist the people.” His framing rhetorically situates the 
increase in government spending and state oversight of 
building projects as a moral and immediate need, which is a 
strong position from which to counter reduced or flat 
spending levels.  
Specifically, Olson argues for the expansion of the 
state’s road paving program as an important part of the 
overall plan to relieve unemployment. In this section, the 
remedy is framed again in terms that call for state 
intervention not just in unemployment, but in this case in 
the setting of hours and wages as well through his clear 
call for strong wages, consistent hours, and locally 
employed (Minnesota) laborers:  
Leading American economists of both conservative and 
liberal tendencies agree that wages must be kept up to 
a high standard. 
A law should be passed providing that the wages paid 
on public work carried on directly by the state, or by 
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contact with the state, must be equal to the highest 
prevailing scale of wages paid for the particular kind 
of work performed. (4-5) 
 
The working hours he ties to “accepted standards prevailing 
at the time the work is performed in public work carried on 
by the federal government,” a move that frames the remedy 
as one that should be guided by the federal government. His 
choice to lead off this section with a reference to 
“economists of both conservative and liberal tendencies” 
frames the remedy as one that is wise and nonpartisan. The 
statement is also accurate—both President Hoover on one 
side and labor activists on the other promoted the 
importance of maintaining or increasing wages, both to 
prevent a further degradation of living standards as well 
as to restore the economy through consumer spending. 
 Further illustrating the shift toward a dominant 
narrative that values the financial affairs of the farmer, 
not just the Wall Street class, Olson also indicates a 
significant shift regarding farmers and taxation. In a 
brief comment on tax reforms, he makes this call:  
You will undoubtedly earnestly study and consider the 
problem of the re-classification of property so as to 
remove the present inequalities of our tax system. I 
especially urge you to consider the farming population 
in the matter of tax equalization and reallocation, 
not only because of the shrinking of farm income, but 
particularly because the farming population is 
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carrying a disproportionate share of the total tax 
burden. 
 
Here Olson frames the farm problem as the burden of a 
“disproportionate share” of taxation on farmers in the 
state. The cause of this imbalance is framed from two 
sides; from the government side it is one of “inequalities” 
in property classification and an overreliance on property 
tax. From the farmer side the cause is “shrinking of farm 
income,” a phrase that implies the income is going to 
continue to get smaller. The remedy, framed as morally just 
as it will fix the unfair “burden” placed on farmers, is to 
reallocate taxes and better classify farmland. Under 
Olson’s leadership, two years later the legislature would 
change the state to an income-tax based system and would 
pass stricter regulations about what classifies a property 
as a farm, a move that would eliminate misuse of lower 
property taxes by corporations that would buy “farmland” 
but not actually use it to produce agricultural goods (MN 
House 1933, H.F. 104; Mayer 1987, 139, 267-272). 
 Additionally, while not as relevant to a consideration 
of farm finance, it is worth noting that Olson also argues 
for federal control of power plants and expanded state 
oversight of utilities, both of which clearly point to the 
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shift in the dominant narrative toward the intervention of 
the state in matters related to access to basic human 
rights. This not only reflects the emergent narrative of 
the 1920s discussed in the last chapter, but contrasts 
sharply to the prior decade’s dominant narrative that 
favored private control of all industry, including 
utilities and power plants. Finally, in a nod to the new 
business-class component of the Farmer Labor Party, Olson 
includes a brief statement in favor of “the independent 
merchant,” framing the merchant as a class that is 
suffering from the problem of a worsened financial 
situation caused by the “monopoly” of “the so-called Chain 
Store system;” Olson calls for a remedy in the form of the 
“passage of appropriate legislation” to eliminate 
“inequalities which injure the independent merchant.” 
Although somewhat vague, what is important in this 
suggested remedy is the visible shift toward a dominant 
narrative that favors government remedies to the financial 
problems of the lower and middle classes in opposition to 
the once dominant narrative that favored big business and 
industry in a free-market system. 
 It is not just in Olson’s first inaugural address that 
the now-dominant narrative’s focus on government 
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involvement in finance and protection of basic human rights 
is visible. By the summer of 1931, the suggestion that 
government should intervene in the needs of daily life, 
considered dangerously radical ideas the prior decade, was 
not limited to the Governor’s speech. The newspaper 
generally frames such ideas in natural terms as the 
depression deepens. For example, an August 23, 1931, page 
one story about the 46th annual convention meeting of the 
Minnesota Federation of Labor is clearly in line with the 
now dominant narrative. Though titled “Labor Favors Shorter 
Days” with the subhead “State Session Reaffirms Opposition 
to Radicalism After [sic] Bitter Fight,” the article 
actually covers what is framed as the following reasonable 
ideas to solve unemployment:  
establishment of the shorter working hours, increase 
of wages, abolition of child labor, unemployment 
insurance and old age pensions to be paid for out of 
income taxes, establishment of community eating houses 
in which needy would be served with food upon 
presentation of a card from municipal welfare boards, 
institutions of a great amount of public work and 
enactment of a new inheritance tax law so that the 
greater portion of huge estates would revert back to 
the public. 
 
The resolution, read by Secretary George W. Lawson, 
continues with criticism that frames the cause of the 
economic turmoil in the U.S. as essentially reaping what it 
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sows as a capitalistic country, suggesting the need for “a 
greater return to the worker from the products of his toil, 
and taxation upon capital to return to society the 
accumulated wealth." Such ideas were, just six years 
earlier, framed as dangerous in their Communist leanings, 
illustrating an interesting shift in what is considered 
“too radical.”  
The remedies suggested here are for policies put in 
place to take care of everyone, including those who cannot 
take care of themselves (children, the aged, those without 
enough money for food). Again the shift toward a rhetoric 
that favors a system of government-based caretaking of the 
most vulnerable in society as well as a “fair” system for 
the working class is the dominant message here; it is 
significant that it is reported in the mainstream press 
without the snide commentary or alarmist communist warnings 
that accompanied such stories in the 1920s. Also present in 
the framing of these remedies to the problem of 
unemployment is a moral frame that suggests it is just and 
right to take care of the elderly and children (those who 
cannot protect/provide for themselves), that the “needy” 
should be provided with the basic human right of food, 
institutions should be established to take care of the 
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public, and the rich should be required to share their 
wealth through a tax system that benefits the public rather 
than wealthy heirs. Taking care of those who cannot take 
care of themselves and sharing wealth with the community as 
morally right are ideas that fit the now dominant narrative 
that government should play a more direct role in the 
structure of society, including its financial 
distributions. 
Interestingly, the “opposition to radicalism” 
referenced in the subhead is actually to the minority 
report from the organization, presented by “radical leader” 
Julius F. Emme, which suggested that basic human needs 
including food, clothing, and shelter must be “socially 
controlled instead of privately owned.” While clearly 
framed as being too radical even for the radicals, still 
the ideas are explained in this article not as the ravings 
of a lunatic Communist (as any suggestion of public 
ownership used to be), but as a minority viewpoint worthy 
of report. In a narrative that includes as worthy of 
consideration the idea of the state providing for basic 
human needs (or rights) including housing, we see the 
paradigm shift in financial regimes from the prior decade. 
In the 1920s, the dominant narrative called for private 
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ownership and management of everything, including 
mortgages. Now it is valid to consider public management of 
all human needs, including housing, which moves financial 
management of mortgages within this new paradigm.  
By late summer of his first term, facing some backlash 
in the conservative press for his government expenditures, 
Olson has his Budget Commissioner13 frame the problems of 
the state (including the farm problem) in terms of greed, 
unfair policies (especially taxation), lack of cooperation 
for the sake of the community, and failure of government in 
the past. The overall narrative here becomes one that again 
reflects the now dominant place of a once emergent 
narrative: basic human rights must be provided by society, 
a society that is structured through the state. In her 
radio address on the evening of August 27, 1931, on WCCO14 
Jean W. Wittich begins by explaining in great detail how 
                                                 
13 Olson’s Budget Commissioner, Jean W. Wittich, was the first woman to 
hold as high an office in the Minnesota government. A Phi Beta Kappa, 
former Republican, and vice president of the League of Women Voters, 
she was an Olson convert who campaigned actively for him from a non-
partisan standpoint (Mayer 1987, 42; Gieske 1979, 144). 
14 WCCO is the oldest radio station in the Twin Cities. At the time 
owned by Washburn Crosby Company (which would become General Mills), 
the station was a leader in radio technology, giving it a tremendous 
broadcasting range, even as far as Hawaii when the weather cooperated. 
The Floyd B. Olson Papers files at the Minnesota Historical Society 
contain many telegrams sent by listeners from all over the Midwest, 
including the Dakotas. The station was bought by CBS in 1932 (CBS 
Minnesota). 
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the state budget works, where the money goes, and how many 
people/institutions it helps. As she moves into the closing 
of her address, Wittich underscores the importance of the 
state expenditures:  
Minnesota is the victim of a great many economic ills 
at present. . . .particularly the farmers who are 
already staggering under heavy taxes and the 
inequalities resulting from tangible property being so 
heavily burdened where again agriculture suffers most.  
 
Here the problem, especially bad for the farmer, is framed 
as “economic ills.” The problem is caused by a tax code 
that relies overly on property tax instead of a fair income 
tax, which results in substantial difficulties for farmers 
who have lots of property but not a commensurate income. 
Implied is the remedy already suggested by Olson and 
covered in the press: a new tax system that favors the 
farmer. The framing used by Wittich also has a moral 
component, in that the suffering of the farmer class seems 
almost biblical in proportion with one “economic ill” after 
another piled on to this “heavily burdened” “victim.” So a 
government remedy here is framed as economically wise and 
morally just.  
Next, in her final statement, Wittich really brings 
home Olson’s message that special interests cannot rule; to 
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solve the problem of economic insecurity, we must all work 
together under government guidance: 
So long as the bankers huddle together in larger and 
larger mergers, placing service charges on checking 
accounts and refusing to loan money for enterprises 
that bring new industry to us; so long as the public 
utilities continue their rates above depression levels 
for other saleable commodities; so long as industry 
retrenches by lowering wages and letting out men and 
women to join the unemployed; so long as labor refuses 
to help work out a constructive program and looks with 
suspicion on almost every cooperative measure; so long 
as agriculture allows itself to be exploited by 
tariffs, high transportation rates and unfair taxes, 
we shall never improve our present condition. The 
economic salvation of the state will be effected when 
every group will honestly face the facts of which it 
is now fully aware and decide to give up some of its 
own advantages and contribute the value of its 
experience toward maintaining an economic balance by a 
unified program worked out under the leadership of the 
government.  
  
In addressing the problem of economic insecurity, Wittich 
provides multiple causes in her frames: bank liquidity 
issues following banks choosing to focus on their own 
mergers and profit margins rather than on their place in 
the community, which in turn hurts the state’s chances to 
enjoy new growth in business; utilities charging too much 
for services in a depression economy; unemployment, made 
worse by industry responding to hard times by lowering 
wages and adding more workers to the unemployment line; the 
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farm crisis, caused by exploitation in the form of tariffs, 
transportation costs, and “unfair taxes.”  
All of these problems and causes are framed in moral 
terms, as it is wrong to: put your own wealth above the 
health of the community, to overcharge for services, to 
lower wages and hours in hard times, and to treat one 
sector of the economy (farming) unfairly. Using a moral 
frame to describe these problems makes the suggested remedy 
of government intervention with the goal of a more fair 
society more attractive. Also, by directly naming the 
industrial habit of responding to hard times by lowering 
wages and adding more workers to the unemployment line, 
there is some moral justification for the frustration of 
labor. By providing that moral justification, while Wittich 
certainly is critical of labor being too “suspicious” to 
find a constructive solution to the problem of 
unemployment, her criticism is couched in understanding.  
Finally, there is the farm problem, caused by 
exploitation in the form of tariffs, transportation costs, 
and “unfair taxes.” In the case of the farm problem, unlike 
the others in which the characters (bankers, factory 
owners) play some active part in worsening their own 
problems, here the farmer’s role seems to be a passive one 
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in allowing his or her own exploitation; if the cause is 
allowing exploitation, then the implied remedy is not 
allowing exploitation, which can only happen through 
organized action, solidarity, and policy change. To attain 
such policy changes, the farmer is called upon to continue 
to protest and insist upon better policies. The moral 
overtones of the address hit their highest note in the last 
sentence, when “economic salvation” is called for through 
sacrifice of all for the greater good of “economic 
balance,” which can only be achieved through cooperation, 
solidarity, and under the guidance of government. Again we 
see the now dominant narrative that through solidarity and 
strong government, we can have a better society. This will 
be a world with generous bankers, fair leaders in industry 
and labor, and sound agricultural policies that allow that 
key sector to thrive, all thanks to the leadership of the 
state. 
In a call to action and solidarity at a Labor Day 
picnic, the Olson administration continues to rhetorically 
frame a new financial regime in which the economically weak 
must be protected. Just a few days after the radio address, 
at a Labor Day celebration in Powderhorn Park on August 30, 
1931, laborers enjoyed “cool, crisp, autumn weather” and 
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“light hearted participation in a program of sports and 
novelty contests and to serious discussion of the problems 
of labor, particularly unemployment,” according to the Page 
1 Minneapolis Tribune article titled “Labor Picnics; Asks 
Week Cut” with the subhead “Five-Day Working Period Urged 
by Speakers at Powderhorn” (Minneapolis Tribune 1931). 
Unlike the anti-union coverage in the paper from the 1920s, 
the reporting on this “organized labor” celebration clearly 
reflects the now dominant position of the ideas of the 
Farmer Labor Party. Overall, the story is one of well-
deserved respite and rational presentations from a series 
of speakers who “stressed the importance of the five-day 
work week as a means of combating unemployment.” An 
important part of the framing of the problem of the economy 
overall is the unemployment problem. While in this story 
the focus is on labor, it is relevant to the overall 
message of the Farmer Labor Party both for the importance 
of solidarity, but also because of an increasing focus on 
citizen as consumer; if factory workers are unemployed they 
cannot buy farm goods any more than struggling farmers can 
buy factory goods. The Minneapolis Tribune article frames 
the economic problem primarily as unemployment, but by 
suggesting the remedy of a more humane work week that would 
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spread the same amount of labor among more workers, the 
unemployment problem is defined in terms of unfair labor 
practices, which can be helped by state involvement. 
At the Labor Day Celebration, among the speeches that 
ran from 2 in the afternoon “until late in the evening” was 
the key address, drafted by Governor Olson. As he was too 
sick to attend himself, Olson had another of his 
appointees, Secretary Vince A. Day, read the speech. After 
making apologies for his inability to be there in person, 
Olson’s words continued, beginning with a succinct 
expression of the dominant narrative that solidarity will 
help fuel societal change:  
Organized labor has cause for celebration because of 
its constant contributions toward making the world a 
better place for all the people to live in. It must 
present a united front and in conjunction with 
unorganized labor and the farmer must militantly 
demand that millions of citizens of this great nation 
shall not suffer from periods of depression and 
distress. That result can be accomplished by law, but 
as a means of temporary relief I urge adoption of the 
five-day week and the six-hour day. 
 
For Olson, then, the problem is framed as something greater 
than unemployment, rather it is a more generalized 
suffering of farmers, organized laborers, and unorganized 
laborers all hurt by the cause he defines as cycles of 
“depression and distress.” While he expresses general 
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support for the reduced work week and day as a solution, he 
frames it as a “temporary relief” for a problem too big to 
be solved through a singular change in the working model 
for labor. What he frames as the remedy here is continued 
solidarity and militancy in demanding systematic and legal 
solutions to their problems. 
That warms him up to frame a highly moral remedy as 
one based in government and the law: 
The theory of American law is to protect the weak. 
That includes those who are economically weak. The 
theory has never become an actuality. That is because 
government, including the law making bodies, has been 
responsive to the needs of the few and not to the 
needs of the many. The doctrines of equality of 
opportunity and individualism have served largely as 
an excuse for exploitation. There is no equality of 
opportunity when millions of people desiring to work 
are unable to secure it. 
 
First, Olson defines the problem of unemployment in 
relation to the cause of a failure of American government, 
including its “law making bodies,” to live up to the 
promise of protecting the weak, including the poor (or, as 
he phrases it, the “economically weak”). Instead of taking 
care of those it should, rather “the needs of the few,” 
namely those with wealth, are served by government and law 
makers. The new financial paradigm is increasingly visible 
in such rhetoric, in which the free market is described in 
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negative terms while speech that is openly critical of the 
old regime moves to the fore. 
Olson then makes a powerful rhetorical move when he 
draws upon two key qualities of the American dream and 
redefines them. When he talks about “equality of 
opportunity and individualism,” he does so not as a 
positive thing, but rather as an avenue to exploitation. 
Yes, unemployment is a problem here, but it is fueled by an 
immoral twisting of what is supposed to be a core American 
value, for there is no equality in a country where so many 
who want to work cannot.15 The speech closes first with a 
moral chastisement of the old system followed by a call to 
co-create a better system of governance: 
Individualism is but a relic of the law of the jungle 
that the strong shall survive and the weak shall 
perish. Let us all join together in securing laws 
which will substantially remove unemployment, provide 
relief from its consequences, and which will insure a 
fair price to the farmer for the products produced by 
him. 
 
                                                 
15 It is difficult, if not impossible, to give accurate unemployment 
numbers from this period as the Federal Government did not keep 
reliable data on unemployment until 1948. However, based on anecdotal 
evidence and study of legislative records, many historians peg the 
number somewhere between 20 to 24 percent unemployment. If accurate, 
that is nearly one in four people unable to find work, a stunning 
figure. For more specific examples from around the country, see Irving 
Bernstein’s The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-
1933. 
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Rather than frame individualism as a positive trait, he 
frames it as “a relic,” metaphorically renaming the free 
market a “jungle” in which “the strong shall survive and 
the weak shall perish.” This is a significant shift from 
the dominant narrative of the 1920s when the leaders of 
banking and industry touted their system as the best to 
ensure a wealthy and prosperous future under rule of 
providence. Now the same ideas are framed as problems 
leftover from the primitive and immoral “relic of the law 
of the jungle.” Olson’s remedy is one that will be brought 
about not by individualism and fierce competition for 
resources, but rather by solidarity of farmer, laborer, and 
business person to bring about changes in the law. In other 
words, the remedy to economic ills here is state 
intervention/governance with the support of the masses. 
What is needed is legislation that will create a strong 
government that protects and provides for all its citizens, 
including those with the least power and wealth.  
Whether it was Olson’s repeated calls for continued 
militancy on the part of the people as a means of securing 
legislative changes, the worsening economic situation 
(especially for farmers), a the shift toward the new 
financial paradigm, or a combination of all of them, the 
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time was right in 1932 for farmer activism to become 
increasingly radical. While in the 1920s, the pricing of 
farm goods was framed in terms of “providence” or market 
forces, by the time the Farm Holiday movement began both 
farmers and legislators (primarily in agricultural states) 
were viewing pricing as something that could be controlled 
either through legislative means or direct farmer action.  
 
Radical Rhetoric and the Farmer Activist 
 
Farm Holiday Association, while officially a movement 
started by Milo Reno of the National Farmers Union and 
popular among Farmer Union members in many Midwest states, 
its calls to action were made to all in the farming 
community, including Farmer Labor Party activists. The 
Jorgensen family (referenced in Chapter 2), in their 
interview about the 1920s and 1930s, often conflate the 
two, which is not surprising considering the Farmer Labor 
Party’s open and loud support of the Association (Valelly 
1989, 91-92). Regardless, Farm Holiday was a separate 
organization from the Farmer Labor Party, each with its own 
press and leadership; however, when analyzing the rhetoric 
of the period related to farm activism, it is important to 
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also incorporate the more radical offshoots such as Farm 
Holiday as their work influenced the larger understanding 
of the farm crisis in the period and was well received as 
high up in the Farmer Labor Party as Governor Olson16. 
 Although the problem of low prices for farm goods is 
primarily what the Farm Holiday movement sought to fix, it 
often frames its message in highly moral terms, as this 
poem published in a radical farm paper illustrates: 
We can't continue longer now 
Upon our weary way 
We're forced to halt upon life's trail 
And call a "holiday." 
 
Let's call a Farmer's Holiday 
A Holiday let's hold 
We'll eat our wheat and ham and eggs, 
And let them eat their gold. 
Iowa Union Farmer, Feb. 27, 1932. (O’Connell 1979, 
163). 
 
Indeed, the wealthy who profit while those who grow their 
food suffer would find it most difficult to sustain 
themselves if required to eat the gold in their coffers. 
                                                 
16 In addition to Farm Holiday, The Tri-County Council of Defense and the 
United Farmers League are just two of the related activist cells named 
by Valelly (1989, 92). There was also a great deal of shuffling about 
of activist leaders from one group to another and even across state 
lines, as covered by Valelly, Millikan (2001), and Mayer (1987) 
throughout their texts. Reading through the memos from Vince Day to 
Governor Olson in the MNHS Vince Day Collection as well as various 
Farmer-Labor Leader issues, repetition of activist names at different 
times and places becomes visible. As I am tracking the rhetorical 
movement of ideas rather than people, I will not chart the movement of 
the leadership specifically here. 
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The image of the wealthy trying to live on their gold 
frames the problem of inadequate payment for farm products 
(prices lower than the cost of production) in terms that 
evoke numerous morality tales, all of which end with the 
same lesson: cruelty and greed toward others for selfish 
gain carries the price in the long run of misery and 
suffering. Here the farmers are framed as the protagonist 
to the wicked banker antagonist. The remedy to this immoral 
problem is direct action. 
Further, by referring to the withholding of food from 
market as a “holiday,” the organization is re-appropriating 
the “bank holidays” called in many states after the crash 
in 1929 to prevent the total collapse of the banking 
system. However, while a bank holiday closed access to 
banks as a means of calming investors to prevent 
uncontrolled runs on withdrawals that could destroy banks 
(especially the smaller banks in rural areas), the “farm 
holiday” was actually more akin to a strike in that it 
withholds product much in the same way a labor union would 
withhold labor. Regardless, the choice of the word 
“holiday” does evoke the farmer taking control of a quickly 
degrading financial situation. The “farm holiday” was very 
practical in purpose: by ceasing shipment of food to 
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market, reserves could be cleared and the farmers could 
“reset” prices at appropriate levels to cover the cost of 
production. The problem, then, is framed as inordinately 
low prices for farm products; the immediate remedy is 
organized protest and control of the commodity to raise 
prices while the long-term remedy is government price 
fixing. The holiday is framed as morally just because it is 
an act in opposition to the profiteers.  
 Another radical action first called in the early 1930s 
by Farm Holiday and later supported by multiple farm 
activist groups, including the Farmer Labor Party, is the 
Penny Auction. As a form of protest, the penny auction 
demands solidarity and willingness to protest the old 
financial system that could take away a farmer’s home and 
livelihood over unpaid debts. The Penny Auctions do 
significant work to solidify the new paradigm that shifts 
the meaning of debt and how farmers can change their 
relationship to that debt through organized action. The 
first goal of a Penny Auction is to stop a foreclosure on a 
farm. This is achieved by mobbing the sheriff’s sale and 
bidding mere pennies for property (which will then be 
returned to the farmer who owned the collateral before it 
went up for sale). Besides the direct bidding, intimidation 
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was used as a tactic to prevent anyone who intended to use 
the auction to actually acquire goods for their own use to 
be shamed (or frightened) out of doing so.   
John or Peter Jorgenson (which man is not specified in 
the oral history transcription) described a protest in Pine 
City, Minnesota, sometime in the early 1930s: 
We were called down to stop the foreclosure and I 
can’t remember now how many we were but we were a hell 
of a lot of farmers, it was all blocked all the way 
around the courthouse and the halls were packed with 
farmers and the sheriff was in his yard and he 
couldn’t get out because he’s out for screwing the 
people. . . . 10 o’clock he came on and he couldn’t 
come out and sell the farm and that’s the way it went 
down. (Jorgensen 1974, 5)  
 
Such acts of protest not only succeeded in showing 
solidarity, but also shamed any potential profiteers and 
made it impossible for the banks to proceed.  
Although the Penny Auction form of protest was 
utilized some in the 1920s, it really spread as a viable 
form of protest after the crash. When farm mortgages were 
at risk for foreclosure in the 20s and 30s, largely because 
of outrageous mortgage constructs, based on highly inflated 
land values, that with their balloon payments and 
expectations for refinancing every five years eerily 
resemble the recent subprime loans, banks attempted to sell 
off the farms to recoup losses. (I use the word “losses” 
  113 
cautiously, as the banks and Rural Credit Bureau, which was 
established in 1923 in Minnesota, were responsible for 
giving loans on inflated values, so the “losses” were 
really gambles that did not pay off.) By 1930, just seven 
years after the formation of the Rural Credit Bureau in 
Minnesota, 27 percent of the loans made the first two years 
of the Bureau had been foreclosed; in Northwestern 
districts, which were at higher risk both because the farms 
were on unproved land and because of the inability of 
farmers to get supplemental work in the cities, the overall 
foreclosure rate was 30 percent in 1930 (True 1933).  
To be clear, the rising foreclosure crisis, while 
absolutely vital to understand from a financial and debt 
perspective, carries a particularly layered meaning: it 
means the loss of a home, the loss of a business, the loss 
of a livelihood, the loss of personal possessions, the loss 
of an entire extended family’s existence, and, of course, 
the loss of a food producer. The Penny Auction as a remedy 
helps frame foreclosure as an issue of not just finance, 
but also morality. By interrupting the normal defaulted 
debt-to-foreclosure cycle, the Penny Auction played a part 
in forcing bankers to stop and reconsider the foreclosure 
route as a remedy to defaulted loans. The FLP and Farm 
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Holiday activists stood together to stop the auctions by 
ensuring carloads of members (including labor union 
activists) would attend, a solidarity that shifted the 
balance of power toward the farmer and away from the 
banker. Clara Jorgenson speaks of the taking back of power 
in her reminiscence of the Penny Auction protests: 
These land companies, they sold the land up here for a 
high price for the type of land when it was bought, 
and then of course the people couldn’t pay. Then 
[they] take it back again. Just about every farm would 
have gone if it wasn’t for the Farmer’s Holiday. 
 
 
By framing the actions of the banks as immoral and defining 
the problem as one of poor valuation, not negligent debt 
holders (which had been the dominant narrative in the 
1920s), members of the Farmer Labor Party and Farm Holiday 
stood in solidarity against the banks and were eventually 
rewarded not just with short-term results (individual sales 
being blocked) but with first state and then national 
legislation. On April 18, 1933, Olson would sign the 
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium and, less than a month later, 
the Emergency Foreclosure Act of 1933 would be passed as 
part of the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 
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Farm Finance and Foreclosures 
 
The massive foreclosures, which illustrated profoundly 
the failure of the old financial regime, took a terrible 
toll all over the country, but especially in agricultural 
states like Minnesota. Besides the demoralization it caused 
in a large part of the population and key sector of the 
economy, the state investment in the foreclosures was 
adding to budget woes already hurting from the inability of 
so many to pay their taxes. Of $10 million in original 
loans made through the Rural Credit Bureau, the State’s 
investment by Dec. 30, 1930, was more than $12.6 million 
(True 1933, 170). So, rather than making money on the farm 
mortgage business, or even breaking even, the state was 
spending millions to deal with the foreclosure problem. 
Ernst Arndt, a professor of economics at the University of 
Pretoria in South Africa, was funded by Carnegie Mellon to 
visit Canada and America in the early 1930s to study 
agricultural finance. He wrote a report on his findings in 
a tone that is fairly detached as he describes some of the 
financial methods used to expand farming. Despite his 
generally detached style, however, Arndt clearly frames the 
situation in a way that not only defines problems but also 
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makes moral judgments about some of the common practices of 
Minnesota bankers.  
Before delving into his moral judgments of bankers 
assigning value to livestock, fields, tractors and farmers, 
it is important to note that this scholar’s framing of the 
old regime’s remedy for the foreclosure as completely 
illogical, mainly because bankers taking over ownership and 
management of farms is the inevitable next step after 
foreclosure. He cites in his report numerous examples of 
banks foreclosing on farms, after which they had to hire 
people to run the farms, pay for new equipment, fix 
dilapidated buildings, just to be able to sell the 
property. “In many instances, I was informed, the banks 
obtained only 50 to 60 per cent [sic] of the amount they 
had advanced several years ago,” [emphasis his] he writes 
(Arndt 1933, 2-3). “In many areas land values during the 
past ten years had dropped 50 per cent,” and with the 
bizarre structuring of the loans the farmer could be 
advanced as much as 90 percent of the value of the farm in 
loan form, “on the basis of valuations which are generally 
considered to be very liberal,” a situation Arndt describes 
as “nothing but suicidal.” While his colorful criticism of 
the old system is interesting, it is also noteworthy that 
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he frames the problem with farm mortgages as a combination 
of inappropriate land values, poor lending practices, and 
generally bad business decisions. Those frames place the 
problem squarely on the shoulders of the bankers, 
reflecting the new paradigm that is critical of the old 
financial regime; again, this illustrates the shift away 
from blaming the farmer who doesn’t pay back debts, which 
was the dominant narrative in the 1920s.   
Arndt also has a chapter on chattel mortgages that 
illustrates his discomfort with the idea of assigning a 
monetary value to living things—including the farmers 
themselves (in that their ability to produce crops or 
animals for slaughter is rated). The invasive quality of 
the chattel mortgage he describes as such: 
Personal property commonly mortgaged by farmers 
includes livestock, farm machinery, automobiles, 
furniture, and musical instruments. In certain 
sections of the country, it is common for the merchant 
to take a chattel mortgage on the machinery and 
furniture sold on credit, while general family 
supplies are often bought on the security of any or 
all of the above forms of personal property. (17) 
 
Importantly, he frames the foreclosure problem again as one 
caused by poor lending practices, particularly the use of 
equipment bought on credit as collateral. And in case his 
readers find his above statement to be an unlikely 
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happenstance, especially the concept of accepting as 
collateral machinery already bought on credit, he assures 
them that “the above quotations by no means give an 
exaggerated picture of the use of the chattel mortgage in 
American finance. They are to be found in possession of the 
ordinary banks.” Arndt’s report reflects the growing 
discomfort with the prior financial regime’s practices in 
relation to farm debt. 
 As the financial paradigm shift becomes increasingly 
dominant in discussions of farmer debt, so, too, does a 
call for a legislative solution to the problem. In a June 
1932 speech Olson made to the League of Minnesota 
Municipalities at Red Wing, his framing of the problem is 
obviously rooted both in his coming up through the Farmer 
Labor Party and the shifting momentum toward government 
remedy: 
The old pioneer idea of government as confined to 
police power has passed off the stage. We have now 
reached the socialized state. Just how far it shall 
extend its functions and services is no longer a 
matter of theory but a problem of practice and 
expediency. The present economic system has shown its 
inability to provide employment and even food or 
shelter for millions of Americans. Only government can 
cope with the situation (Mayer 1987, 108). 
 
The rhetorical move toward a legislative remedy is crystal 
clear. The “present economic system” is a failure. It has 
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caused problems of unemployment, lack of food, inadequate 
shelter for millions. Once again evoking and redefining the 
American Dream, Olson reminds us that the United States is 
no longer a Wild West frontier in which the only function 
of government is to keep the peace. He expresses urgency 
for enactment of his remedy, one that will extend 
government’s functions into the economic system. His words 
push forward the idea of the new financial paradigm that 
rejects what was the dominant narrative of the 1920s.  
Olson’s comments came at a time when “Hoovervilles,” 
or shantytowns, were springing up outside many urban areas, 
providing rudimentary cardboard or scrap-heap shacks for 
the many Americans made homeless by the Great Depression. 
And while Americans were not dying of starvation, daily 
hunger and even malnutrition were growing problems. Hoover 
himself had begun to try to find some solutions to the 
problem, stepping outside his non-interference ideology, 
but by then his actions were considered too little, too 
late (Kennedy 1999, 93-95). It is important to note that 
his framing of this issue directs attention to government 
forces and the economic system rather than other plausible 
frames (such as the farmer’s mismanagement of resources or 
failure to adapt to changing markets, the once dominant 
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frames of those in power). In this powerful speech, one of 
many he would make with a focus on the national issues 
related to the Great Depression as he campaigned for 
reelection (Mayer 1987, 107-113), the remedy for financial 
problems is one that ensures basic human rights including 
employment, housing, and food. 
 The idea of the old financial system being the cause 
of the current economic crisis, particularly among the 
farmer class, was also evident in a radical farm 
publication first published in 1932 in Washington, D.C., 
where it would be published sporadically until becoming 
Farmers National Weekly.17 The publication reflects a 
similar frame that defines the farm crisis largely in terms 
of unfair labor practices, poor economic policies, and 
greedy profiteers (often labeled “middlemen” and “Wall 
Street fat cats”). While not directly related to the Farmer 
Labor Party, the publication is worthy of consideration as 
further evidence of the growing rhetorical chorus that 
empowered the farmer class to enact change. Consider the 
                                                 
17 This particular publication is part of a Microfilm collection of 
agrarian activist publications donated to the MNHS by agricultural 
historian Lowell K. Dyson and Lem Harris, a writer of farm and labor 
issues and Communist activist (Effland, Anne 2008; Alarcon, Evelina and 
John Pappademos 2002). It contains very little information about the 
publication, other than it was not regularly published and it was 
distributed in mimeographed form. 
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publication’s stated mission, as published just beneath the 
“Farm News Letter” title on the front page of its first 
issue: 
FARM NEWS LETTER is issued weekly to supply farmers 
and farm workers with a critical analysis of official 
reports, farm relief proposals, farm legislation, etc. 
It gives timely accounts of the struggles of the farm 
population against those agencies responsible for the 
chronic agricultural depression. It aims to get at the 
kernel of the deepening crisis by supplying vital 
facts which are too often beautified, ignored or 
actually distorted. (Farm News Letter 1932a) 
 
First, it clearly frames the problem as “the chronic 
agricultural depression” and “the deepening crisis,” 
something made worse by, apparently, agencies who fail to 
provide truthful information about the depth of the crisis 
and its causes. That is a frame that clearly excludes the 
farmer’s action (or inaction in the case of debt default) 
as the problem and focuses instead on structural issues 
that must be addressed. One need look no further than the 
first article on the page to be sure that the problem is 
clearly framed in terms of the failure of the prior 
financial regime: 
Headline: Ruin of American Farm Calls for Action! 
Lead: In a news letter addressed to business men, 
Roger Babson (the doctor for sick business) tells them 
to “go into the woods, rest, think and pray.” Farm 
News Letter is addressed to farmers, and it will not 
advise them to “rest, think and pray.” When farmers 
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are losing their homes to the sheriff and tax 
collector, when their year’s crop is being swallowed 
by the banker and the food industries, it is no time 
to talk about resting and praying. It is time for 
thinking, of course, but especially it is time for 
action. (Farm News Letter 1932b) 
 
The problems, then, are framed as foreclosures and unfair 
practices by bankers and food industries. Interestingly, 
although advising against praying as a course of action, 
still the moral judgment is one that favors the farmer 
taking action to stop the “sheriff and tax collector,” “the 
banker and the food industries” from causing further harm 
to the farmer. The farmer is on the morally correct side in 
working to end injustice.  
The article then goes on to point to the following 
problems caused by the old financial regime: 
 Farm prices falling below 50% of pre-war levels. 
 Farm taxes more than double pre-war levels. 
 Freight rates higher. 
 Farm mortgages on the rise along with foreclosure, 
which “increases tenantry and sharecropping”. 
 Tenantry on the rise. 
 Wages for farm workers in decline or now nonexistent 
(room and board often the only pay). 
 Unemployment generally, which removes buyers from the 
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market. 
So the problems are defined here as structural/societal/ 
economic failures: pre-war prices for farm goods, 
foreclosures, unfair taxation. The moral judgment remains 
clear in the publication as it implies the farmer is being 
abused and misrepresented, and is not being protected by 
society. The remedy, then, is to take action to change the 
system. 
 
Systemic Problems Demand Legislative Remedies 
 
 The first issue of Farm Holiday News, published 
February 28, 1932, is even more direct in its framing of 
the problem being a systemic one that privileges wealthy 
Wall Streeters over farmers to the detriment of society. 
Directly under the Farm Holiday News title is the slogan: 
“A Fight to Save Civilization.” To its left is a box 
saying: “The Farmer Feeds the World and Deserves His Pay;” 
to the title’s right is a box reading: “Agriculture is the 
Foundation of All Industry” (Farm Holiday News 1932a). The 
front page headlines of this publication are particularly 
enlightening: 
 “A National Meeting of Farmers to Be Called in March 
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for Outlining Proposed Plans of Future Action” 
 “High American Tariff Has Been a Doubtful Blessing to 
United States Farmers”18 
 “Farmers of America Are Fighting for the Homes They 
Are About to Lose: The Disparity Between Prices 
Received and the Cost of Things They Buy Makes It 
Impossible for the Farmer to Carry the Full Burden” 
 “Sold to the Highest Bidder—But Suppose There Are No 
Bids?” (an article about the Penny Auction protests to 
stop foreclosure sales) 
 “This Farmer Strikes Back With the Money Lender’s Own 
Weapon” 
 “As Falling Prices Have Deflated the Southland 
Farmers” 
The paper does double work, both encouraging further 
activism by illustrating its effectiveness in enacting 
change and pointing to problems caused by structural 
failures, such as unstable prices and a corrupt mortgage 
market. In this narrative, the farmer is far from 
                                                 
18 To be clear, I have intentionally left the tariff disputes out of my 
project. While tariff issues certainly have the potential to affect 
farm prices, they were not commonly discussed in the farmer-labor press 
except for the occasional calls for “better tariff protections.” In a 
project more focused on Washington D.C. debates and the global market, 
research into the tariff would be vital, but it is not needed here. 
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powerless, however, as activism and fighting back against 
the corrupt lenders is a remedy that has results. So once 
again we see criticism of the old financial regime and a 
setting up for a new relationship with debt, one that will 
be, at least in part, on the farmer’s terms. 
In the center of the front page is a particularly eye-
catching article titled “Buzzards Pick the Carcass of the 
Dead Very Clean” (Farm Holiday News 1932b). It is eye 
catching because it includes a political cartoon of two 
buzzards in top hats and smoking cigars (caricatures of 
Wall Street profiteers) hunched over a human skeleton 
labeled, “Remains of Foreclosure Sale.” In the speech 
bubbles above the vultures, the one on the left, who is 
drooling while talking and smoking his cigar, asks, “Is 
there anything more satisfying than an after-dinner cigar?” 
to which his friend on the right answers, “Yes, the 
dinner.” While the cartoon is universal in its message of 
exploitation, a nearby article makes its activist stance 
personal, naming a Chicago Trust company that was 
benefiting from farm foreclosures. The repeated defining of 
the problem of foreclosures as one that devastates farmers, 
hurts society, and benefits banks is a consistent message 
across farmer-activist publications. It is a message that 
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prepares its readers for a new debt relationship that will 
take some of the power away from Wall Street.  
 By January 1, 1933, the paradigm shift in debt 
relations becomes increasingly visible in the mainstream 
press in Minnesota. It is Minneapolis Tribune reporter 
Orwin Folwick who best accesses the dramatic change in the 
framing of the issues in the past decade. In his cover 
story, "Olson, F.-L. Face Crisis in Fight on Legislation," 
he discusses the opening of the Minnesota legislature’s 48th 
“fling at lawmaking” by saying, “It [the legislation] will 
consider and be asked to pass laws that 10 years ago would 
have been thrust aside as radical dreams.” Among those 
“radical dreams” under consideration: “a statutory income 
tax, unemployment insurance, revision of the gross earnings 
taxes, and proposals to place the state in the electric 
power business". Two days later, the Minneapolis Tribune’s 
Washington Correspondent, George Authier, writes one of the 
first news stories in which the influence of the Farmer 
Labor Party’s educational, organizational, and political 
campaigns can be seen in the framing used. In “Dairy 
Allotment Aid Denied,” Authier very clearly defines the 
problem as poverty and unemployment in the farmer class 
hurting the economy everywhere as the poverty of farmers 
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means not only that they cannot work effectively, but that 
they cannot buy goods (Authier 1933a).  
 A week later, an AP story run on the front page of the 
paper, for the first time includes a moral evaluation of 
various remedies under consideration at the federal level 
when the article considers fairness, especially regarding 
who should pay for farm aid and as it relates to 
foreclosures (Associated Press 1933a). To be clear, the 
foreclosure crisis was not in Minnesota alone; it was a 
national issue and one that was brought to the table by the 
Senators from Tennessee and Florida. Another issue that was 
heavily debated in the early part of 1933 was the issue of 
which commodities would be included in the push for 
federally-backed aid. Minnesota Senator Andresen led the 
fight for several Midwest and Northeast states to include 
dairy/butterfat in the aid bill, framing that particular 
problem as one that would affect all industry if not 
included and would unfairly burden the dairy farmer through 
higher costs of feed grain with no payoff in higher prices 
for dairy. The issue of “fairness,” then, is again a way to 
morally frame the legislative debate. 
 By January 12, 1933, the debate about farm aid has 
clearly taken shape in the House and Senate, defining the 
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problem as one upon which the nation’s prosperity depends, 
as without a prosperous farmer, the U.S. cannot thrive 
(Authier 1933b). Further, the moral stance once expressed 
primarily by the Farmer Labor Party becomes increasingly 
visible, as the debate now frames the remedy as the 
responsibility of the nation and the government to help the 
farmer. Although the allotment bill under debate on January 
12 would not pass, it was but a precursor of Roosevelt’s 
larger Agricultural Adjustment Act that would be presented 
as soon as he took office. It is interesting to note, 
however, that he played a part in the drafting of the 
allotment bill even though he was not yet sworn in. This 
quote from William G. McAdoo, senator-elect from California 
and a political associate of then President-elect 
Roosevelt, makes clear the importance for the nation and, 
therefore, the federal government, that the farm problem be 
fixed:  
If this measure fails, I can see nothing except to 
return to war time price fixing for the principal farm 
commodities, wheat, cotton, hogs and tobacco. There 
can be no return of prosperity until the purchasing 
power of the farmer is restored. The prosperity of 30 
states rests directly upon their crops. The prosperity 
of the nation rests primarily upon the prosperity of 
these states. (Authier 1933b) 
 
The problem could not be more clear; farmers must be 
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returned to a state of prosperity, and the only way to make 
that happen is through federal legislation. 
 As what would eventually become the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act continues to be debated, more and more the 
problems defined include the need for farmers to get higher 
prices for their goods and the need to have the foreclosure 
problem addressed:  
In a day of renewed discussion of the agricultural 
problem, hearings were opened on a measure . . . under 
which the Reconstruction Corporation would be 
authorized to lend the owners of mortgaged property 
sufficient money to pay their taxes for the next two 
years. . . . Senator Harrison, describing the farm 
mortgage situation as most acute, told the banking 
committee the enactment of such a measure at the 
present session is imperative. (Associated Press 
1933b) 
 
Interestingly, while the influence of the Farmer Labor 
Party and Farm Holiday message regarding the need for 
intervention in the foreclosure crisis is present in this 
debate, the problem is defined as “foreclosures,” not as a 
banking failure. As such, while the rhetoric moves closer 
to a government remedy to the problem, it is a remedy that 
does not entirely free the farmer of debt. It rather 
enables the farmers facing foreclosure to stay in their 
homes, but also to stay in debt. 
 Also interesting is Roosevelt’s open participation in 
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the debate as president-elect, even as lame-duck Hoover 
threatened to veto any action taken toward federal 
government intervention. Roosevelt made it clear that it 
was vital that the relief bill provide 1933 crop production 
loans to get farming back on track. He also added to the 
framing of the problem as one of foreclosures: “Mr. 
Roosevelt has notified congressional leaders that he 
considers most imperative the need for legislation to keep 
farmers from losing their homes and thus becoming 
embittered or broken” (Associated Press 1933c). In this 
quote from Roosevelt it is clear to see the moral judgment 
inherent in the statement that we cannot allow farmers to 
become “embittered or broken.” Here it is not a question of 
industry or of economics; it is a question of soul. Keeping 
up the spirits of the farmer is important, which means that 
a depressed farmer class is clearly defined here as a 
problem. 
 Another AP story, “Rush Farm Debt Relief Bill: 
Democrats to Push Plan for Mortgages Aid,” not only defines 
the problem as impending foreclosures, but right in the 
subhead frames this issue as a moral one. The subhead 
reads: “Robinson Draws Up Plan to Give Farmer Latitude in 
Working out Salvation.” The use of the world “salvation” is 
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fascinating, as is the proposed legislation that relies 
upon third parties to help work out a debtor/creditor 
relationship that is fair. The lead of the story, too, does 
interesting work framing the problem in moral terms that 
recognize the humanity of farmers in new ways: "The 
powerful Democratic leadership in congress Friday night 
threw the full force of its support behind a mammoth plan 
for adjusting the debts of the nation's farmers on a basis 
of their ability to pay" (Associated Press 1933d). It is 
new to see “ability to pay” as a consideration. 
 Finally, by the end of the heavy legislative month of 
January, 1933, the defining of the problem is threefold: 1. 
Foreclosures, 2. Lack of buying power for farmers, and 3. 
Lack of payment for products. In a January 26th article, the 
subhead, "Proposal Designed to Give Agriculture Ready Cash. 
Would Postpone Mortgage Payment and Lower Rate" (Associated 
Press 1933e) hints at the ready acceptance now of what 
would have been out of the realm of possibility less than a 
decade earlier by any but the most liberal Farmer 
Laborites, who were often written off as kooky Communists 
in the 1920s. Additionally, the lead states that the 
legislative proposal has “the backing of the powerful 
Democratic leadership and organized agriculture,” 
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indicating in this front page article that it is important 
now to have the approval of farm groups if legislation is 
to be passed. Also important is the suggested threat of 
revolution by the farmer class, which is placed in the 
third paragraphs of the story. The “revolution” is 
discussed less as a threat and more as an inevitable 
occurrence unless farm groups are in support of the agreed-
upon legislation: 
spokesmen for the big farm organizations who helped to 
frame this and the other major farm relief proposals 
were telling a senate committee that revolution in the 
rural regions impends unless adequate steps are taken. 
 
Later in the story the reporter specifies that it was 
Edward A. O’Neal, president of the American Farm Bureau, 
who said that, “unless something is done for the American 
farmer we will have a revolution in the countryside in less 
than 12 months” (Associated Press 1933e, 2). John A. 
Simpson, president of the Farmers Union, was quoted as 
saying that “the biggest and finest crop of revolutions you 
ever saw is sprouting all over this country right now” 
(Associated Press 1933e, 2). After more than a dozen years 
of activism, farmers at last have a voice and the ability 
to strike fear into those with the power to enact change. 
 From here we will see this newly recognized coalition 
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continue to frame the problem as a failure of the financial 
regime of the 1920s and the remedy as federal government 
policy that restructures the farmer’s relationship to debt 
and creditors. In the next chapter this now dominant frame, 
once emergent, will shift as the Roosevelt administration 
blends both frames to move toward a remedy that will indeed 
structure farm debt under the guidance of the federal 
government in a way that, it is hoped in 1933, will help 
both farmers and their bankers.  
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Chapter 4 
 
New Financial Paradigm Enacted 
 
The term “farm crisis” perhaps is one that has been 
used so often in past decades that we have become calloused 
to its meaning, or have come to think of the phrase as 
meaning general difficulties on the farm. But in the 1920s 
and early 1930s, there can be little doubt that there was, 
indeed, a crisis in agricultural sectors, one brought about 
by a failure of profit-seeking bankers, investors, and 
farmers to successfully incorporate farming into industry 
like any sector. In this failed regime, bankers, without 
interference from lawmakers, had attempted to treat 
agriculture and farming as an “industrial sector,” failing 
to recognize the many complexities inherent in food 
production. By trying to encompass the farm into standard 
industrial growth models that rely upon expansion, 
increased production, and improved technology without 
consideration of the farm as home, family, and producer of 
primary goods relied upon by all humans for existence, 
these bankers and investors failed. Mortgages and related 
taxes went unpaid, debt-addled farmers fled their 
properties, private banking firms and joint-stock land 
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banks lost money trying to fix farms acquired through 
foreclosure. The failed efforts made by these anti-
government-intervention financiers to profit through 
investment on loans backed by tenuous future farm earnings 
would help to end an era and shift financial regimes. 
Governor Olson describes the period as the third of 
three eras in business development in the U.S., the era of 
“big bank control not only of credit but of industry 
itself,” one that has led to “the concentration of wealth 
and the concentration of the control of our money and 
credit,” a concentration that, as it “has been steadily 
accelerated, [so] the misery and distress of the farmer and 
the wage earner who make up the majority of the population 
has been steadily increasing” (Olson 1933). So great is the 
“distress of the common man and woman” that it cannot be 
cured “until we tear down this structure of concentrated 
control of wealth,” which can only be done through 
intentional, multifaceted intervention of the federal 
government into finance.  
Nothing could be less in line with the anti-government 
interference thinking of 1920s capitalists like Clive 
Jaffray than Olson’s remedy. And yet, when the farm crisis 
of the 1920s spiraled out of control amid the Great 
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Depression, when farm foreclosures were rampant and farm 
debts unpaid to the point of completely frozen banks across 
agricultural regions, even hardline, anti-government 
intervention bankers like Jaffray accepted the New Deal’s 
intervention into farm finance in the form of the Farm 
Credit Act of 1933 and the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 
1933. These acts, which worked in conjunction with the 
extensive Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 that 
stabilized prices, would essentially form the structure of 
farm finance as a sector requiring federal oversight and 
involvement, a policy that still largely defines farm 
credit today. This marks the coming of a new financial 
regime, one monitored by the federal government and 
accepted by banking officials, even those once morally and 
practically opposed to government intervention. Witnessing 
the birth of a new regime is the point of this chapter. 
As has been analyzed in past chapters, this move to 
bring farm finance under the purview of the federal 
government emerged after more than a decade of steady 
rhetorical efforts to promote strong government in the 
economy of food production. In this chapter, the acts 
themselves will be discussed as well as the ongoing 
coverage in the news, some of the debates about the new 
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structure in Congress, and FDRs comments on the proposed 
actions as well as those accompanying his executive order 
that created the Farm Credit Administration. By analyzing 
the framing of this solution, we can observe the 
culmination of this crisis in capitalism made possible by 
the decade long effort of farmer activists to reframe the 
farm crisis to promote federal government intervention.  
 
FDR’s Message to Congress: Executive Order 6084 
 
 On March 27, 1933, President Roosevelt issued an 
executive order that created the new Farm Credit 
Administration (FCA).  The FCA organized all the existing 
agricultural credit agencies of the United States, which 
included the Federal Land Banks established in 1916 as well 
as the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923 that had spawned 
such disastrous facilities as Minnesota’s state-run 
Regional Credit Corporation (the agency responsible for the 
close to 25% foreclosure rate on Minnesota farms by the 
time of the crash). With the executive order, Roosevelt 
abolished the much-criticized Federal Farm Board and 
declared that its replacement, the FCA, would be headed by 
a Governor appointed by Roosevelt, and moved any government 
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functions, powers, and funds related to agricultural credit 
under the purview of the new FCA administration (U.S. 
President 1933).  
In addition to the executive order, Roosevelt also 
sent a message to the House and Senate both summarizing the 
order and justifying it, first by promoting uniformity of 
programs related to agricultural credits, then by naming 
specific and immediate savings of $2 million as well as 
anticipated future savings. Of more interest for this 
project, however, is his concluding paragraph that sets the 
stage for the new financial regime he is just beginning to 
institute with this order: 
Important as are the foregoing, of greater and 
controlling importance is the maintenance of the long-
standing policy of the federal government to maintain 
and strengthen a sound and permanent system of 
cooperative agricultural credit, subject to federal 
supervision and operated on the basis of providing the 
maximum of security to present and prospective 
investors in bonds and debentures resting on farm 
mortgages or other agricultural securities—all for the 
purpose of meeting the credit needs of agriculture at 
minimum cost. (U.S. President 1933) 
  
Although Roosevelt justifies the FCA remedy in the 
executive order by tying it to the March 3 congressional 
declaration “that a serious emergency exists by reason of 
the general economic depression; that it is imperative to 
reduce drastically governmental expenditures,” in the first 
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part of the long quote above, Roosevelt downplays the 
savings he has just named. Rather, he frames the remedy’s 
“greater and controlling importance” as that of federal 
government intervention and supervision of agricultural 
finance. Interestingly, he implies that such federal 
intervention is “long-standing policy.” That is hardly the 
case. While it is absolutely true that the federal Farm 
Loan Act of 1916 established federal Land Banks and the 
Agricultural Credits Act of 1923 was intended to provide 
short-term credit, intervention was minimal and left 
largely to the state agencies and farm bureaus who 
interacted directly with farmers. Nothing as centralized, 
credit-focused, and supervisory had existed prior to the 
implementation of the executive order. Even the Farm Board 
created by Hoover in 1929 in an attempt to fix the 
agricultural problem was largely advisory and encouraged 
formation of co-ops, dealing only minimally with direct 
purchase of commodity surpluses. 
 Next in his statement Roosevelt frames the remedy as a 
“permanent system” through which the federal government 
will “maintain and strengthen” agricultural credit through 
its supervisory role. Because of the government 
supervision, Roosevelt writes, investors will have the 
  140 
“maximum of security,” making it safe once again to buy 
bonds and mortgage-backed securities related to farming. 
Through his framing of the remedy, Roosevelt surely implies 
that part of the spiraling problem with agricultural 
finance, a problem so vast that it has led not only to farm 
foreclosures on a massive scale but also to frozen banks in 
agricultural areas, is that there was not sufficient 
supervisory and operational oversight from the federal 
Government. Once that is in place, he argues, banks and 
investors can once again extend credit to farmers with the 
knowledge that those investments have the might of 
Washington behind them. Clearly, Roosevelt is displaying 
the benefit of this radical move even for those in the 
banking industry who had balked at such ideas in the past. 
He ends, though, with a pro-farmer statement that “the 
purpose” of the creation of this new administration is to 
provide needed credit to agriculture “at minimum cost.” In 
essence, he has framed his remedy as the best solution for 
bankers, investors, and farmers. By giving up the notion of 
free market finance and relying instead upon governmental 
intervention, farmers will get the credit they need to put 
agriculture back on the sound footing necessary for the 
country to recover financially while those involved in 
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agricultural finance from the provider side will benefit 
from guarantees backing their investments.  
  In this small bit of presidential rhetoric what is 
visible is a kind of finality or culmination of the shift 
in financial paradigms. We have observed a shift in 
dominant narratives since the early to mid-1920s, leading 
to this moment when the man at the seat of power is able to 
activate the language and law needed to change the 
financial regime as it relates to agricultural finance. 
After a decade of thought, debate, and various rhetorical 
expressions related to this idea, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the newspaper coverage of the creation of 
the FCA, both in Minnesota and in the New York Times, is 
mild and positive, focusing more on the specifics of 
refinancing plans than on the structural shift in the way 
agricultural finance will now function. The Minneapolis 
Tribune, using Associated Press coverage for its main 
story, ran a banner headline of “Farm Debt Aid Plan 
Offered” followed by the headline “Wallace Gives Congress 
Way for Refinance” (Henry A. Wallace was then FDR’s 
Secretary of Agriculture). The subheads, “Proposal Comes on 
Heels of Order to Consolidate Agricultural Credit Agencies” 
and “Morgenthau Heads Successor of Farm Board--Policy Sound 
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But Lenient,” frame the FCA formation as lesser news than 
the farm mortgage refinance proposal that followed it 
(Associated Press 1933e).  
The story’s lead is simple, straightforward, and non-
critical in a way that positions the news as an ordinary 
governmental function worth knowing about but not something 
that should elicit concern: “The scattered federal farm 
credit agencies, including the farm board, were tied into a 
single unit Monday by President Roosevelt in the first of 
his reorganization moves.” The lead of this front page 
story frames part of the problem of agricultural debt 
issues as related to the cause of “scattered federal 
agencies” and frames the remedy as bringing the agencies 
into “a single unit.” Rather than judge this shift, the 
lead simply frames it as the first of Roosevelt’s 
“reorganization moves;” readers would have understood from 
heavy newspaper coverage at the time that Roosevelt was 
expected to reorganize government as that was part of his 
election platform and, even before taking office in March, 
he had been working with government leaders and soliciting 
opinions from a variety of experts and laypeople from 
around the country to formulate the changes he would enact 
(Stuckey 2013, 37-38).  
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Unlike the Minneapolis Tribune, the New York Times 
does point first to the consolidation of agencies and then 
to the Wallace proposal, but again the focus is more on 
government structure than it is on a shift in the financial 
paradigm, illustrating the acceptance of this move toward 
government intervention. The page one headline reads 
“Roosevelt Saves Millions by Union of Farm Agencies,” which 
is followed by the subheads: “Orders Farm Board Abolished 
in Consolidation Under New Credit Administration,” 
“Morgenthau ‘Governor’,” “Red Cross Will Take Over Last of 
Stabilization Wheat and Cotton,” “Plan to Cut Farm Debt,” 
and, finally, “Wallace Outlines Refinancing Proposals to 
Congress—Burden Estimated at $12,000,000,000” (New York 
Times 1933a) With the order and content of its headlines 
and subheads, the New York Times positions the news as a 
story of consolidation, cost savings, and correction of the 
failed Farm Board effort to fix the agriculture problem. 
This double-barreled news item also covers the next steps 
of the Wallace proposal regarding the farm mortgage 
problem, but secondarily. Hence, the primary problem, by 
implication, is framed as one of inefficiency in 
government, a problem in the case of agriculture that was 
caused in part by the Farm Board. The remedy is the 
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consolidation of farm agencies, the elimination of the Farm 
Board, and the appointment of a New York favorite and 
friend of Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau Jr.  
The lead of the Times story, which details the 
headlines and subheads just examined, is followed 
immediately with news of the Wallace proposal: 
Coincidentally with the receipt of the message and 
order, Secretary Wallace of the Agricultural 
Department sent to Congress in response to a 
resolution an outline of a broad program to help 
farmers readjust their burden of debt through a 
governmental refinancing plan. The Secretary estimated 
the total farm debt at $12,000,000,000. 
 
Refinancing of mortgages under the Wallace program 
would be the province of the Federal Land banks and 
the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations, which 
would come under the jurisdiction of the new 
Consolidated Farm Credit Administration. (1933a) 
  
Of particular importance when tracking the emergence of the 
new financial paradigm are some turns of phrase in the 
above passage that frame governmental intervention and 
oversight of a finance problem as natural. Note that 
through “a governmental refinancing plan” farmers will get 
help to “readjust their burden of debt.” Here the problem 
is framed as a “burden of debt,” one that will be remedied 
through readjustment planned by the government. 
Specifically, the existing Federal Land Banks (initially 
designed for long-term debt such as mortgages) and 
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Agricultural Credit Corporations (initially created as 
short-term credit facilities for seasonal seed loans) will 
be the avenue for readjustment, but now “under the 
jurisdiction of the new Consolidated Farm Credit 
Administration.” The writer for the Times clearly has an 
understanding of the way the new system will function, 
namely under centralized leadership of the federal 
government; yet, the coverage of this shift is rather 
matter-of-fact, which does important work to frame the 
remedy as acceptable.  
 The article goes on to explain that “refinancing of 
mortgage principle would be handled through the Federal 
Land banks.” In order to do so, funding would be provided 
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which would 
either buy existing mortgages outright or they would be 
“exchanged for Reconstruction Corporation securities.” 
Further, loans with the purpose of paying interest and 
past-due amortization installments as well as back taxes 
would be arranged through the Regional Agricultural Credit 
Corporations. The aim of these loans was not to increase 
farmer debt, but rather to lessen the existing debt by 
shifting it to government-backed securities, essentially 
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taking farm mortgages out of the free-market banking 
system. Wallace is quoted as saying that: 
These plans represent an outright reduction in 
indebtedness through providing credit facilities, 
which will induce existing holders to scale down the 
principal of their mortgages, and the shifting of loan 
obligations from existing mortgage holders to the 
federal agencies, which will defer foreclosures.”  
 
The quote is left to stand without discussion, being 
followed immediately by a partial comment from Mortgenthau 
that he made after a meeting with Roosevelt: 
Mr. Morgenthau, leaving a conference with President 
Roosevelt, declared the credit administration would be 
directed ‘in the interest of the farmers and along 
sound lines.’ The aim, he said, would be lower and 
more uniform interest rates. (New York Times 1933a, 2) 
 
The combination of the Wallace quote, which clearly frames 
the farm foreclosure problem as one that will be remedied 
by direct federal government involvement in farm finance, 
and the Morgenthau quote, which frames the remedy as one 
that privileges farmers, does overall work to frame this 
new financial paradigm as desirable and natural.  
It also gives the federal government’s primary 
agricultural representatives—Wallace as Secretary of 
Agriculture and Morgenthau as Governor of the new FCA—space 
to make some radical claims: first, the existing structure 
of farm mortgages through private facilities and with high 
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interest rates is not a workable system; second, deferment 
of foreclosures is important and will be prioritized; and 
third, the welfare of farmers will be put first. 
Additionally, the Morgenthau phrase, “along sound lines,” 
which is also quoted in the Associated Press story, 
combined with the Wallace claim that principals will be 
“scaled down,” clearly alludes to the farm mortgage problem 
in causal terms of poor financial management by private 
firms who have not used “sound” judgment and who have used 
inflated assessments of properties, leading to high 
principals on existing mortgages.  The framing of the issue 
by Roosevelt’s appointees, while surely implying criticism 
of the prior system, is not strong enough to alienate the 
mortgage-backed security holders who the administration 
will rely upon to exchange their high-interest, unstable 
loans for low-interest, government-backed loans. 
Additionally, the New York Times clearly gets the 
administration’s message that the new system being 
instituted is best for everyone, as it inserts a subhead in 
its reprinting of FDR’s executive order consolidating the 
farm agencies: “For Sounder Farm Securities.” 
 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 
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One week later, on April 3, 1933, Roosevelt would 
address the farm mortgage issue directly in a message to 
Congress. The opening of that message is rich terrain 
rhetorically: 
As an integral part of the broad plan to end the 
forced liquidation of property, to increase purchasing 
power and to broaden the credit structure for the 
benefit of both the producing and consuming elements 
in our population, I ask the Congress for specific 
legislation relating to the mortgages and other forms 
of indebtedness of the farmers of the Nation. 
(Roosevelt 1933a).  
 
First, he opens by framing what will become the Emergency 
Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 as part of the larger remedy 
being implemented in a number of legislative moves broadly 
grouped under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. More 
specifically, he frames “forced liquidation of property” as 
a problem that must be addressed by Congress. Partly that 
is important because of the lack of available “purchasing 
power” for the “the producing and consuming elements in our 
population;” in other words, when people lose their homes 
and farms, they cannot play the vital role of consumer of 
industrial goods any more than they can continue to produce 
needed food products.  
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Tracey Deutsch (2010), in Building a Housewife’s 
Paradise: Gender, Politics, and American Grocery Stores in 
the Twentieth Century, reperiodizes state involvement in 
the food business, particularly the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration’s interactions with food retailers 
(80-81). When adding to that perspective the reach of the 
New Deal into the realms of food production and farm 
finance, the shift is indeed profound. Roosevelt’s rhetoric 
regarding consumerism here is part of a shift in 
perspective regarding the federal government’s economic 
approach described by Deutsch as “a crucial change” 
influenced by Keynesian thinking in which “fostering 
purchasing power would now be as important as fostering 
production” (97). Politicians increasingly celebrated “the 
consumer” in their rhetoric while federal officials showed 
growing interest in Keynesian-influenced policy making that 
would fuel consumerism.19   
                                                 
19 In a Saturday night radio address about farm relief made by Secretary 
of Agriculture Wallace on March 18 that same “farmer as consumer” 
rhetoric is clear in his description of what the farm relief bill aims 
to achieve: “Its basic purpose, first of all, is to increase the 
purchasing power of farmers. It is, by that token, farm relief, but it 
is also by the same token, national relief for it is true that millions 
of urban unemployed will have a better chance of going back to work 
when farm purchasing power rises enough to buy the products of city 
factories” (Wallace 1933).  
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 Roosevelt’s message continues, reminding Congress 
“That many thousands of farmers in all parts of the country 
are unable to meet indebtedness incurred” when crop prices 
were considerably higher, or, as he puts it, “crop prices 
had a very different money value,” a problem he defines as 
“known to all of you.” Then, referencing the omnibus 
agriculture relief bill that includes crop price 
stabilization measures, the message readies readers for his 
request: 
The legislation now pending, which seeks to raise 
agricultural commodity prices, is a definite step to 
enable farm debtors to pay their indebtedness in 
commodity terms more closely approximating those in 
which the indebtedness was incurred; but that is not 
enough. 
 
Here he is doing two things. First, he is expanding the 
frame of the farm crisis as partially caused by the abysmal 
prices now received for commodities, prices far below the 
pre-World War I value, but also as a larger issue that 
cannot be solved by price correction alone. Second, he is 
diagnosing the cause in terms of the larger economy rather 
than laying it at the feet of farmers who have failed “to 
pay their indebtedness.” The implication is clear in the 
choice of the phrase “unable to meet indebtedness;” the 
farmer would pay back debts if it were possible to do so. 
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Therefore, the farmer is not the cause of the problem, the 
economic situation is the cause.  
 In answer to his set up that price stabilization “is 
not enough,” Roosevelt explains the need to intervene in 
the farm mortgage crisis using a highly moral frame that at 
once indicates the immorality of the current situation from 
a humanity standpoint and concurrently from an economic 
standpoint: 
In addition the federal government should provide for 
the refinancing of mortgage and other indebtedness so 
as to secure a more equitable readjustment of the 
principal of the debt and a reduction of interest 
rates, which in many instances are so unconscionably 
high as to be contrary to a sound public policy, and, 
by a temporary readjustment of amortization, to give 
sufficient time to farmers to restore to them the hope 
of ultimate free ownership of their own land. I seek 
an end to the threatened loss of homes and productive 
capacity now faced by hundreds of thousands of 
American farm families. 
 
First, the moral framing is evident in his use of words 
such as “should,” “equitable,” “unconscionably,” and 
“hope.” What Roosevelt is saying “should” be enacted by the 
federal government is the means to refinance debt in a way 
that repairs both the principal and interest rates. The 
principal on the mortgage debts is not “equitable” 
primarily because of outdated or predatory loan structures 
based on an idealized farm value of WWI years. The 
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accompanying interest rates “are so unconscionably high as 
to be contrary to a sound public policy,” meaning that not 
only are interest rates morally unjust, but they are not 
acceptable from a social and economic standpoint as they 
should be under the terms of “sound public policy.” 
Finally, not only is it important to enact the suggested 
public policy to provide a more just system for farmer 
debt, but it is also necessary to give time to farmers to 
adjust to this new world order, one in which “hope” will be 
restored—hope not just for sound economics but for a piece 
of the American Dream in the “ultimate free ownership of 
their own land.”  
 Through the moral judgments in the paragraph, 
Roosevelt frames his proposed “sound public policy20” as a 
needed remedy to the problem of “the threatened loss of 
homes and productive capacity.” It is a problem caused by 
immoral and unjust debt structures that put undue and 
unfair demands on farmers. In his final sentence he further 
defines the problem’s multifaceted dimensions and moral 
thread by mentioning three key facets: the who (American 
                                                 
20 “Sound” is a word that both Roosevelt and his FCA Governor Morgenthau 
repeatedly use to describe the newly proposed government interventions. 
It is an interesting way to contrast their new, Keynsian-inspired ideas 
to the prior administration’s “unsound” public policy. 
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farm families), the what (loss of production and homes), 
and the how much (hundreds of thousands). By naming “the 
who” as farm families, he illustrates that the agricultural 
sector cannot be classified in the same terms as other 
industries; when a farm is lost, it is not the same thing 
as a business shutting its doors. When a farm is lost, that 
means a family loses its home. Similarly, with “the what,” 
he shows that with each farm lost, we lose not only a home 
but also the associated production of that farm. Since what 
a farm produces is foodstuffs for the rest of the country, 
it is especially important that production continue. 
Finally, the “how much” is a reminder of how widespread 
this problem actually is. Pegging the number as “hundreds 
of thousands” makes it clear that this is a problem of 
immense proportion, which helps to justify the need for 
federal intervention. 
 The message closes out with two more arguments for the 
moral righteousness of this remedy along with a note that 
the proposed legislation “will not impose a heavy burden 
upon the national Treasury.” The lack of burden follows 
from the plan’s location of enactment in “existing agencies 
of the Government,” namely the Farm Credit Agency and the 
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federal banks now under its purview. As for the continued 
moral framing, the statement continues: 
the farm owners of the Nation will be enabled to 
refinance themselves on reasonable terms; it will 
lighten their harassing burdens and give them a fair 
opportunity to return to sound conditions.  
 
So in this frame farmers will be empowered to take control 
of their own finances, but on “reasonable terms,” as 
opposed to the existing terms which, by contrast, must be 
unreasonable. The righteousness of providing an avenue for 
independence for the farmer combined with the elimination 
of “their harassing burdens” has a nearly biblical ring to 
it. This frame allows a new vision of the farm family, one 
in which the “harassing burdens” of an unfair financial 
system can be cast off, replaced with “fair opportunity” 
and “sound conditions” provided by federal government 
policy. To drive home the moral frame, Roosevelt next gives 
a brief preview of his plan for “extending this wholesome 
principle to the small home owners of the Nation, likewise 
faced with this threat.” His legislative proposal, then, is 
framed as “wholesome” and an answer to a “threat” to the 
entire nation, farmer and small homeowner alike. Through 
these frames we can see the larger acceptance of the new 
financial paradigm in which substantive government 
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intervention is necessary, just, and required for the 
stability of the nation.  
 New York Times coverage of the emergency farm mortgage 
plan ran on the front page both as a preview on the day of 
Roosevelt’s presentation to Congress April 3, 1933, as well 
as the next day with full details of how the legislation 
would function. The preview carried the following headline: 
“Roosevelt to Ask Huge 4% Bond Issue to Ease Farm Debt” 
along with these subheads: “Special Message to Congress 
Today Will Propose Wide Mortgage Refinancing,” “2 to 3 
Billion Required,” “Enabling Measure Drafted for Rider to 
Expedite Agricultural Relief Bill,” “Sentiment is 
Favorable” “Bonds Would Be Exchanged for Farm Mortgages and 
Also Sold to the Public” (New York Times, 1933b). The 
headline and subheads immediately frame the Roosevelt 
remedy both in terms of its magnitude as well as its 
necessity for pushing forward the larger farm relief bill 
on which it would ride. When compared with the Federal Farm 
Loan Act passed under Hoover in 1932, which invested $125 
million in the Federal Land Banks, it is clear that the 
investment in farm finance being proposed is, indeed, a 
radical departure from the status quo with its expected 
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cost of $2 billion to $3 billion. That departure is further 
marked with the Times lead:  
A gigantic flotation of government bonds to refinance 
the mortgage indebtedness of the farmers will be 
proposed by President Roosevelt in a special message 
which he will transmit to Congress tomorrow. The bonds 
will carry an interest rate of 4 per cent, and between 
$2,000,000,000 and $3,000,000,000 will be required, it 
is estimated. 
 
Indeed, $2 to $3 billion in government bonds could 
reasonably be described as “gigantic,” a fairly colorful 
adjective for a paper not known for its dynamic language 
choices.  
As such, it is particularly interesting to note that 
the story frames the act as necessary in terms of the 
larger agricultural relief efforts and that “Sentiment Is 
Favorable.” Further down in the preview story, the writer 
pairs the magnitude with a possible explanation for its 
acceptance: 
While the proposal is regarded as one of the most 
daring yet offered by the administration, sentiment in 
Congress appears to favor its acceptance. This is due, 
it is said, to the promise that the President will 
later recommend similar legislation to take care of 
home mortgages. Pressure for the proposed legislation 
providing for the exchange of government bonds for 
farm mortgages has been brought to bear upon 
Washington of late, particularly by insurance 
companies and savings banks. 
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First, this passage, in connecting the farm legislation to 
the promise of similar legislative intervention for home 
owners, frames the proposal definitionally as a remedy tied 
to a greater plan to help the entire population. The 
support of varied congressional representatives supports 
that supposition. Further, in suggesting that legislators 
have been under “pressure” from “insurance companies and 
savings banks,” the story frames the remedy as one with 
wide appeal, even by those who have in the past opposed 
government intervention in their lending models.  
 Finally, after explaining the scale of the problem 
being addressed as farmer debt exceeding $12 billion and 
frozen farm mortgages amid farmers being “unable to meet 
their obligations and a vast majority of those whose 
property is encumbered face foreclosure,” (1, 5) the 
article moves to contextualize the legislation as a move 
that should have been expected. It does so by quoting some 
of Roosevelt’s campaign rhetoric:  
he said that ‘much work was done in the last Congress 
to extend and liquefy and pass on to the federal 
government a portion of the debts of the railroads, of 
banks, of utilities and industry in general. Something 
in the nature of a gesture was made in the financing 
of urban and suburban homes. But practically nothing 
has been done toward removing the menace of debt from 
farm homes.’ Mr. Roosevelt said that he could see no 
reason why the farmers had not been succored in the 
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same manner as bankers and industrialists. (1933b, 5) 
 
Beyond framing the legislative proposal as a fulfillment of 
a campaign promise, the passage also points to the 
important role that Roosevelt’s understanding of 
agriculture as a key American sector played in his 
election. Roosevelt understood early on the importance of 
stemming the tide of farm foreclosures, a problem he framed 
as systemic in nature, which justified his promise “to 
direct all the energies of which I am capable to definite 
projects to relieve that distress,” namely federal 
involvement in banking and the farm mortgage business (New 
York Times 1933b, 5). So the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act 
represents a clear move to keep a promise for the 
institution of a new financial regime in which the federal 
Government sets interest rates on loans and guarantees them 
with Treasury and bond-issue funds.21  
 Similarly to the New York Times story, the Minneapolis 
Tribune preview coverage, run on the front page April 3, 
1933, focuses on the magnitude of the Roosevelt proposal 
with the banner, “Billion Farm Debt Asked,” followed with 
                                                 
21 While the focus here is on Roosevelt’s programs specifically as they 
relate to banking and farm finance, it is important to note that he did 
fully understand the need to stabilize the economic wellbeing of all 
people (not just bankers or farmers), as the Works Progress 
Administration most famously illustrates. 
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the headline, “Congress Will Get Roosevelt Scheme Today” 
(Associated Press 1933g). However, the next deck of 
headlines points immediately to the benefit to holders of 
farm mortgages and the likelihood of rapid relief: 
“Executive Calls for Certificates at 4 1/2 Per Cent to 
Replace Present Mortgages” and “President Hopes to Add 
Proposal to Commodities Bill Now Pending.” The accompanying 
Associated Press story lead, too, frames the legislation 
primarily in terms that define it as a remedy to the 
problem of farm debt: "Legislation to reduce the 
overbalanced debt burden on American farmers by a billion 
dollars and more will be proposed to congress Monday by 
President Roosevelt." The phrase “overbalanced debt burden” 
further frames the remedy as morally just as it will right 
a wrong endured by the farmer class. The story continues, 
naming the legislation “one of his [Roosevelt’s] most 
ambitious attacks on the economic crisis,” before 
explaining that the proposal will enable “a swapping of 
present mortgages for new certificates of indebtedness to 
be based on a greatly reduced interest rate.” Specifically, 
“instead of the present rates of 6 and 7 per cent on 
agriculture mortgages a maximum rate of 4 1/2 per cent will 
be provided." The frames are clear. The debt load of 
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farmers is a problem caused, at least in part, by high 
interest rates on mortgages; the remedy is federal 
legislation that will reduce those rates substantially. 
 The article continues by explaining that "the gigantic 
task of refinancing government and private mortgages held 
by farmers" will fall under the purview of "existing 
agencies," namely the federal land banks. It also names 
Henry Morgenthau as the official responsible for the 
drafting of the legislation of the program that will 
largely fall under his control as Governor of the Farm 
Credit Administration. Here again there is a clear 
understanding of what is happening with this legislation—
the federal government is planning to relieve the farm 
mortgage crisis by directly intervening. The Federal Land 
Banks are slated to take over a much larger share of the 
farm mortgage market using interest rates far below the 
current commercial rates. Coverage the day after the 
legislation was proposed details the hope that commercial 
lenders will “join in the general plan” by exchanging loans 
for bonds as well as by lowering their own rates to get in 
line with the interest set by the federal government. It 
also clearly states that the legislation “provides for 
special loans to be made by the Farm Loan Commissioner from 
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funds supplied by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
at 5 per cent interest, to permit farmers to protect 
themselves from immediate foreclosures and to recapture 
their property” (New York Times 1933c, 1-2). That the 
office of the Land Bank Commissioner, which formerly 
functioned as the regulator of the Federal Land Banks, will 
now be authorized to make direct loans for the first time, 
is included as just one more detail in the overall report 
on the legislation. The lack of fanfare accompanying a 
significant change in government involvement in the farm 
mortgage business indicates an acceptance of this new 
financial paradigm. 
 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
 
 On May 12, 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was 
passed and signed into law; it included Title II, better 
known as the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933. As for 
Title I, the “Agricultural Adjustment” portion of the 
legislation, it opens with a “Declaration of Emergency” 
that defines the farm emergency problem as part of the 
larger “acute economic emergency” that we now call the 
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Great Depression. It frames the cause of the agricultural 
contribution to economic distress as:  
in part the consequence of a severe and increasing 
disparity between the prices of agricultural and other 
commodities, which disparity has largely destroyed the 
purchasing power of farmers for industrial products, 
has broken down the orderly exchange of commodities, 
and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets 
supporting the national credit structure. 
(Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 31)  
 
In other words, the prices paid to farmers for their goods 
is so low as to cripple the farmer financially, a situation 
that both prevents the farmer class from contributing to 
the economy as consumer and undermines the credit stability 
of the entire nation. As such, the government is justified 
in enacting a policy that will “establish and maintain such 
balance between the production and consumption of 
agricultural commodities” by re-establishing prices at pre-
WWI levels “by gradual correction of the present 
inequalities” (32). Said correction will be achieved 
through government oversight of production levels and 
marketing as well as through taxation of processors (as a 
means of protecting consumers). 
 As there is no shortage of scholarship and analysis of 
the legislation’s Title I role in the New Deal efforts for 
economic recovery, I will not focus on it overly here 
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(Kennedy 1999; Stuckey 2103; Valelly 1989). It is 
important, however, for the purpose of unpacking the 
justification for Title II (the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act 
portion of the bill) and the upcoming passage of the Farm 
Credit Act, to note that the new policy put the Secretary 
of Agriculture in charge of determining appropriate 
production levels of commodities. When Hoover had attempted 
to fix the farm problem with the Federal Farm Loan Act of 
1932, his program failed in part because it set aside 
limited funds to buy up surpluses from farmers without 
setting limits on production; therefore, his relief program 
was unable to keep up with the surplus purchase demands. 
Under the Roosevelt program, commodity production had 
extensive government oversight, largely funded by the tax 
on processors, who had been heavily criticized for the past 
decade by activists who argued that such “middle men” were 
profiting by paying too little to farmers for their raw 
goods and charging too much to consumers for the processed 
products.  
Because of this new system of oversight and taxation, 
it was fully expected that farmers would be returned to a 
“sound” financial position. From that sound position, it 
would be possible to re-enter a balanced financial order in 
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which farmers could once again pay their debts, including 
those in the form of farm mortgages. Hence, to fully 
understand the justifications for the passage of the 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, or Title II of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, it is important to keep in 
mind that the expectation was for Title I to stabilize the 
farmer financially, which helped bolster the argument for 
the unique mortgage bailout proposed.  
The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 called for a 
bond issue by Federal Land Banks to the tune of $2 billion, 
bearing interest of 4 percent; the bonds could be issued at 
any time for the next two years. The funds raised with the 
bond issue were to be used for making new loans, for buying 
mortgages, or in a direct exchange of bonds for mortgages, 
all overseen by the Farm Loan Commissioner. The new or 
refinanced loans were to be based on the “normal value” of 
the property and not to exceed 50 percent of its value 
(plus an additional 20 percent based on the value of 
permanent improvements on the farm). By “normal value” the 
administration means the value of the land in the 1909-1914 
period covered by the rest of the act; by so setting the 
“normal value,” ostensibly the overinflated assessments of 
the early and mid-1920s could be avoided while at the same 
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time steering clear of a massive devaluing of real estate 
by relying on the current deflated environment. It further 
allowed for direct loans by the Federal Land Banks (at 4 ½ 
percent) as well as, for the first time, the Federal Loan 
Commissioner (at 5 percent) when the Land Banks were either 
unavailable or unable to lend; an automatic reduction of 
interest rates to no more than 4 ½ percent on all existing 
Federal Land Bank loans; and forbearance on principal 
payments for up to five years. Finally, it forced the 
liquidation of Joint-Stock Land Banks first by making it 
illegal for the privately held lending institutions to 
issue stocks or bonds based on their mortgages (thereby 
ending any future business) and by offering Farm Loan 
Commissioner-backed loans (made with Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation funds) for 4 percent bonds in exchange for 
existing mortgages. Any attempts by Joint-Stock Land Banks 
to foreclose upon farm mortgages were made illegal except 
by approval from the Land Bank Commissioner or when the 
farm was abandoned. 
President Roosevelt’s statement upon signing the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (or so-called Farm Relief Bill) 
focused not on the price and production stabilization 
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components, but rather on the measures aimed at stemming 
the tide of foreclosures. It begins: 
I have just signed the Farm Relief Bill, which 
includes the refinancing of farm debts. 
 
The Act extends relief not only to farmer borrowers, 
but to mortgage creditors as well. 
 
Holders of farm mortgages will have the privilege of 
exchanging them for Federal Land Bank bonds, the 
interest payments upon which are to be guaranteed by 
the Treasury of the United States. 
 
Farmers whose mortgages are to be exchanged for these 
bonds will reap the benefit of lower interest rates 
and more liberal terms of payment. (Roosevelt 1933b) 
 
From the outset, the signing statement frames the remedy 
essentially as a government-sponsored compromise, in that 
both sets of players involved in the farm mortgage crisis 
will find relief: the farmers struggling to make payments 
and hold onto their farms, and their creditors who are 
losing money in unpaid interest and principal and in the 
cost of foreclosures.  
While it may seem an overreach to use the term 
“privilege” when describing the exchange of farm mortgages 
for Federal Land Bank bonds, indeed the backing of said 
bonds by the U.S. Treasury made them roughly equivalent to 
actual Treasury Bonds. When taking into account the 
volatile/collapsing farm mortgage market, the possibility 
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of trading a farm mortgage, even one with a 6 or 7 percent 
interest rate, for a guaranteed interest payment of 4 or 5 
percent was indeed a generous offer. Of course, it is an 
offer that shifts the financial paradigm toward government 
oversight of the immense farm mortgage market. For farmers, 
the lowered interest rates were undoubtedly a benefit, when 
taking into account the typical duration of these loans at 
30 years, but of more help was what is referred to above as 
the “liberal terms of payment,” namely the federal 
government’s new amortization schedule that permitted 
putting off payments on principal without penalty for up to 
five years. The goal of that portion of the Act was to give 
the farmer time to reap the rewards of the new commodity 
pricing efforts and thereby to stabilize farm finances 
before requiring farmers to get back on schedule with the 
loan repayment. The compromise element of the Act is 
further evident in that delayed repayment plan, in that it 
assumes the farmer will, in fact, repay the mortgage debt; 
the insistence on repayment is in fact compromise when 
viewed in light of the radical farmer class that proclaimed 
existing farm mortgages to be immoral and based on 
unrealistic land valuations made by greedy Wall Street fat 
cats. So from the most radical viewpoint, the loans 
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themselves should have been eliminated, not repaid. 
Although technically the bill also allowed for actual loan 
forgiveness on the principal based on new assessments, it 
hardly ever happened (Rose 2013, 14-16).  
Roosevelt’s statement continues, at once reasserting 
the compromising nature of this act while making it clear 
that the federal government is taking control in the realm 
of farm mortgage finance, and as such it is vital to avoid 
hasty action:  
It is to the interest of all the people of the United 
States that the benefits of this Act should be 
extended to all who are in need of them and that none 
should be deprived of them through ignorance or 
precipitate action.  
 
For this reason, I appeal particularly to mortgage 
creditors and all others who have money claims against 
farmers. Every effort will be made to administer the 
Act promptly, considerately and justly. 
 
The compromise frame is reasserted by describing the Act as 
being “to the interest of all the people of the United 
States.” All the people here includes farm creditors, farm 
debtors, and the entire country, as it has been repeatedly 
argued by Roosevelt and his administration that there 
cannot be an economic recovery without raising up the 
farmer class. And to achieve that goal, the financial 
paradigm has been shifted, giving the federal government 
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the power to stabilize the farm mortgage market through 
direct intervention in the form of new loans and the 
refinancing of existing loans. In a frame of moral 
justness, Roosevelt asks creditors to recognize the federal 
government’s new authority and to not act in haste to 
“deprive” farmers of this opportunity to correct their 
financial situation.  
He does assure creditors that waiting for the new 
structure to be implemented will not be an overly taxing 
sacrifice for them, as much advance preparation has been 
made “by officers of the Federal Land Bank system.” 
Regardless, the “applications cannot be acted upon 
instantly. Time for examination, appraisal and perfection 
of records will be necessary.” He continues:  
I urge upon mortgage creditors, therefore, until full 
opportunity has been given to make effective the 
provisions of the mortgage refinancing sections of the 
Farm Relief Act, that they abstain from bringing 
foreclosure proceedings and making any effort to 
dispossess farmers who are in debt to them. I invite 
their cooperation with the officers of the land banks, 
the agents of the Farm Loan Commissioner and their 
farmer debtors to effect agreements which will make 
foreclosures unnecessary. 
 
This passage, perhaps at first blush a plea for leniency 
and an invitation for “cooperation,” is, more importantly, 
a moral framing of the new state of farm mortgages. By 
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suggesting that creditors give the “full opportunity” for 
implementation of the new legislation by “abstain[ing]” 
from initiating more foreclosures or “making any effort to 
dispossess farmers,” a turn of phrase that evokes exile or 
a turning out, he is pointing to foreclosure proceedings as 
a choice. Creditors, in this moral frame, need not 
“dispossess” those indebted to them, not now that an 
alternative and better solution for both farmers and 
creditors exists.  
Under this new financial paradigm, a refiguring of 
existing debt “will make foreclosures unnecessary.” And, 
just in case the creditors missed the point of the lecture, 
Roosevelt closes with, “This is in line both with public 
duty and private interest.” Not only does the new model of 
farm mortgage finance, as Roosevelt so succinctly states, 
benefit those involved on an individual level (“private 
interest”), but it is the morally correct path for society 
(“public duty”). That last sentence also circles back the 
framing of this remedy in terms of its brilliance as a 
compromise measure, one that incorporates into the newly 
dominant narrative just enough of the last decade’s 
dominant narrative to provide a smooth transition: “private 
interest” here applies to all of those involved in the farm 
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mortgage crisis—creditors and debtors alike. Nobody wins 
outright in that farmers do not get their debts forgiven 
any more than creditors get payouts on the totality of the 
loans they issued; however, everybody wins as farmers have 
the opportunity to stay on their land and repay their 
mortgages under more reasonable terms while creditors avoid 
the costly foreclosure process, instead getting the 
equivalent of a Treasury Bond for their troubles. Even 
society wins as farmers will once again become consumers 
and investment firms will stop losing money.  
 In the Minneapolis Tribune, the coverage of the 
bill’s passage is heralded not for the price stabilization 
measures, which Farm Holiday and Farmer Labor Party 
representatives had tried unsuccessfully to expand with an 
amendment that would guarantee the price of commodities 
cover the cost of production (Associated Press 1933h), but 
rather with a focus on the emergency farm mortgage 
measures. Running with the headline “Mortgage Aid for Farms 
to Begin Monday” and the subheads “Morgenthau Outlines 
Procedure to Put New Relief Act Into Effect” and “Will Seek 
to Have Insurance Firms Exchange Mortgages for Bonds,” the 
staff written story leads with news that Morgenthau “will 
hold a conference Friday with representatives of the 
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leading insurance companies relative to farm mortgages. The 
conference is to make effective the farm mortgage 
legislation in the farm bill” (Authier 1933c, 1). The 
framing of the farm mortgage remedy as primary marks the 
perceived importance for local readers of this new 
financial structure. The story itself is highly detailed, 
covering every aspect of the new farm mortgage system and 
also highlighting the main points of a May 2, 1933, news 
story that reprinted Wallace’s letter to Olson with point 
by point instructions on setting up the local 
infrastructure that would handle the loan revisions 
(Authier 1933d, 1). Included in the details of the 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, under the subhead “Refinancing 
Debts,” are the details of the new loans “to be 
administered by the farm loan commissioner of the new farm 
credit administration. This fund will be loaned by the 
commissioner’s representatives located in the Federal Land 
Banks” (2). Again, it is clear from the detailed coverage 
of the Act and Washington Correspondent Authier’s ongoing 
and nuanced reporting on agriculture-related legislation 
that the he knows this is a new and entirely government-run 
form of farm finance. Yet his focus is not on the increased 
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reach of the federal government here but rather on the 
specific needs of farmers that will be addressed. 
In contrast, the New York Times, in its May 13, 1933, 
front page coverage, does at last point to the far reach of 
the federal government with the passage of the Agricultural 
Credit Act, clearly showing an understanding of the new 
financial paradigm that is unfolding. Overall, the Times 
frames the news as an acceptable remedy for addressing the 
farm crisis. That acceptance comes through in the story 
even as it expresses some concern, as seen in the headlines 
and subheads, about an amendment regarding inflationary 
measures that was added on late in the process, giving 
President Roosevelt “an array of powers in his hands and 
left the manner and timing of their exercise to him alone” 
(Kennedy 1999, 143)22. The main headline, “President Signs 
Farm Bill, Making Inflation the Law,” is followed by the 
subheads “But He Is Silent at the White House Ceremony on 
Use of Broad Currency Powers,” “Asks Foreclosure Delay,” 
“Mortgage Creditors Are Urged to Grant Time to Make Measure 
                                                 
22 Kennedy notes that while Roosevelt, in response to the upset of his 
economic counselors when he decided to allow the amendment stand, the 
President told his advisors that he was merely “yielding to the 
inevitable” to avoid “even worse mandatory inflationary measures” 
(143). However, Kennedy writes that actually Roosevelt had been 
“fascinated with inflationary ideas for months” and was pleased with 
the opportunity to take control.  
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Effective,” and “Wallace Acts at Once.” So even as the 
paper points to Roosevelt’s silence on his new executive 
powers related to inflation, it still frames as most 
important the mortgage refinancing portion of the law.  
In the story’s lead and contextualizing second 
paragraph, we see the new financial paradigm fully 
displayed: 
Affixing his signature to the farm relief inflation 
act today, President Roosevelt not only made effective 
one of the greatest phases of his legislative program, 
but became empowered with the widest range of 
authority over the economic affairs of the nation ever 
granted to a President in peace time. 
In the one measure are included threefold powers 
authorizing unprecedented control over agricultural 
production and marketing, refinancing for billions of 
dollars of agricultural debts and a complete 
adjustment of the currency system of the United 
States. (New York Times 1933d) 
 
The lead clearly illustrates the magnitude of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act as legislation that grants the 
President unprecedented authority in regards to the 
economic system of the United States, especially at a time 
when the country is not at war. In the next paragraph, we 
see again the now dominant narrative that favors government 
intervention into economic affairs, a narrative that 
reflects the new financial paradigm in three parts: 1. 
Federal government control of the “production and 
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marketing” of agriculture, 2. Direct refinancing by the 
federal government of “billions of dollars of agricultural 
debts,” and 3. A “complete adjustment” of the U.S. currency 
system by the President. The story also makes it clear that 
while there was some “vocal opposition in Congress” to the 
currency amendment, roll call actually showed widespread 
support for that measure and the entire Act. After more 
than a decade of working its way into the dominant 
position, the new financial paradigm is smoothly accepted 
and adopted into law.  
 Not long after the passage of the omnibus bill, on 
June 16, 1933, the Farm Credit Act of 1933 was passed into 
law. Passed essentially as drafted by the Farm Credit 
Administration’s Governor Morgenthau, who had the power to 
do so thanks to the April executive order that created the 
Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Credit Act’s purpose 
was “To provide for organizations within the Farm Credit 
Administration to make loans for the production and 
marketing of agricultural products” (Farm Credit Act of 
1933, 1). To make such loans possible, Morgenthau was 
charged with chartering 12 banks (one in each city with a 
Federal Land Bank), each with a minimum starting capital of 
$7.5 million, with the express purpose of providing credit 
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for cooperatives of 10 or more farmers. There would also be 
a Central Bank to be used by cooperatives whose needs were 
too large to be handled by the regional Banks for 
Cooperatives. He was also charged with using the Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks to provide short- and 
intermediate-term lines of credit to Production Credit 
Corporations to help farmers with the types of loans used 
primarily for crops, feed, and infrastructure improvements. 
A June 1, 1933, story about the legislation in the New York 
Times carried little fanfare (1933e). Running on page 31, 
it is a short piece with few details but with a long quote 
from Representative Jones, chairman of the Agriculture 
Committee, who framed the legislation as a remedy to the 
“production and marketing problems of agriculture in so far 
as the matter of credit is involved.” He further frames the 
remedy as a compromise, defining “direct lending by the 
government to farmers” as an “unsatisfactory system” except 
in times of extreme emergency, while also saying outright 
that allowing the same lending “to be done entirely by 
private agencies has proven equally unsuccessful.” 
Therefore, the compromise:  
in the form of federal capital and supervision to the 
establishment of local institutions in which farmers 
are participants and owners, and through which 
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necessary credit may be provided on a safe business 
basis and also at a reasonable rate of interest. 
 
As such, the Farm Credit Act brings to the fore what was 
once an emergent narrative, one in which the farmers are 
insulated from the brutality of the free market through 
government intervention and controls in the much-needed 
area of credit. 
 It is important to remember that just a decade prior 
to the passage of the Farm Credit Act of 1933, the dominant 
narrative regarding farmers, bankers, and debt was one 
framed primarily by the bankers. It framed the farmer’s 
need for lines of credit as a problem best remedied in the 
domains of private finance, free of government interference 
and regulation. These early efforts at financialization in 
relation to agriculture held a place of dominance in the 
narratives of the press and politicians. In particular, the 
Coolidge administration encouraged independent bank finance 
of farm credit while Coolidge himself praised business and 
bankers while encouraging farmers to learn to be better 
business people. Even as the pro-free market framing 
dominated in the press and in the rhetoric of those in 
power, however, the emergent narrative of the Farmer Labor 
Party was gaining strength as it demanded a change in debt 
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conditions of the farmer. Foundational in this emergent 
narrative was a call for a society structured by sound 
government policies that value the lives and worth of all 
citizens, not just the wealthiest few at the top. It is in 
those emergent narratives of the 1920s that the roots of 
the dominant narrative of the early 1930s is visible. By 
the time Floyd Olson is elected governor of Minnesota on 
the Farmer Labor Party ticket in 1930, the country has 
experienced its most dramatic financial downturn yet, 
helping to fuel the growing acceptance of the idea that 
government involvement in financial affairs, particularly 
as related to the farm, is the best path to follow.  
 From this study of the rhetoric of bankers, Farmer 
Labor Party and other farmer activists, and those in power 
at the level of the state and federal government, two 
important points help to contextualize the radical changes 
brought about by the Roosevelt administration in 1933. 
First, a social movement that uses a three-pronged approach 
(education, organization, and legislation) and maintains a 
strong and clear rhetorical message for many years can 
effect significant changes. In light of today’s widening 
gap between rich and poor and increasing concerns about the 
domination of corporate rhetoric in society, taking note of 
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a social movement that successfully lead a charge to change 
debt relations at a federal legislative level in a time 
with similar concerns is worth noting. Second, while it 
surely does not take away from the magnitude and shear 
breadth of FDR’s sweeping regulatory changes that 
prioritized the wealth of the nation over the wealth of the 
few, noting the shift in dominant narratives over a 10-year 
period helps to contextualize the acceptance of Roosevelt’s 
ideas at the time. Yes, his policies were radically 
different from prior models of governance. But, that 
paradigm shift in financial relations between bankers, 
farmers, and the government had been shouted for, first in 
the alternative press, and later from main-stream 
newspapers and legislative offices. Roosevelt’s brilliance 
was not just in his policies and politicking, but his keen 
insight that the citizens of the U.S. were ready for 
radical change. Although, of course, for some on the 
extreme left his policies failed to go far enough, and on 
the extreme right his policies were interventionist in the 
worst sense of the word, he did skillfully manage to lessen 
the immediate burden on farmers. Some of that burden was 
shared with bankers, yes, but largely his new debt 
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structures helped the banker as well as the farmer, which 
in turn helped to stabilize the economy overall. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through exploration of the rhetoric of competing 
economic narratives from 1925 to 1933, this dissertation 
shows how a financial paradigm shift occurred in the United 
States, creating a long-lasting, structural change in the 
debt relations of farmers, bankers, and the federal 
government. In so doing, it begins to fill a gap in 
knowledge about the forces that led to a state-run 
agricultural finance structure becoming the preferred 
system instead of a privatized, free-market one. Insight 
into early rhetorical efforts to promote regulation-free 
financialization of the farm economy contributes to the 
growing scholarship of rhetoricians and historians who 
recognize the importance of understanding the role of 
capitalism in society, while examination of the more 
successful narratives of the Farmer Labor Party provides 
fresh perspective on a long-lasting movement that achieved 
changes in debt relations on a federal legislative level. 
And, finally, this dissertation helps to contextualize the 
New Deal’s agricultural interventions as concepts that had 
been in development for some time, enabling President 
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Roosevelt to activate familiar rhetorical justifications 
for leading the way down his “new and untrod path” 
(Roosevelt 1933c).  
 In Chapter 2, the dominant narrative in 1925 is first 
introduced, a narrative that promotes a free market, pro-
banking America as the righteous path to a better and 
stronger economy and country for all. The rhetorical 
framing of farming and its relation to debt and credit is 
examined in the main-stream press and in a prominent 
banker’s memoirs. Analysis shows that the dominant 
narrative about farming framed it as an industrial sector 
with tremendous earning potential, potential that wasn’t 
yet realized because farmers hadn’t learned to properly 
diversify, to sell their products effectively, or to pay 
their debts in a timely fashion, which leads to liquidity 
problems for rural banks.  
In this dominant narrative, among the issues framed as 
problems with farming are low prices, insufficient lines of 
credit, and delinquent debts. The causes of these problems 
are framed as poor crops and inadequate management (lack of 
marketing expertise, not enough diversification and 
modernization). The remedies to those issues are framed 
first and foremost as not requiring government 
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intervention, but rather better crops, higher prices, and 
improved business skills along with harder work by farmers. 
Increased lines of credit from banks and private 
agricultural finance firms are also framed as part of the 
remedy to the farm problem. Finally, this dominant 
narrative often uses moral framing that judges the “good 
farmer” as one who works hard to bring to fruition the 
profit potential inherent in the Northwest agricultural 
sector. And a good farmer always pays his debts.  
During the same time frame, rhetorical analysis of the 
alternative press and radical politicians shows the 
emergent narrative created by the Farmer Labor Party tells 
a very different story. The Farmer Labor Party, which was 
just beginning to move into positions of legislative and 
bureaucratic power in the state of Minnesota, created an 
emergent narrative that called for government intervention 
in farm finance as required for a stable and just future. 
The party framed the farm crisis as a problem of too much 
power and wealth with too few people, a problem caused by 
an oligarchy that put its own profit before the people. 
That problem could be remedied only through government 
policies that prioritized the welfare of the majority of 
the people over the profit motives of the few, especially 
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in the area of credit and debt. The Farmer Labor Party 
consistently used moral framing to show the banker and 
profiteer as bad in contrast to the good farmers and 
laborers who seek government structures to ensure basic 
human rights (housing, food, power, water, etc.). The 
party’s focus on education, organization, and political 
action all worked together to help elevate this once 
emergent narrative to a position of dominance in the next 
decade. 
In Chapter 3, the Farmer Labor Party’s once emergent 
narrative begins to move into a position of dominance, as 
is illustrated in the rhetorical analysis of the main-
stream and alternative press, Governor Floyd B. Olson and 
his appointees, and federal legislators from 1930 to 1933. 
The consistent efforts of the Farmer Labor Party to 
educate, organize, and change policy made familiar the 
defining of the farm crisis as a problem of farm debt 
caused by a reckless, self-promoting oligarchy, that can 
only be remedied through government intervention. Together 
with like-minded activist organizations, the Farmer Labor 
Party would move this narrative into a position of 
dominance not just through its radical press, but through 
protest and, significantly, through the election of the 
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first Farmer Labor Party Governor, Floyd B. Olson of 
Minnesota.  
Among the problem frames prevalent as the Great 
Depression took hold were the problems of unemployment, 
unfair taxes, farm foreclosures, and suffering of the 
workers and farmers. The causes of these problems were 
framed primarily as inadequate government spending, 
policies that favor the rich, commodity prices too low to 
cover the cost of production, and unfair/under-regulated 
credit and debt structures. Thanks to highly visible 
protests such as Penny Auctions that stopped farm 
foreclosures and Farm Holiday members’ withholding of 
goods, the morality frames surrounding the farm crisis were 
increasingly dominated in ways that labeled Wall Street 
profiteers as bad and government protection of basic human 
rights as good. The broadening base of the Farmer Labor 
Party that now included middle class business people and 
pastors helped to move the party’s narrative into a 
position of dominance, as did the worsening economic 
condition. Through solidarity and consistent rhetoric for 
more than a decade, the Farmer Labor Party succeeded in 
framing the problem as a failure of the existing financial 
regime and the solution as federal government policy that 
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restructures the relationship between farmer, debt, and the 
government in a new financial paradigm. 
In Chapter 4, the enactment of a new financial 
paradigm is examined through rhetorical analysis of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (which included the 
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933) and the Farm Credit 
Act of 1933 as well as the executive order that created the 
Farm Credit Administration, the main-stream press coverage 
of the legislative acts, and the statements of President 
Roosevelt. The Farm Credit Act of 1933 and the Emergency 
Farm Mortgage Act of 1933, which worked together with the 
price stabilization measures in the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, shifted agricultural finance away from a free-market 
model and firmly established the long-lasting structure 
that still largely defines farm credit today. In this newly 
created financial regime, federal oversight and involvement 
is required to provide financial stability to the 
agricultural sector and, therefore, to the country.  
Throughout this chapter, the rhetoric shows a framing 
of the farm crisis as a problem of foreclosures, lack of 
buying power of farmers, and inadequate oversight of farm 
finance. The remedy to these problems is always the same: 
government intervention and the installation of a permanent 
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structure to manage and monitor the credit and debt of the 
nation’s farmers. Also consistent in the narrative of the 
farm crisis in 1933 is a moral frame that points to the 
wrongness of farmers losing their homes and livelihood. 
That wrongness is magnified by the framing of the cause as 
an unjust credit and debt structure. Roosevelt is quite 
direct in asking for a respite for farmers through 
cessation of foreclosures; it is morally right in this 
dominant frame to do whatever is possible to save a 
family’s home. The importance of restoring hope to farmers 
instead of continuing to batter them is a common moral 
frame that clearly privileges the farmer over the banker. 
Yet in both the rhetoric surrounding the legislation and 
the actual legislation itself, it is clear that the remedy 
here is one of compromise on a practical level: farmers 
must repay their debts, but they can do so on more 
reasonable terms; bankers, once faced with reams of bad 
paper, can now exchange those mortgages for government 
bonds and a promise of interest payments. Where the 
legislation is not a compromise is in its permanent 
institution of government involvement in farm finance, 
thereby ushering in a new financial paradigm. 
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Together, the chapters of this dissertation begin to 
fill a gap in knowledge about an important time in the 
development of the financial structure that ties farmer, 
banker, and the state. The dominant narrative in the 1920s 
of the capitalist banker elite that foresaw a bright future 
in regulation-free, financialization of agriculture would 
not ultimately be realized. Instead, the emergent narrative 
of the 1920s of the Farmer Labor Party that demanded 
government intervention in farm finance would come to 
dominate by the early 1930s. Through the long-lasting and 
consistent educational, protest, and legislative efforts of 
the Farmer Labor Party, a narrative calling for government 
structure of agricultural finance provided President 
Roosevelt the rich rhetorical foundation needed to activate 
and initiate the now accepted idea that it is indeed the 
role of the state to structure the financial system used by 
a vital segment of the U.S. economy: agriculture. 
Regarding limitations and future direction for study, 
this project has intentionally used a wide range of 
rhetorical objects to trace a financial paradigm shift at 
an important time in the financial history of the country 
and of the state of Minnesota. While news stories, 
speeches, political cartoons, radio addresses, the 
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Congressional Record, memoirs and oral histories have 
indeed provided a broad pool from which to draw, more could 
be done in this area. Primarily, it is hoped that future 
studies can incorporate the voices of more women who were 
involved in the Farmer Labor Party, in politicking for 
various parties, and in managing or working on farms. It 
proved a challenge to uncover such voices in the archives 
for a number of reasons.  
First, although the photos of the Farmer Labor Party 
clearly show that women were involved in the organizing and 
educating of the party, aside from a few mentions of the 
women members in the Farmer-Labor Leader, they are 
virtually invisible in most stories in both the main-stream 
and the alternative press. This invisibility conflicts with 
the mythos surrounding the party that it includes all 
people--men, women, farmers, laborers, immigrants, and 
people of color. Yet, with the FLP press run by men and the 
main-stream press outright hostile to women (Akerson 1922), 
evidence that those claims are true get lost in time. 
Second, most of the memoirs written by women who lived on 
farms are poorly described when in English and not 
described at all when in German or Swedish, making their 
recovery a project all its own. Finally, as many farm 
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families abandoned their farms at the height of the farm 
foreclosure crisis, it is more likely that the women’s 
diaries of interest to this project are located at archives 
in Kansas, the Dakotas, and the West Coast where many went 
in search of work. It would do a great deal to expand the 
understanding of the education and organization efforts of 
the party as well as to learn if credit and debt was a 
common concern to the women on the farm to be able to read 
their own thoughts on the subject. 
Regarding foreclosures, that is a segment of the 
project worthy of considerable research and analysis. Part 
of the genesis of this project was actually research into 
the 2007 housing crisis; the goal in looking back to the 
New Deal era was to learn what was done in the past when 
the housing market collapsed. Not only is it important for 
scholars trying to make sense of the most recent crisis to 
have the historical context of past responses to 
foreclosure, but it is important for social movement 
scholars and practitioners as well. Surely, Occupy Homes 
Minnesota could benefit from a study of the Penny Auction 
protest. But more importantly, it is vital to understand 
how financialization has worked--or failed to work--in the 
past if we are to properly analyze its more recent 
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incursions and keep perspective about the power limitations 
of the banking industry. Additionally, so little has been 
researched about the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 
that Jonathan D. Rose, an economics staffer at the Federal 
Reserve Board in Washington, had to conduct primary source 
research in his efforts to write a white paper on the 
subject in 201323. With the continued cycle of predatory 
lending that targets the poor, the more we can learn about 
the history of mortgages, and government and banking 
responses to their failure, the better.  
Finally, research into the farm crisis of the 1980s is 
called for here. A period of deregulation of farm finance 
played a significant role in the devastation of farmers in 
the U.S. at the time. The response was, eventually, 
stricter regulation that looked similar to that instituted 
by FDR in 1933. Of course, by the 1980s what it means to be 
a farmer had radically altered. With the large 
agribusinesses competing with the family farm, how was a 
solution reached that could help agriculture generally? Or 
was it not? While clearly there will be many differences in 
                                                 
23 “Farm mortgage debt relief is a relatively unexplored area of the New 
Deal.” That’s how Rose opens his white paper. He footnotes that 
sentence with the following: “As far as I can tell, there is little 
secondary literature on federal mortgage debt relief programs of this 
era.” He is quite correct. That should be remedied. 
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the problems of the 1980s and the 1920s, looking for the 
parallels and the differences, both in the official 
documents and the rhetoric of protest, would be a worthy 
venture that would add more to social movement scholarship 
and rhetorical studies of public address and economic 
issues. 
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